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itself, when that idea is said to be in it: by determinate, when applied to a complex idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas, joined in such a proportion and situation, as the mind has before its view, and sees in itself, when that idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a man gives a name to it: I say, should be; because it is not every one, not perhaps any one, who is so careful of his language, as to use no word, till he views in his mind the precise determined idea, which he resolves to make it the sign of. The want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in men's thoughts and discourses.

I know there are not words enough in any language, to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men's discourses and reasonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uses any term, he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of, and lo which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that present discourse.Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas: it is plain his are not so; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of, which have not such a precise determination.

Upon this ground I have thought determined ideas a' way of speaking less liable to mistakes, than clear and distinct : and where men have got such 'determined Jcas of all that they reason, inquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end. The greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words, or (which is the same) indetermined ideas, which they are made to stand for; I have made choice of these terms to signify, i. Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it. 2. That this idca, thus determined, i. e. which the mind bas in itself, and knows, and sees there, be determined without any change to that Dame, and that name determined to that precise idea. If men had such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses, they would both discern how far their own inquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of ube disputes and wranglings they bave with others.

Besides this, the bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the reader, that there is an addition of


two chapters wholly new; the one of the association of ideas, the other of enthusiasm. These, with some other larger additions never before printed, he has engaged to print by themselves, afier the same manner, and for the same purpose, as was done when this essay had the second impression.

In the sixth edition, there is very little added or altered; the greatest part of what is new, is contained in the 21st chapter of the second book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition.



come by any knowledge,

sufficient to prove it not


2. General assent, the great


VOL. 1.

is not bitterness; and a
thousand the like, must

be inrate.

19. Such less general propo.

tions known before these

universal maxims.

20. One and one equal to

two, &c. not general, nor

useful, answered.

21. These maxims not being

known sometimes till

proposed, proves them

not innate.
22. Implicitly known before

proposing, signifits, that
the mind is capable of
understanding them, or

else signifiez nothing.
23. The argument of assent-

ing on is first hearing,
upon a false supposition

of no precedent teacher.

24. Not innate, because not

universally assented to.

25. These maxims not the

first known

26. And so not innate.

27. Not innate, because they

appear least, where what

is innate, shows itself

28. Recapitulation.

No innate practical princi-


1. No moral principles so

clear and so generally re-

ceived as the forementi.

oned speculative maxims.

2. Faith and justice not

owned as principles by

all men.

3. Obj. Though men deny

them in their practice,
yet they admit them in

their thoughts, answered.
4. Moral rules need a proof,

ergo, not innate.
5. Instance in keeping com.

6. Virtue generally approv.

ed, not because ianate,

but because profitable.
7. Men's actions convince
us, that the rule of vir.
tue is not their internal


8. Conscience no proof of

any ingate moral rule.
9. Instances of enormities

practised without re-

10. Men have contrary prac-

tical principles.
11–13. Whole nations reject se-

veral moral rules,
14. Those who maintain in-

nate practical principles,

tell us not what they are.
15–19. Lord Herbert's innate

principles examined.
20 Obj. Innate principles

may be corrupted, an-


21. Contrary principles in

the world.

22-26. How men commonly

come by their principles

27. Principles must be exa-



Other considerations about

innate principles, both spe-
culative and practical.

1. Principles not innate, un.

less their ideas be innate,
2, 3. Ideas, especially those

belonging to principles,

not born with children.

4, 5. Identity an idea not in-


6. Whole and part, not in-

nate ideas.

7. Idea of worship not innate.

8-11. Idea of God, not ionate-
12. Suitable to God's good-

ness, that all men should
bave an idea of him,
therefore naturally in-
printed by him, an.

13-16. Ideas of God various

in different men,

2. All ideas come from sen-

sation or reflection.
3. The objects of sensation

one source of ideas.
4. The operations of our

minds, the other source

of them.
5. All our ideas are of the

one or the other of these.
6. Observable in children.
7. Men are differently fur.

nished with these, accord-
ing to the different ob.

jects they converse with.
8. Ideas of reflection later,

because they need at-


9. The soul begins to have

ideas, when it begins to


10. The soul thinks not al.

ways; for this wants

ll. It is not always conscious

of it.
12. If a sleeping man thinks

without knowing it, the

slepping and waking man

are two persons.

13, Impossible to convince

those that sleep without

dreaming that theythink.

14. That men dream without

remembering it, in vain

15. Upon this hypothesis the

thoughts ofa sleeping man

ought to be most rational.
16. On this hypothesis the

soul must have ideas not
derived from sensation or
reflection, of which there

is no appearance.
17. If I think when I know

it not, nobody else can

know it
18. How knows any one that

the soul always thinks?
For if it be not a self-evi.
dent proposition, it needs


19. That a man should be busy

in thinking, and yet not

retain it the next mo.

ment, very improbable.
20~23. No ideas but from sensa-

lion, or reflection, evi.
dent, if we observe chil.

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