how could fuch a Profligate as Antony, or a Boy of eighteen like Octavius, ever dare to dream of giving the Law to fuch an Empire and People? Wherein the latter fucceeded, and entailed the vileft Tyranny that Heaven, in its Anger, ever inflicted on a corrupt and poifoned People: And this with fo little Appearance, at Cefar's Death, that when Cicero wrote to Brutus, how he had prevailed by his Credit with Octavius, to promife him (Brutus) Pardon and Security for his Perfon; that great Roman received the Notice with the utmost Indignity, and returned Cicero an Answer (yet upon Record) full of the highest Resentment and Contempt for fuch an Offer, and from fuch a Hand.

HERE ended all Shew, or Shadow of Liberty in Rome: Here was the Repofitory of all the wife Contentions and Struggles for Power, between the Nobles and Commons, lapped up fafely in the Bofom of a Nero and a Caligula, a Tiberius and a Domitian.

LET us now fee from this Deduction of particular Impeachments, and general Diffenfions in Greece and Rome, what Conclufions may naturally be formed for Inftruction of any other State, that may haply, upon many Points, labour under the like Circumftances.

U

СНАР. IV.

PON the Subject of Impeachments we may observe, that the Custom of accufing the Nobles to the People, either by themselves, or their Orators (now ftyled, An Impeachment in the name of the Commons) hath been very antient, both in Greece and Rome, as well as Carthage; and therefore may feem to be the inherent Right of a free People; nay, perhaps it is really fo: But then, it is to be confidered, first, that this Custom was peculiar to Republicks, or fuch States where the Administration lay principally in the Hands of the Commons; and ever raged more, or lefs, according to their Encroachments upon abfolute Power; having always been looked upon, by the wifeft Men,

and

and best Authors of thofe Times, as an Effect of Licentioufnefs, and not of Liberty; a Diftinction which no Multitude, either reprefented or collective, hath been, at any time, very nice in obferving. However, perhaps this Cuftom, in a popular State, of impeaching particular Men, may feem to be nothing else but the People's chufing, upon Occafion, to exercise their own Jurifdiction in Perfon; as if a King of England fhould fit as Chief Juftice in his Court of King's Bench; which, they fay, in former Times he fometimes did. But, in Sparta, which was called a kingly Government, although the People were perfectly free; yet, because the Administration was in the two Kings, and the Ephori, (with the Affistance of the Senate) we read of no Impeachments by the People; nor was the Process against great Men, either upon account of Ambition, or ill Conduct, although it reached fometimes to Kings themselves, ever formed that way, as I can recollect; but only paffed through those Hands where the Adminiftration lay. So likewife, during the regal Government in Rome, although it were inftituted a mix'd Monarchy, and the People made great Advances in Power; yet I do not remember to have read of one Impeachment from the Commons against a Patrician, until the Confular State began, and the People had made great Encroachments upon the Administration.

ANOTHER Thing to be confidered is; that allowing this Right of Impeachment to be as inherent as they pleafe; yet, if the Commons have been perpetually miftaken in the Merits of the Causes and the Perfons, as well as in the Confequences of fuch Impeachments upon the Peace of the State; we cannot conclude. less, than that the Commons in Greece and Rome, (whatever they may be in other States) were, by no means, qualified either as Profecutors, or Judges, in fuch Matters; and therefore, that it would have been prudent, to reserve these Privileges dormant, never to be produced but upon very great and urging Occafions, where the State is in apparent Danger, the universal Body of the People in Clamours against the Administration, and

no

no other Remedy in View. But, for a few popular Orators, orTribunes, upon the Score of perfonal Picques; or to employ the Pride they conceive in feeing themfelves at the Head of a Party; or as a Method for Advancement ; or moved by certain powerful Arguments, that could make Demofthenes Philippize: For fuch Men, I fay, when the State would, of itself, gladly be quiet, and hath befides Affairs of the laft Importance upon the Anvil; To impeach Miltiades after a great Naval Victory, for not pursuing the Perfian Fleet: To impeach Ariftides, the Perfon moft verfed among them in the Knowledge and PraEtice of their Laws, for a blind Sufpicion of his acting in an arbitrary Way; that is, as they expound it, not in concert with the People: To impeach Pericles, after all his Services, for a few inconfiderable Accompts; or To impeach Phocion, who had been guilty of no other Crime, but negotiating a Treaty for the Peace and Security of his Country: What could the Continuance of fuch Proceedings end in, but the utter Difcouragement of all virtuous Actions and Perfons, and confequently in the Ruin of a State? Therefore, the Hiftorians of those Ages, feldom fail to fet this Matter in all its Lights; leaving us the highest and most honourable Ideas of thofe Perfons, who fuffered by the Perfecution of the People, together with the fatal Confequences they and how the Profecutors feldom failed to repent when it was too late.

had;

THESE Impeachments perpetually falling upon many of the best Men, both in Greece and Rome, are à Cloud of Witneffes, and Examples enough to discourage Men of Virtue and Abilities from engaging in the Service of the Publick; and help, on the other Side, to introduce the Ambitious, the Covetous, the Superficial, and the Ill defigning; who are as apt to be bold, and forward, and meddling, as the former are to be cautious, and modeft, and reserved. This was fo well known in Greece, that an Eagernefs after Employments in the State, was looked upon by wife Men, as the worlt Title a Man could fet up; and made Plato say, That if all Men were as good as they ought; the Quarrel

Lib. Memorab.

in a Commonwealth would be, not as it is now, fhould be Minifters of State, but who should not be fo. And Socrates is introduced by Xencphon feverely chiding a Friend of his for not entering into the publick Service, when he was every way qualified for it. Such a Backwardness there was at that Time among good Men to engage with an ufurping People, and a Set of prag

Lib. 11.

matical ambitious Orators. And Diodorus telleth us, That when the Petalifm was erected at Syracufe, in Imitation of the Ofiracifm at Athens, it was fo notoriously levelled against all who had either Birth or Merit to recommend them, that whoever poffeffed either withdrew for fear, and would have no Concern in publick Affairs. So that the People themselves were forced to abrogate it for fear of bringing all Things into Confufion.

THERE is one Thing more to be obferved, where. in all the popular Impeachments in Greece and Rome feem to have agreed; and that was a Notion they had of being concerned in Point of Honour to condemn whatever Person they impeached, however frivolous the Articles were upon which they began; or however weak the Surmifes, whereon they were to proceed in their Proofs. For, to conceive, that the Body of the People could be mistaken, was an indignity not to be imagined, until the Confequences had convinced them when it was paft Remedy. And, look upon this as a Fate to which all popular Accufations are subject; although I fhould think that the Saying, Vox Populi, Vox Dei, ought to be understood of the univerfal Bent and Current of a People; not the bare Majority of a few Representatives; which is often procured by little Arts, and great Industry and Application; wherein thofe, who engage in the Purfuits of Malice and Revenge, are much more fedulous than fuch as would prevent them.

FROM what hath been deduced of the Diffenfions in Rome, between the two Bodies of Patricians and Ple heians, feveral Reflexions may be made.

Firft, That when the Balance of Power is duly fixed in a State, nothing is more dangerous and unwife than to give way to the first Steps of popular Encroachments; which is ufually done either in Hopes of procuring Ease and Quiet from fome vexatious Clamour; or else made merchandize, and merely bought and fold. This is breaking into a Constitution to ferve a prefent Expedient, or fupply a prefent Exigency: The Remedy of an Empyrick to ftifle the prefent Pain, but with certain Prospect of sudden and terrible Returns. When a Child groweth eafy and content by being humoured; and when a Lover becometh fatisfied by fmall Compliances, without further Purfuits; then expect to find popular Affemblies content with small Conceffions. If there could one fingle Example be brought from the whole Compafs of Hiftory, of any one popular Aflembly, who after beginning to contend for Power, ever fat down quietly with a certain Share: Or, if one Instance could be produced of a popular Affembly, that ever knew, or propofed, or declared what Share of Power was their due; then might there be fome Hopes that it were a Matter to be adjusted by Reasonings, by Conferences, or Debates: 'But fince all that is manifeftly otherwise, I fee no other Course to be taken in a fettled State, than a steady conftant Refolution in thofe to whom the rest of the Balance is entrusted, never to give way fo far to popular Clamours, as to make the leaft Breach in the Constitution; through which a Million of Abuses and Encroachments will certainly, in Time, force their Way.

AGAIN, from this Deduction, it will not be difficult to gather and affign certain Marks of popular Encroachments; by obferving of which those who hold the Balance in a State, may judge of the Degrees, and, by early Remedies and Application, put a ftop to the fatal Confequences that would otherwise enfue. What thofe Marks are, hath been at large deduced, and need not be here repeated.

ANOTHER