tradesman is unequal, we may more readily judge of the rest. Besides, the maxims which he would insinuate are not difficult to divine, from the first principles here laid down, which he attempted to establish.

"After speaking of the preparations for the approaching campaign, he affected to dread the superior forces of the two crowns in the Netherlands, and represented them as the more formidable, because they are under the command of two brave chiefs, the elector of Bavaria and Vendome, who are perfectly in unison.

"That Louis XIV. had concluded the treaty for the neutrality of Italy only to deceive the allies, and that the general propositions and the offer of holding a congress, made through the elector of Bavaria, were merely illusory.

"That the king of France affects to be too much humbled, in order to separate the allies, by raising mutual jealousies of their respective interests, and draw to his support the sovereigns of the north. With this view he had offered the mediation to the king of Sweden, although he had previously made the same offer to the Pope, and lastly to the Catholic cantons of Switzerland, and the Venetians. Finding it rejected, he has now recourse to the king of Sweden, hoping that he will either force the allies to accept his mediation, or in case of their refusal, will take revenge for the rejection by force of arms.

"That the king of France has doubtless endeavoured to cover his secret views, and to touch his serene majesty with compassion for the house of Bavaria, to which the king of Sweden is allied. That he has also excited the princes of the empire to profit by this occasion, and in conjunction with the Swedish monarch, to vindicate the infraction of their privileges, against the exorbitant authority exercised by the emperor, as well as to animate the zeal of the king for the Protestant religion, persecuted by the emperor, and to irritate his majesty still more against the elector palatine.

"That the allies well knew that this last commission employed the attention of the colonel, who is now at Leipsic, on the part of the elector of Bavaria, and that the other instructions have been executed during the winter by the secretary of Bonnac, and by another person whom France maintains among the Poles.*

"That the allies are conscious the king of Sweden will not give any credit to these false representations, and are convinced that he is too wise to be prejudiced unfavourably, and against his own interests; since France ardently endeavours to create a civil war in the empire, and to gain by the ruin of the Germanic body.

"That it is not the object of England and Holland to lower France too much; because if from any motive, commercial or otherwise, the two maritime powers should be at variance, it is their common interest that France should be as powerful as the house of Austria would be, if pos sessed of the Spanish monarchy, as it was before the death of Charles II.

*One of these doubtless alludes to the Sieur de Ricoux, whom we have mentioned in the preceding chapter.

For should Spain support one of the contending parties, France might support the other, and thus maintain the equilibrium of Europe.

"That this balance is the sole object of the allies, and particularly of England; and for this reason it was necessary to take from France the power of making offensive war, daily, and alone, against all Europe, insulting her neighbours, invading their territories, and rendering the will of her king an universal law.

"That the queen is ready to acknowledge King Stanislaus, and to guarantee the peace of Alt Ranstadt, and will use all her efforts to remove the objections of the Dutch, against concurring jointly with her majesty in regard to those two points.

"That her Britannic majesty well knows the king of Sweden has no reason to be satisfied with the Dutch; perhaps she is not so herself, and does not know what may in future happen; that she relies most on the king's friendship, and desires him to be well convinced of her friendship on all occasions.

"That the conduct of the emperor in Italy opens the eyes of all the world; while the absolute principles with which the court of Vienna affects to govern the whole empire, are neither consonant to the interest nor to the inclination of England and Holland; but it is not yet time to announce this sentiment. That it is allowed the emperor has given many causes of resentment to the king of Sweden, and that the latter has a right to protect the college of princes, and the Protestant religion, unjustly persecuted in Silesia and in the palatinate, as well as to obtain satisfaction for the elector palatine.

"That the queen entreats the king of Sweden to take no public cogni. zance of these affairs, until the general peace, and in that case promises to act in concurrence with him for the affairs of the empire, to confine the emperor within just bounds, and to exact full satisfaction, in regard to religion, to the Germanic empire, and to his Swedish majesty in particular.

"That if the king of Sweden will permit the allies to make this campaign without interference, by withdrawing his army from Germany, and undertake nothing which may directly or indirectly divert them, the next winter they may listen to propositions of peace; because France may become more weary of war, when she sees the allies resolved to continue it. While the king of Sweden, who is justice itself, is well inclined to support the equilibrium of Europe and the common security; France will not fail to make more equitable propositions for the re-establishment of general tranquillity. That if the king of Sweden maintains a corps in the empire or on the frontiers, it will create alarm in some, and jealousy in others.

"This is the political rhapsody of an idle tradesman, who loves to exercise his ingenuity in divining what were the arguments which, perhaps, the Duke of Marlborough employed at the court of Sweden, to persuade the king not to accept the mediation offered by France."*

• Appendix, note F.

CHAP. LVI. - BATTLE OF ALMANZA.-1707.

THE satisfaction which Marlborough experienced from the happy result of his journey to Saxony, was considerably abated by intelligence which announced the fatal defeat of the allied forces at Almanza, and by the perverse and selfish conduct of the court of Vienna.

The extraordinary success of the allied arms in Italy inspired the court of Vienna with new hopes and new plans, which contributed to increase their misunderstanding with the duke of Savoy, as well as to excite the displeasure of the English cabinet. Hitherto embarrassed by the rebellion in Hungary, and alarmed at the preponderance of the French in Italy, the emperor had strained every nerve to maintain the war, and zealously co-operated in a system which deeply involved his own safety, as well as that of the allies. But no sooner was Italy liberated and the frontier on the side of the Tyrol secured from attack, than he began to render the interest of the Grand Alliance subservient to his own. He first cavilled with the duke of Savoy, and resorted to every artifice to avoid the cession of the provinces which had been promised as the price of his defection from the Bourbon alliance. He also affected to regard the Milanese as no part of the Spanish dominions, and endeavoured to substantiate an eventual claim to the duchy, by conferring it on his brother as a fief of the empire. But, above all, his jealousy was roused by the overtures which Louis had recently made to the maritime powers to resign Spain and the Indies, together with the Netherlands, in return for the cession of Naples and Sicily to the duke of Anjou. Knowing that this plan was strongly favoured by the Dutch government, and dreading that it might be carried into effect, he took the resolution to frustrate it by an immediate invasion of Naples, where his numerous partisans called for assistance.

On the other hand, the duke of Savoy transferred his apprehensions and jealousy of the French to his late deliverers, and laboured secretly and earnestly for the re-establishment of that system which had enabled him to hold the balance of power between the houses of Austria and Bourbon.

Aware,

also, that Austria was no less desirous to rule in Italy than the French, he clamoured for the fulfilment of the promises made under the guarantee of England, and rejected with scorn the evasive expedients of the imperial court. From the same principle he was anxious to prevent the occupation of Naples and Sicily, unless his acquiescence was purchased by an equivalent in Lombardy. He was, at length, gratified by an accommodation effected through the agency of Marlborough, by which he obtained the promise of the emperor to fulfil the treaty of 1703.* Joseph also renounced his claims to the Milanese as an imperial fief, and agreed to consider it as part of the Spanish dominions.

The great object of the maritime powers was to employ the combined forces in Italy in an invasion of Provence, with the view of ruining the naval power of France in the Mediterranean, by the capture of Toulon, which was in an ill state of defence. Marlborough was now engaged in arranging the plan of operations and accumulating the means of attack. With this view he obtained the consent of the German princes for the continuance of their troops in Italy, and persuaded the Dutch not only to furnish pecuniary assistance, but to join their fleet in furtherance of the design. He found, however, great and unexpected obstacles. Both the emperor and the duke of Savoy were less solicitous for the destruction of the French navy, which they considered as the peculiar object of the maritime powers, than for an attack against Dauphiné and the Lyonnois, which would more effectually contribute to the safety of Italy. Their consent was, however, at length extorted, and preparations were made for the execution of this momentous enterprise as soon as the return of the season opened the passages of the Alps.

But neither party entered cordially into the design, and the emperor, in particular, resolved to render it secondary to his own views on Naples. With this intention he secretly concluded with France, on the 13th of March, a treaty of neutrality for Italy; and for the sake of accomplishing the speedy reduction of the Milanese and Mantuan, permitted the French garrisons to withdraw unmolested. This accommodation was not disclosed until it was too late to prevent its completion; and the consent of the duke of Savoy being ex*See Chapter XVII.

torted, the maritime powers had no other alternative than to acquiesce in an arrangement of which they foresaw the fatal consequences.

The primary object of the emperor became now apparent by the orders issued for a detachment of the Austrian army to take the route towards Naples. The consequences were also equally felt in every part of the theatre of action. Relieved from the constant drain occasioned by the war in Italy, the king of France not only reduced his army on the side of the Alps, but sent the troops which he could thus spare, as well as those which he drew from the blockaded fortresses in Lombardy, to swell the army on the Upper Rhine, to give new energy to the contest in Spain, and to complete the unexpected successes which had marked the close of the last campaign. His designs were favoured by the imprudence of the allied generals and the disputes in the court of Barcelona, which had already marred their operations. In conformity with the resolution adopted in the preceding year, Lord Galway and Das Minas were anxious to profit by their supposed superiority of force. The news which arrived of the neutrality concluded for Italy, and the march of reinforcements from France, induced them to commence their operations before the Gallo-Spaniards could receive the expected succours. Unable to obtain intelligence in a country where every peasant was a spy or an enemy, they collected their troops, and made a hasty attempt to break up the quarters of Berwick at the very moment when he was joined by part of his reinforcements.

After a fruitless attempt to reduce Villena, they descended into the plains of Almanza, under the walls of which town they found the army of Berwick encamped. They hurried to the attack on ground highly favourable for the manœuvres of cavalry, in which the enemy were greatly superior. This desperate, but ill-judged, effort was repelled; and the Portuguese cavalry, being seized with a panic, abandoned the field in the utmost confusion. The foot, left without support, were broken on all sides, and the rout became complete. Thirteen battalions of infantry, after cutting their way through the hostile lines, took post in a wood, but were surrounded and reduced to surrender. Great part of the baggage and artillery, with a hundred and twenty standards,