could imagine there were the least truth in what Lord Peterborough has taken so much pains to profess to you, my own opinion would be, not to make him desperate, till he had first given clear demonstration. It was impossible for him not to be troublesome; but in this, as in all other things, I can submit to better judgments, and I incline to think that the opinion of lords Halifax, Somers, and Sunderland, would, in this particular, be the same that Mr. Secretary Harley seems to have.

"I have written to my Lord Manchester by this post, in my Lord Sunderland's absence, that he would lose no time in proposing to the Venetians to come into the great alliance, upon promising subsidies for ten or twelve thousand men, to join the duke of Savoy, and giving them assurances of taking care of their interests at the general peace; and that no peace shall be made without their participation."

The letter from Secretary Harley to Lord Godolphin, to which allusion is here made, is too singular to be omitted, particularly when we consider the situation of the secretary, and his subsequent approbation of Peterborough's conduct.

"Wednesday, Aug. 13. Your lordship will see what Mr. Robinson writes to me apart, in answer to my queries about Lord Peterborough. I confess it is none of my business, and therefore I beg your lordship's pardon, if my zeal run before my discretion, when I offer to your lordship's consideration what should be done with Lord Peterborough as soon as he arrives. Should he not give an account in writing of his proceedings, and that being represented to the committee, if not to the council, and if it appears he has acted contrary to his instructions, ought he not to be committed? It is true he will be admitted to bail, but he may be tried by a common jury for a misdemeanor. I need not specify the reasons for it, they seem to be obvious. It is better to find him work to clear himself, than leave him leisure to do mischief. I must again beg pardon for offering my thoughts, to which I have no motive but the honour of the queen, and the service of her ministers."

In the next letter we find Godolphin reverting to the feuds in the cabinet, and the embarrassments arising from the influence of Mrs. Masham and Harley.

"Windsor, Aug. 16-27.—Mr. Hare came hither yesterday, and finding he resolved to return to you by the very next packet boat, I have a mind to mention some particular things to you, by a safe hand, which I should not care to venture by the post.

"I reckon one great occasion of Mrs. Morley's obstinacy, and of the uneasiness she gives herself and others, especially about the clergy, proceeds from an inclination of talking more freely than usual to Mrs. Marsham; and this is laid hold of and improved by Mr. Secretary Harley, upon all such matters, if not upon others, to insinuate his notions, which, in these affairs, you know by your own experience, from the conversation we had together before you left England, are as wrong as possible.

I am apt also to think he makes use of the same person to improve all the ill offices to the Whigs, which both he and that person are as naturally inclined to, as the queen is to receive the impressions of them.”

"Now this must needs do a great deal of mischief, and I am afraid we shall find the effects of it in the winter, if a timely remedy be not put to it, which I think cannot be done, but by you and me, speaking very plainly at the same time to Mrs. Morley, both of Mr. Harley and a great many things, and settling a rule for preventing, before it is too late, all the uneasiness for the future. But how this will be done in time I cannot see, unless your affairs on that side will allow of your being here some time before the meeting of the parliament; and to satisfy you of how great importance it is that you should be here before that time, is the chief reason of my giving you this trouble."

"Windsor, Aug. 22.-Sept. 2.- - I have the favour of yours of the 22d and 25th, and am very sorry you have had so much bad weather: we have had our share of that, and therefore I hope you have yours of the fine weather we have here at this time.

I have not yet heard of Lord Peterborough, though our letters from the Hague tell us he was to come over in the last packet boat; but whatever he shall say it cannot be relied on. He will be governed by his animosities or his interest. I cannot answer which of them will prevail."

CHAP. LXI. - FAILURES OF THE ALLIES. - 1707.

THE rains having at length ceased, Marlborough quitted Soignies on the 1st of September, and, directing his march upon Ath, passed the Dender, with the view of turning the hostile position at Chievres. But the enemy, instead of awaiting his approach, fell back to the Scheldt, in order to avail themselves of the protection afforded by their great fortresses. The fatigues of this arduous march did not prevent the duke from transmitting the detail of his movements, nor from giving his opinion on the suggestions contained in the letter from Godolphin, dated August 15-26.

"Ath, Sept. 1.- You will know by the letters of this day, upon our marching hither, the enemy decamped in great haste, and I believe our march to-morrow will oblige them to pass the Scheldt. The deputies are convinced that if we had made the march to Genappe two months ago, when I pressed for it, the duke of Vendome would have been obliged to retire as he now does.

"I know nothing of the duke of Savoy's quitting the siege of Toulon

but what I am told by the duke of Vendome's trumpet, who says it was on the 22d. I believe this will naturally put a stop to the descent you intended; and if you have good reason for a descent, as yours of the 15th seems to think, it is most certain that early in the year, when they have the whole summer before them, is a much properer time.

"What Mr. Secretary Harley says in his letter concerning Lord Peterborough may be right; but I think as you do, that you must take no step in that matter but in conjunction with Lord Somers, Lord Halifax, and Lord Sunderland, and, if possible, with Lord Wharton also, or he will play you tricks. By what I have heard Lord Peterborough say, I believe he thinks he can justify himself in every particular; but I should think it is impossible to justify the application of the money; for whenever you have those accounts I believe you will find the greatest confusion imaginable, so that I think Mr. Bridges should make himself master of that account as soon as possible.

Upon this ill news from Provence, I am already pressed by M. de Quiros that immediate orders might be given for sending troops to King Charles. Till I know what the duke of Savoy's and Prince Eugene's projects may be, by Mr. Palmes, who, I believe, might leave them as soon as they marched from Toulon, I shall not be able to give any anIn the mean time I should be glad to know what your thoughts in England are as to that point. The enclosed from Count Wratislaw * I received this morning; you will see it gives more reason for hopes than Mr. Robinson's letters."

swer.

Resuming his march on the 5th, Marlborough crossed the Scheldt above Oudenard, and encamped at Petteghem, from which place he thus announces his movements.

"Sept. 5.- Since my last we have made three marches in order to pass the Scheldt, which we have done this morning. We shall stay in this camp to-morrow, and the next day march to Helchin, by which we shall oblige the enemy to eat up their own country, which I am afraid is all the hurt we are likely to do them; for I am very confident they will be careful not to give occasion for action."

Advancing on the 7th along the tongue of land bounded by the Scheldt and the Lys, Marlborough established his left at Helchin, where he took up his head-quarters, and extended his right to Belleghem. This bold and decisive movement alarmed the enemy, and, as he had foreseen, they immediately crossed the Scheldt and withdrew to the strong post of Pont à Tressin, which was covered by a series of new lines, formed behind the Marque, and protected by the cannon of Lille.

Alluding to the successful progress of the negotiation with the king of Sweden.

During his continuance in the stationary camp at Helchin, Marlborough received the first intelligence of the unfortunate failure before Toulon, and the retreat of the combined forces into Piedmont.

To the success of this momentous enterprise, which had held all Europe in anxious suspense, the British ministry had confidently looked, as a compensation for the misfortune in Spain, and as the means of extorting from France a peace no less honourable than secure. Their exertions were commensurate with the magnitude of the object. The cares of Marlborough were long called forth in providing ample means of aggression; and no resource was omitted to stimulate the zeal of the two powers employed in the execution. But it was beyond human foresight to calculate on the effects of jarring interests and passions, or to devise expedients for combining contradictory elements in one uniform and consistent plan. By importunities, threats, and largesses, the concurrence of the courts of Vienna and Turin had indeed been extorted; but no efforts could soothe their jealousies or obviate their contentions. The first and most prominent obstacle arose from the suspicion fostered by the imperial court against that of England, and the fears they entertained, lest the destruction of the French marine in the Mediterranean would be the prelude to a separate peace between France and the maritime powers. Similar jealousies existed between the courts of Turin and Vienna, and the interest which the duke of Savoy appeared to manifest in the enterprise was a sufficient reason for the aversion with which it was regarded by the emperor. The rivalry which reigned in the cabinet extended its influence to the field, and created the same disunion between the duke of Savoy and Eugene, in their capacity of generals, as between the duke and the emperor, in their capacity of sovereigns. As early as June we find the duke of Savoy expressing his indignation at the obstacles and mortifications which he endured, and declaring, that were it not from respect for the queen England, he would instantly quit the alliance. On the other hand, the imperial court were not sparing of their censures and insinuations. They expatiated on his selfish and encroaching policy, and ascribed his opposition to the enterprise against Naples to a secret wish of preserving that

of

crown for his son-in-law, the duke of Anjou. Eugene also not only re-echoed the accusations of his court, and incessantly dwelt on the danger and difficulties of the design in which he was unwillingly engaged; but treated the complaints of the duke of Savoy with regard to his want of authority, as proofs of an intention to avert from himself the blame of a failure, which he considered as inevitable.

The effects of these disputes were felt at every step of this ill-fated enterprise. In addition to the diminution of force, occasioned by the detachment for the invasion of Naples, no recruits appeard to fill up the vacancies in the Austrian ranks, and day after day was spent in combating objections and obviating delays. An enterprise commenced under such auspices afforded but a faint prospect of success.

The 25,000 auxiliaries in the pay of the maritime powers were united with the troops of Savoy and Austria, and a fleet of forty sail, under the command of Admiral Shovel, hovered on the coast to maintain the communications by sea, and to co-operate in the intended attack. It was not till towards the latter end of June that the army was in a condition to move, and after the necessary garrisons were drafted for the protection of Italy, the whole collective force did not exceed 35,000 men. They scaled the Col di Tende, forced the passage of the Var, and traversing the rugged country bordering the Mediterranean, reached the camp of La Vallette, in the vicinity of Toulon, on the 26th of July, the fleet at the same time appearing before the mouth of the harbour.

The garrison of Toulon scarcely exceeded 8000 men, the works were in ill condition, and the new defences, which had been projected to resist the peril of the moment, were yet incomplete. The troops, elated at the sight of the goal which appeared to bound their enterprise, anxiously expected the orders for an immediate assault, and such an effort would doubtless have been crowned with success. The expectation of all was raised to the highest pitch, when the two commanders ascended the heights, to survey the town and works, and the presence of the admiral indicated the ready cooperation of the fleet. But a sudden damp seized the spirits of the soldiery when orders were given, which announced the abandonment of an assault, and the preparations for