ruined their State: And the frequent Murders of their Generals, which Diodorus telleth us, Lib. 20. was grown to an established Custom among them, may be another Instance that Tyranny is not confined to Numbers. I SHALL mention but one Example more among a great Number that might be produced; it is related by the Author laft cited. The Orators Lib. 15. of the People at Argos, (whether you will style them in modern Phrafe, Great Speakers in the House, or only in general, Reprefentatives of the People Collective) ftirred up the ComMONS against the NOBLES; of whom 1600 were murdered at once; and, at last, the Orators themfelves, because they left off their Accufation; or to speak intelligibly, because they withdrew their Impeachments; having, it feemeth, raised a Spirit they were not able to lay. And this laft Circumstance, as Cafes have lately flood, may perhaps be worth noting FROM what hath been already advanced, feveral Conclufions may be drawn.

FIRST, That a mixt Government, partaking of the known Forms received in the Schools, is by no Means of Gothic Invention, but hath Place in Nature and Reafon; feemeth very well to agree with the Sentiments of moft Legiflators, and to have been followed in moft States, whether they have appeared under the Name of Monarchies, Ariftocracies, or Democracies. For, not to mention the feveral Republicks of this Compofition in Gaul and Germany, defcribed by Cafar and Tacitus; Polybius telleth us, the best Government is that which consisteth of three Forms, Frag. lib. 6. Regno, Optimatium, et Populi Imperio: Which may be fairly tranflated, the Kings, Lords, and Commons. Such was that of Sparta, in its primitive Inftitution by Lycurgus; who obferving the Corruptions, and Depravations to which every of these were fubject, compounded his Scheme out of all; so that it was made up of Reges, Seniores, et Populus. Such alfo was the State of Rome, under its Confuls:

.

And

And the Author telleth us, that the Romans fell upon this Model purely by Chance, (which I take to have been Nature and common Reason) but the Spartans by Thought, and Defign. And fuch at Carthage was the Summa Reipublicæ, or Power in the last Refort; for they had their Kings called Suffetes, and a Senate which had the

Idem ib.

Power of Nobles, and the People had a Share establish

ed too..

SECONDLY, It will follow, That thofe Reafoners, who employ fo much of their Zeal, their Wit, and their Leifure for the upholding the Balance of Power in Chrifiendom, at the fame time that by their Practices they are endeavouring to destroy it at home, are not fuch mighty Patriots, or fo much in the true Intereft of their Country, as they would affect to be thought; but. feem to be employed like a Man, who pulleth down with his Right Hand what he hath been buildingwith his Left.

THIRDLY, This maketh appear the Error of thofe, who think it an uncontroulable Maxim, that Power is always fafer lodged in many Hands than in one.. For, if these many Hands be made up, only from one of the three Divifions before mentioned; it is plain from thofe Examples already produced, and eafy to be paralleled in other Ages and Countries, that they are as capable of enflaving the Nation, and of acting all Manner of Tyranny and Oppreffion, as it is poffible for a fingle Person to be; although we should fuppofe their Number not only to be of four or five hundred, but above three thousand.

AGAIN, It is manifeft from what hath been faid, that in order to preferve the Balance in a mixed State, the Limits of Power depofited with each Party ought to be ascertained, and generally known. The Defects of this is the Caufe that introduces thofe Strugglings in a State about Prerogative and Liberty, about Encroachments of the Few upon the Rights of the Many, and of the Many upon the Privileges of the Few; which ever did, and ever will conclude in a Tyranny;

Tyranny; firft, either of the Few, or the Many, but . at latt infallibly of a fingle Perfon. For, which ever of the three Divifions in a State is upon the Scramble for more Power than its own, (as one or other of them generally is) unlefs due Care be taken by the other Two; upon every new Question that arifes, they will be fure to decide in Favour of themselves, talk much of inherent Right; they will nourish up a dormant Power, and referve Privileges in petto, to exert upon Occafions, to ferve Expedients, and to urge upon Neceffities. They will make large Demands, and fcanty Conceffions, ever coming off confiderable Gainers: Thus at length the Balance is broke and Tyranny let in; from which Door of the Three it matters not.

To pretend to a declarative Right upon any Occa-fion whatever, is little lefs than to make ufe of the whole Power; that is, to declare an Opinion to be Law, which hath always been contefted, or perhaps never started before fuch an Incident brought it on the Stage. Not to confent to the enacting of fuch a Law, which hath no View befides the general Good, unless another Law fhall at the fame time pass with no other View, but that of advancing the Power of one Party alone; what is this, but to claim a pofitive Voice as well as a negative? To pretend that great Changes and Alienations of Property have created new and great Dependencies, and confequently new Additions of Power, as fome Reafoners have done, is a moft dangerous Tenet: If Dominion must follow Property, let it follow in the fame Pace: For Changes in Property through the Bulk of a Nation make flow Marches, and its due Power always attends it. To con

clude, that whatever Attempt is begun by an Affembly, ought to be purfued to the End, without regard to the greatest Incidents that may happen to alter the Cafe; to count it mean, and below the Dignity of a Houfe, to quit a Profecution; to refolve upon a Conclufion, before it is poffible to be apprifed of the Premiffes. To act thus, I fay, is to affect not only abfolute Power, but Infallibility too. Yet fuch unac

countable

countable Proceedings as thefe have popular Affemblies engaged in, for want of fixing the due Limits of Power and Privilege.

GREAT Changes may, indeed, be made in a Government, yet the Form continue, and the Balance be held; but large Intervals of Time must pass between every fuch Innovation, enough to melt down, and make it of a piece with the Conftitution. Such we are told were the Proceedings of Solon, when he modelled anew the Athenian Commonwealth. And what Convulfions in our own, as well as other States, have been bred by a Neglect of this Rule, is fresh and notorious enough: It is too foon, in all Confcience, to repeat this Error again.

HAVING fhewn that there is a natural Balance of Power in all free States, and how it hath been divided, fometimes by the People themfelves, as in Rome; at others by the Inftitutions of the Legiflators, as in the feveral States of Greece and Sicily: The next Thing is to examine what Methods have been taken to break or overthrow this Balance; which every one of the three Parties hath continually endeavoured, as Opportunities have ferved; as might appear from the Stories of moft Ages and Countries. For, abfolute Power in a particular State, is of the fame Nature with univerfal Monarchy in feveral States adjoining to each other. So endless and exorbitant are the Defires of Men, whether confidered in their Perfons or their States, that they will grafp at all, and can form no Scheme of perfect Happiness with lefs. Ever fince Men have been united into Governments, the Hopes and Endeavours after univerfal Monarchy have been bandied among them, from the Reign of Ninus, to this of the Moft Chriftian King: In which Pursuits Commonwealths have had their Share, as well as Monarchs: So the Athenians, the Spartans, the Thebans, and the Achaians did feveral Times aim at the univeríal Monarchy of Greece: So the Commonwealths of Carthage and Rame, affected the univerfal Monarchy of the then known World. In like Manner hath abfolute Power been pursued by the

feveral

feveral Parties of each particular State; wherein fingle Perfons have met with most Succefs, although the Endeavours of the Few and the Many have been frequent enough: Yet, being neither fo uniform in their Designs, nor fo direct in their Views, they neither could manage nor maintain the Power they had got; but were ever deceived by the Popularity, and Ambition of fome fingle Perfon. So that it will be always a wrong Step in Policy, for the Nobles, or Commons, to carry their Endeavours after Power fo far, as to overthrow the Balance: And it would be enough to damp their Warmth in fuch Purfuits, if they could once reflect, that in fuch a Course they will be fure to run upon the very Rock that they meant to avoid; which I fuppofe they would have us think, is the Tyranny of a fingle Perfon.

MANY Examples might be produced of the Endeavours from each of thefe three Rivals after abfolute Power: But I fhall fuit my Difcourfe to the Time I am writing it; and relate only fuch Diffenfions in Greece and Rome, between the Nobles and Commons, with the Confequences of them, wherein the latter were the Aggreffors.

I SHALL begin with Greece, where my Obfervations fhall be confined to Athens; although feveral Instances might be brought from other States thereof.

CHA P. II.

Of the Diffenfions in Athens between the Few and the Many.

T

HESEUS is the Firft, who is recorded with any Appearance of Truth to have brought the. Grecians from a barbarous Manner of Life, among fcattered Villages, into Cities; and to have established the popular State in Athens, affigning to himself the Guardianship of the Laws, and chief Command in War. He was forced, after fome Time to leave the Athenians