tions, rendered it impracticable to assemble the lodges and participate in the parade as contemplated by the resolution.

The suggestion submitted by W... LEVI GIBB, Master of the Lodge of Strict Observance, No. 94, in relation to an appropriate celebration to commemorate the close of the year 1899, was not deemed feasible by reason of the centennial observance of the funeral ceremonies of GEORGE WASHINGTON held on the 31st day of December, 1899.

In the matter of the petition of EDWIN F. HALL, late a member of Ivanhoe Lodge, No. 610, for restoration to the rights and privileges of Masonry, referred to the Grand Master with full power to take such steps as he might deem wise, in conjunction with the Grand Master of Pennsylvania, looking toward the complete restoration of said HALL; and the Grand Master of Pennsylvania, after the case had been fully represented to him, certifying that no Masonic objection existed against said HALL, I exercised the power in me vested at the last session of the Grand Lodge and restored him to all rights and privileges of Masonry.

AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION.

The Grand Lodge, by an amendment to the Book of Constitutions, having changed its time of meeting from the first Tuesday in June to the first Tuesday in May, it becomes necessary to make further changes in order to harmonize other portions of the law with the amendment heretofore made to Section 11. I therefore recommend that the following changes be made in our Book of Constitutions so far as the same can be done at one annual session of the Grand Lodge :

Section 37, subdivision 5.

insert the word " April.”

Strike out the word "May" and

Section 37, subdivision 6. Strike out the word "May" and insert the word " April."

Section 47. Strike out the word "June" and insert the word "May." Strike out the word "May" and insert the word "April."

Section 78, subdivision 8. Strike out the word “May” and insert the word " April."

Section 94. Strike out the word "May" and insert the word "April."

THE ACTION OF THE GRAND LODGE, AFFIRMING THE EXPULSION OF ROBERT KOPP, SUSTAINED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

ROBERT KOPP, a former member of Strict Observance Lodge, No. 94, of the State of New York, while undergoing a sentence of suspension for unmasonic conduct, wrote and mailed, March 6, 1899, to the then Grand Master, my predecessor, a communication relating to the appeal said Kopp had taken from the judgment of the Trial Commissioners to the Grand Master. This communication became a part of the record in that case and was filed in the office of the Grand Secretary, with the decision of the Grand Master affirming the suspension. The charges which had thus been tried, and the sentence of suspension which was thus affirmed, having grown out of complaints coming to me as Deputy Grand Master from members of his lodge, I was interested to examine the record, and the singular character of the letter of March 6th attracted my attention. It has since been judicially determined "that such letter was a gross violation of Masonic obligation, Masonic conduct, and Masonic law." Upon my suggestion, as Deputy Grand Master, and without consulting the then Grand Master, further charges were preferred against Kopp to the then District Deputy of the Fourth Masonic District on account of writing and sending the above described letter. The judgment of the Trial Commissioners thus appointed expelled Mr. Kopp from the rights and privileges of Masonry. From such judgment of expulsion he appealed to the Grand Lodge, and the judgment was duly affirmed by the Commission of Appeals, whose recommendation affirming the judgment was unanimously adopted by the Grand Lodge (Proceedings, 1899, page 215).

Thereupon, and on or about the 6th day of October, 1899, said Robert Kopp brought an action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York for reinstatement and restoration. I assigned the legal defense of said action to the R.·. W... Elbert CRANDALL, Chief Commissioner of Appeals.

The suit was tried April 3, 1900, before the HON. MARTIN L. STOVER, at a special term of the Supreme Court in the County of New York. His Honor thereafter duly rendered his decision, sustaining the action of the Grand Lodge in an opinion

which is given herewith in full, for the reason that it is believed by me to be of great interest in that this is the first time such a case has been brought before the civil courts of this State, and because by this decision it is held that Masonic tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction of such matters, a jurisdiction with which the civil courts will not interfere.

This is an action against the Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of the State of New York, brought under Section 1990 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by which it is sought to have the plaintiff reinstated as a Mason.

The plaintiff was accused and convicted of having in a communication to the Grand Master of Masons of the State of New York, in insulting and scurrilous epithets, grossly abused the Grand Master. He was served with a copy of the charges, and a notice of the time and place of trial, and appeared before the commissioners appointed for the trial of the charges, but does not seem to have made or served an answer to the charges that were made. Upon the first meeting of the commissioners, the plaintiff was represented by counsel, the complainant also being represented by counsel. The chairman of the commission asked if the defense had any objection to any of the commissioners, and the plaintiff's counsel, instead of answering the question, thereupon stated that he desired to ask the commissioners certain questions in regard to the matter. Counsel for the complainant thereupon asked the counsel for the accused to define his posi tion, stating that if he desired to challenge the commissioners, the code pointed out the way to do so. Counsel for the accused thereupon stated that there were no specific reasons in his mind why the commissioners should not act. He was again asked by the commissioner, "Has the defense any specific challenge against the commissioners," to which the counsel for the accused answered, "I challenge all the commissioners." The chairman thereupon inquired the grounds of the challenge to the commissioners, and the counsel for the accused refused to state any grounds, but insisted upon a right to examine the commissioners in advance of any challenge. The chairman having stated that the challenge must be based upon some certain ground, and that if there were any grounds they should be stated and put upon the record, otherwise a challenge could not be sustained, and after a refusal by counsel for the accused to state the grounds of the challenge, the defense withdrew from the trial, the counsel for the accused stating "The defense withdraws from this trial, and is not before this commission any further." Thereupon the defendant was asked by the prosecution to take the stand; his counsel announced that he would not take the stand, and after some considerable exchange of views the accused left the room. The trial was thereupon adjourned, and upon the adjourned day the commission met, it being stated that the accused had been notified of the meeting and requested to be present; but not appearing, the commission proceeded to take the testimony, and made its

adjudication, finding the accused guilty of the charges as specified, and sentencing him to expulsion from the order. The sentence of expulsion was afterwards duly affirmed by the commission of appeals, which is the Masonic appellate tribunal, and this action was subsequently fully approved by the Grand Lodge at its annual communication in June, 1899.

It is claimed on behalf of the plaintiff herein, that he has been deprived of his right, under the code of procedure of the Masonic order; that his trial was not legal; that his conviction was unjustified; as based upon hearsay evidence ; that the evidence was insufficient to establish the proof of the charges, and that the punishment was too severe.

The theory of the plaintiff seems to be that the court has power to review, not only the questions of jurisdiction but also the questions of procedure that have arisen from time to time during the course of the trial and appeals. In the case of White vs. Brownell, 4 Abb. Pr. Rep. N. S. 162, the distinction between the expulsion of members of a corporation and those of voluntary associations, such as the Masonic order, is pointed out, being this: the privilege of membership in an unincorporated, voluntary association, like the one under consideration, is not given by statute or derived through prescription as in a corporation, but is created and conferred by the organization itself, and may be withheld or conferred at the pleasure of the association, and under such rules and restrictions of the association as it may see fit to establish. While in a corporation the rights are conferred by statute and under the law of the land; a person complying with the requirements of the statute, or the law, may become a member of the corporation without the consent of the corporation itself, unless such consent is rendered necessary by the law. And as was said in the case above cited, a member of an unincorporated, voluntary association has as such, undoubtedly, rights which the law will protect, but they do not rest upon the same grounds, and are in no wise co-extensive with the franchise enjoyed by a member of a corporation. And again, "Individuals who form themselves together into a voluntary association for a common object, may agree to be governed by such rules as they think proper to adopt, if there is nothing in them in conflict with the law of the land; and those who become members of the body are presumed to know them-to have assented to them—and they are bound by them." They may provide modes of trial and meaus of expulsion. So that, in this case, the question under consideration is the same as in the case of White vs. Brownell, whether the plaintiff here has been expelled in accordance with the laws governing the organization of which he was a member.

As to the first error alleged, namely, that set forth in paragraph II of the complaint, " a" that the trial commissioners repeatedly ordered the plaintiff to take the stand as a witness for the prosecution to testify against himself, it cannot be well founded, for the reason that the plaintiff did not take the stand as a witness, and therefore was not prejudiced by the request of the commissioners.

Second. That the communication was privileged, and therefore there can be no conviction for it, is also not well founded, for the reason that the statements there made were not necessary in the course of the proceeding, but were all facts and circumstances, if they existed, entirely outside of the matter under consideration, and had no relevancy to the matters under discussion between the Grand Master and the plaintiff herein.

As to the objection marked "e" that it constituted no offense against the Masonic law, and that the conviction was not authorized, it seems to me was a question for the Masonic courts to decide, and is not open to inquiry in this

court; but even if it were, this court might well hold that a communication which charged the Grand Master of an organization with using the organization for his own private purposes, and charging by innuendo that the commission which had theretofore convicted him of a Masonic offense were incompetent, unfair, or unworthy, and declining to appear before a new commission if they "are to be constructed of the same Masonic ashlar" as the former commission, and charging the Grand Master with using political methods inside the Fraternity, and with dereliction in his duty as Grand Master, with incompetent and glaring mismanagement, and calling upon some of the Brothers to return "some of their ill gotten but ill concealed?" and concluding by stating that the acts charged in the letter might be the means yet of impeachment of the Grand Master; if not libelous upon its face, was of such a character as to render the member of the organization making the charge subject to such discipline as the duly constituted authorities of the order might, in their judgment, see fit to exercise.

As to the objection marked "d" the constitution of the Grand Lodge provides that when charges are preferred between members of different lodges, the District Deputy Grand Master of the District shall, by his warrant, appoint a commission who shall hear and determine the charges.-Article 19, Section 126, of the Constitution.

These charges were preferred by a member of a different lodge from that to which the plaintiff belonged, and the commission was legally appointed under

Section 126.

As to the next error alleged in the complaint, that his challenges were not sustained, the counsel seems to have been led into error by the course of procedure that is sometimes adopted in trial courts, namely, that a challenge is presumed to be interposed, and counsel is permitted informally to inquire of the members of the jury as to their qualifications; but if this course should be objected to, the challenger would be compelled to state his challenge to the court, and thereupon try it regularly. There can be no question but what the commissioners were entirely regular in demanding that the accused should state the grounds of his challenge, in order that there might be an intelligent investigation into the proceeding.

Another ground of complaint is that subdivision 10 of Section 22 was violated. Subdivision 10 of Section 22 reads as follows: "When the accused fails to appear or answer, testimony must be taken in the same manner as if he appeared and defended, and with even more technical accuracy, fullness and certainty; and, in such cases, some competent brother should be designated by the commissioners and required to appear for the accused, and to see that he have a fair and impartial trial.

It will be seen that subdivision 10 applies only when the accused fails to appear or answer. In this case the accused did not fail to appear, but had appeared before the commissioners, and his failure was to appear upon the adjourned day. It is true he was not present at the trial, but there was not an entire failure to appear, and it seems that a fair construction of the section would be that in such cases the designation of a competent member to appear is a recommendation which is not mandatory upon the commissioners. He might be designated to appear, but it is not clear that the section intended that the failure to designate should vitiate the trial; and whether or not the failure to designate was error, was within the jurisdiction of the commission of appeals to finally decide.

The next allegation of error is that hearsay evidence was introduced. The question at issue was whether the plaintiff had written and sent the letter.