CHAP. LXXX. SIEGE OF TOURNAY.-1709.

ALTHOUGH Marlborough was disappointed in his hopes of peace, he yet did not rely so implicitly on the sincerity and apparent distress of France, as to delay the necessary preparations for an early and vigorous campaign. We have seen at the close of the preceding year his efforts to anticipate the enemy, and his anxiety to collect a superior force. The French, however, were equally active on their side, and drawing troops from all quarters, were in a condition to take the field before the allies. Indeed, the very circumstances on which the negotiators had founded their hopes of peace, con. tributed to rescue the French monarchy from disgrace; for famine and misery drove crowds of recruits to the camp, and verified the unfeeling remark of Louis, that hunger would compel his subjects to follow his bread waggons. An army was thus assembled, scarcely inferior in numbers or appointments to that of the allies. In the place of Vendome, the chief command was conferred on Villars, who had gained high reputation for checking the designs of Marlborough on the Moselle, and who was considered as the most fortunate and enterprising of the French generals, and honoured by the French monarch with the name of invincible.

Notwithstanding the excessive scarcity of provisions and forage, the most active exertions were made in all the frontier provinces to collect necessaries for the army; and early in June the French troops were in motion for the plains of Lens, where they purposed to take a defensive position, to cover the places on the Scarpe and Lys, which they considered as principally menaced.

The rainy weather, as well as the extreme backwardness of the season, prevented the confederate generals from assembling their troops so early as they intended; but, without waiting for the definitive answer of France, they collected the army in the beginning of June. They issued orders to form a camp between Menin and Oudenard, and despatched a corps of twelve battalions and as many squadrons, under the command of Lieut.-general Dompré, to take post at Alost, and to cover Brussels. Having visited the

different divisions of the army, they repaired to Lille on the 18th; and on the 21st their whole force, amounting to 110,000 men, assembled between Courtray and Menin. On the following day, taking the route towards Lille, they encainped between Lincelles and Roubaix. On the 23d, the two generals, assuming the command, divided their troops into two great bodies. The right, consisting of imperialists and Germans, under Eugene, crossed the Lower Dyle, below Lille; while the left, comprising the British, Dutch, and the auxiliaries, traversed the Marque, at Pont à Marque; and they established their respective camps on both sides of the Upper Dyle. Marlborough fixed his head-quarters at the abbey of Looz, and Eugene at the castle of Lompret. Orders were sent for the advance of the field artillery from Menin, and General Dompré, commander of the flying camp at Alost, was directed to join the army with the utmost speed.

It was the first object of the two commanders to force the enemy to a battle, or, if that could not be effected, to undertake a siege; and for the purpose of forming their decision, they sent out different detachments to reconnoitre the position of the enemy.

Meanwhile Villars, having learnt the advance of the allies, took up a position between Douay and the Lys, behind a regular line, strong both by nature and art, extending from Aunay, near Pont à Vendin, to the west of Bethune. The right flank abutted on the high-crested canal of Douay, and was protected by numerous rivulets and impassable marshes; the centre was covered by La Bassée, and the left supported on Bethune and the adjacent streams and marshes. Along the whole line were fortified villages, redoubts, and partial inundations. His great object seems to have been to protect the frontier provinces, and prevent the siege of Ypres. As he expected that the enemy would attack him in this position, he made the most active preparations for resistance; and the movements of the allies afforded sufficient grounds for his opinion. For the formation of the confederate army between Menin and Courtray, as well as the passage of their battering train up the Lys, appearing to threaten Ypres, Villars retained his position, and increased the garrison by 16 battalions. The march of the allied forces to the Upper Dyle did not relieve his alarms. On the 23d Eugene crossed at

Haubourdin, and united with Marlborough between Seclin and Wattignies; and on the 24th, as they reviewed their troops, and made demonstrations as if they were moving with their whole force against the enemy, Villars reinforced his army from the neighbouring garrisons, particularly from Tournay and the places on that side which appeared to be less threatened.

The extent of his precautions evinced a persuasion that his antagonists were determined to risk an engagement. Such, at least, was the impression which the movements of the confederate generals tended to convey; for on the 26th a council of war was held, and reports were industriously spread, that the resolution had been taken to attack the enemy. To give strength to these rumours, the heavy baggage was sent back to Lille. But, in reality, the views of the allied commanders were now directed to another object; because, after reconnoitring the French lines, it was the unanimous opinion of all the generals that it was too hazardous to attack the enemy in their camp, intrenched as it then was. * They therefore turned their attention to the siege of Tournay, though, to deceive Villars, they still continued to make demonstrations on the lines of La Bassée.

The feint thus practised on the French commander produced its full effect, and the same deception was continued to cover the final and decisive movement. The battering artillery was remanded to Menin, bodies of troops from the army of Eugene directed their march towards the right of the hostile lines, and some even approached to the vicinity of La Bassée; while Marlborough appeared to move in the direction of Tournay.

In the midst of the perplexity occasioned by these different alarms, Villars continued to strengthen his position and prepare for the approaching conflict; but, on the 29th of June, he learnt that the allied forces had re-united and marched towards Tournay, and that their battering train was reascending the Lys to approach that place. Their march was indeed made with the same skill and secrecy, which characterised their operations on so many occasions. They decamped from Seclin at seven in the evening without beat of drum, and advanced part of the night in a direction towards the * Letter from the Duke to Lord Godolphin, June 27.

French camp; but when the troops of Marlborough expected the signal to engage, they were ordered to file towards the left, and to move in the direction of Tournay. They marched in two columns, one by Pont à Bovines, and the other by Pont à Tressin. At seven in the morning, the advanced corps reached the vicinity of Tournay, while the prince of Orange, with 10 battalions and 30 squadrons, drew towards St. Amand and Mortagne, from whence he dislodged the French posts, and covered the movement in that direction. The governor of Tournay was so ill prepared for their approach, that a part of the garrison, sent out to collect the cattle of the vicinity, were intercepted. General Lumley, with 24 battalions and 45 squadrons, began the investment at noon. At night Eugene led his army to the same point, and the whole force united in the vicinity of Tournay. Marlborough, who was to superintend the siege, took up his head-quarters at Villemeau; and Eugene, with the covering army, posted himself in a line extending from Pont à Tressin, on the Marque, toward St. Amand, on the Scarpe, for the purpose of observing the movements of Villars.*

Villars was so completely deceived by these masterly movements, that he observes, "their artillery, which ascended the Lys, again descended it on the side of Tournay; and it was evident that their object was, after defeating me, to thunder against Aire and St. Venant with their heavy artillery, to penetrate as far as Boulogne, and after laying all Picardy under contribution, to push their detachments even to Paris. In this they would have succeeded, if listening to the timid counsels of certain general officers, je m'etais (to use his own expression) blotti derrière la Scarpe. It was a

* Before retiring to rest, after so fatiguing a march, Marlborough thus briefly explains the motives of these successful operations, in a note to the duchess:

"June 27. — If it had been reasonable, this letter would have brought you the news of a battle; but Prince Eugene, myself, and all the generals, did not think it advisable to run so great a hazard, considering their camp, as well as their having strengthened it so, by their intrenchments; so that we have resolved on the siege of Tournay, and accordingly marched last night, and have invested it, when they expected our going to another place, so that they have not half the troops in the town they should have to defend themselves well, which makes us hope it will not cost us dear. I am so sleepy that I can say no more, but am entirely yours."

great relief to me that the enemy fixed on the siege of Tournay, which ought to occupy them the whole of the campaign."

Tournay, which was thus rendered the object of general solicitude, is most advantageously situated on the frontier of France. Its circuit is large; the interior walls were of ancient construction, but a series of advanced works had been added by Vauban; and the citadel, which was a regular pentagon with exterior works, was considered by the great Condé as the most perfect of its kind. The town was commanded by no height, and a considerable part of the circumference could be additionally defended by partial inundations of the Scheldt. The citadel also, with several parts of the works, derived a considerable strength from a regular system of mines and connecting galleries. The fortifications were in the best state, and the magazines filled with ammunition and military stores. Its strength was duly estimated, and a pompous inscription, placed in one of the half moons, shows the opinion entertained of this bulwark by the French court. It states, that Louis XIV., in 1667, took this ancient seat of the Nervii in four days; and, to render it impregnable, had added to it all military defences, and had assisted in the construction of this work, which the victorious hands of his troops had raised from its foundations in eight days.

The attack of such a place, if properly provided and garrisoned, must have been an act of extreme rashness, which could only terminate in disgrace. We cannot, therefore, sufficiently admire the skilful manoeuvres of the two great commanders in deceiving Villars, himself a master in military stratagem, and in laying siege to the place, at the moment when the garrison was not half equal to its defence, when many of the officers were absent, and even this scanty proportion of troops was ill supplied with provisions.

From the 3d to the 6th of July, the whole town, including the citadel, was regularly invested on both sides of the river, from Cercq, on the Upper Scheldt, to the castle of Constantine, on the Lower. Three grand attacks were traced: the first by Count Lottum, general of the Prussians, against the citadel, opposite the gate of Valenciennes, near the left bank of the Upper Scheldt; the second by Count Schulemburg * Mem. de Villars, tom. ii. p. 63.