started by the revival of the old Platonic | ing moral good in so rigid a form, are not and Aristotelic disquisitions on this sub- constrained to acknowledge that the ject, in the forthcoming volumes of Sir moral law has not been kept by man. W. Hamilton. But it should never be Taking their own high principles along forgotten, that the motive part of man's with them, neither could have loooked nature may be excited by a great many within, without discovering sin to be quite other objects as well as pleasure and pain, as much a reality as virtue. Stewart by all the objects, indeed, which are ad- could not have gone out of his dwelling in dressed to the motive principles of man. the old College or the Canongate, nor can It is the apprehension of objects as about Cousin go out of his chambers in the Sorto gratify the motive principles of the bonne, without being obliged to observe mind-whatever they be-which stirs up how far man and woman have fallen bethe emotions. Thus, the apprehension of neath the ideal picture which they have a coming object, which is to gratify a mo- drawn in their lectures. At the very time tive principle, excites hope, which is strong when the Scottish metaphysicians were in proportion to the strength of the appre- discoursing so beautifully of moral virtue, hension and the strength of the particular there was a population springing up motive principle; while the apprehension around their very colleges in Edinburgh of a coming object, which is to disappoint and Glasgow, sunk in vice and degrada this motive principle stirs up fear. It is tion, which appalled the good men of the. strange that Stewart no where treats of next age-the age of Chalmers-to conthe emotions in his Philosophy of the Ac- template, which the men of this age know tive Powers. not how to grapple with, and which is not to be arrested by any remedy which the mere philosophic moralists have propounded. We acknowledge most fully, that Stewart's lectures and writings have tended, directly or indirectly, to carry several important measures which are calculated to elevate the condition of mankind, such as Reform in the Legislature, Prison Improvement, and the Abolition of Tests and of Restrictions on Commerce. But the institutions which aim at lessening the sin and misery of the outcast and degraded-such as missions, ragged schools, and reformatories-have proceeded from very different influences; and a philosophy embracing the facts which they contemplate, must dive deeper into human nature, and probe its actual condition more faithfully, than the academic moralists of Scotland ever ventured to do. Mr. Veitch very properly remarks, in a foot-note: "The great fact of man's actual condition, as a member of a lapsed world-the peculiar ethical motives of reverence and love for a person who has exemplified the moral law in absolute perfection, and done so in the creature's behoof-and all the questions connected with the adjustment of the results of the ordinary Christian ethics Stewart's view of the Moral Power in Man, and of Moral Good, seems to us to be substantially correct. In treating of these subjects, he avows his obligations to Butler and Price.* His doctrine has been adopted, with some modifications, which are improvements, by Cousin. Stewart and Cousin are the most elevated of all the moralists who treat of ethics on grounds independent of the word of God. We are convinced that they never could have given so pure a morality, had they not lived in the midst of light shed abroad on our earth by a supernatural religion. We have always felt it to be a strange circumstance, that Stewart and Cousin, in giving so high a view of the moral faculty, are never led to acknowledge that it condemns the possessor; and, after present * Aristotle holds his place at Oxford. We rejoice at this, provided he is not allowed to slay all his younger brethren that he may be undisturbed in his reign; that is, provided his writings are not studied, to the neglect of modern authors who have proceeded in the inductive manner. The volume on the "Ethics of Aristotle," lately published by Sir Alexander Grant of Oxford, is the best work in the EngJish language on the Ethical system of Aristotle, even as the first half of the second volume of Archer Butler's History is the best work on the Dialectics of Plato. We do not agree with Sir Alexander in his view of the death of Socrates, but we are grateful to him for his account of the Sophists as against Grote. His account of the relation in which the philosophy of Aristotle stood to the previous Grecian systems, is searching and generally accurate; though he does not, we think, give full credit to Aristotle for correcting the extravagances of Plato, who did not acknowledge the reality of the individual. are unnoticed by Mr. Stewart, or, in general, by Scottish ethical speculators of note." As Mr. Veitch has found space, from time to time, to refer, in his Memoir, to writers of his own Hamiltonian school, he might also have spared a sentence to state, that this defect was sup plied by Chalmers, who is reckoned, wherever the English language is spoken, an ethical writer of note. It is an interesting and encouraging circumstance, that the majority of the professors of Morals in the Scottish colleges at this present time, have avowed in their writings a belief in the doctrines of sin and atonement, and, we presume, teach them in their classes. We hope that it will never be tolerated again in Scotland, that any professor of moral science should inculcate, that man is subject to moral law, without adding that he has disobeyed it. It is very evident that the Scottish academic moral writers of last century, while they pay a dignified respect to Christianity, have kept at a distance from its profound peculiarities. Without meaning to excuse this deficiency, we may yet affirm that some incidental advantages have sprung from this reticence. It was certainly better that they should have kept at a respectful distance from Christianity, than that they should have approached it only, like the great German metaphysical systems, to set all its truths in rigid philosophic framework, or to absorb them all within themselves, as by a devouring flame. But the peculiar advantage arising from their method, consists in this, that they have, by induction, established a body of ethical truth on grounds independent of revealed religion; and this can now be appealed to in all defenses of Christianity, and as an evidence of the need of something which philosophy is incompetent to supply. Divines can now found on those great truths which the Scottish philosophers have established, as to there being a distinct moral faculty and an immutable moral law, and then press on those whose conscience tells them that they have broken that law, to embrace the provision which revelation has made to meet the wants of humanity. The space which we have occupied with the Mental and Moral Philosophy, precludes us from entering on the two volumes of Political Economy, now pub. lished for the first time, partly from manuscripts left by Stewart himself, and partly from notes by pupils. The views expounded will scarcely be regarded as much advancing the science in the present day; but they did good service when delivered for twenty years in lectures. They are still worthy of being looked at on special topics; they may form an in teresting chapter in the history of the literature of political economy, and they illustrate the character of Stewart's intellect and philosophy. An estimate of the influence which has been exercised by Stewart, may form an appropriate close to this article. In Scotland, he increased the reputation of the Edinburgh University. Horner speaks of "many young Englishmen who had come to Edinburgh to finish their education," and not a few of these had been attracted by Stewart. He has had a greater influence than perhaps any other, in diffusing throughout Scotland, a taste for mental and moral science. We have referred to the power exercised on him by Reid; but if Stewart owed much to Reid, Reid owed nearly as much to his grateful pupil, who finished and adorned the work of his master, and by his classical taste has recommended the common-sense philosophy to many who would have turned away with disdain from the simpler manner of Reid. And here we are tempted to give utterance to the feeling, that Reid has been peculiarly fortunate in those, who have attached themselves to his school. If Stewart helped to introduce Reid to polite society, Sir William Hamilton, by his unmatched logic, and vast erudition, has compelled philosophers to give him-notwithstanding the somewhat untechnical character of his writings-a place in their privileged circle. By his expositions of Reid, and his own independent labors, Mr. Stewart aided in throwing back a tide of skepticism, which had appeared in France in the previous century; in England toward the beginning of the eighteenth century, on the back of the licentious reigns of Charles II. and James II.; and in Scotland, about the middle of that century. It appears from letters of Dr. John Gregory, published in Forbes' Life of Beattie, that atheism and materialism were about that time in high fashion, and were supported by many who used the name of Hume, but who had never read his works, and were incapable of understanding them. This tide came to a height about the time of the French Revolution, and it was one of the avowed aims of Stewart, "to stem the inundation of skeptical, or rather atheistical publications, which were imported from the Continent." Nor is it to be forgotten, that Stewart, directly by his lectures and indirectly by his pupils, contributed as much as any man of his | nity, and of God. This wretched philoage, to diffuse throughout Scotland a sophy-if philosophy it can be called— taste for elegant literature, and enlarged was one of the fatal powers which opeand liberal opinions in politics. rated to give an evil direction to the ReAs to England, Sir J. Mackintosh, writ-volution, and prevented good from issuing ing to Stewart in 1802, speaks of the want out of it. After Sensationalism-which of any thing which he could call purely used, but only to abuse, the name of philosophical thinking; and Horner, in Locke-had reigned for more than half a 1804, declares, that the highest names in century, there appeared a reäction led on the estimation of those in the metropolis, by M. Royer Collard, who began in 1811 who felt any interest in speculative pur- to lecture at the Normal School. It is a suits, were Hobbes and Hartley. Such most interesting circumstance, that in works as the Moral Philosophy of Paley, conducting this war against the debasing were fitted to lower still farther, rather systems which prevailed, he betook himthan elevate, this taste. It was altogether self to the philosophy of Reid and Stethen for the benefit of English thought, wart. Exercising a considerable influence that Stewart did become gradually known in himself, Royer Collard has had a more in South-Britain, where his elegant style, extended sway through his pupils, espehis crowning good sense, and the modera cially Victor Cousin and Theodore Jouftion of his opinions, recommended him to froy. In this course of years, the works mang who had imbibed as great an aver- of Reid were translated into French, sion to Scotch Metaphysics as ever George with an admirable historical and critical III. had. There are still persons who ab- introduction, by Jouffroy. So early as hor the infidelity of Hume, and who de- 1808, the first volume of Stewart's Elespise the plainness of Reid, who suspect ments was translated into French by M. the rhetoric of Brown, and are frightened Prevost, of Geneva; and of late years M. by the bristling nomenclature and logical Peisse has translated the other two voldistinctions of Hamilton, but who are at- umes of the same work. It is now many tracted by the writings of Stewart, which years since since Stewart's Outlines were are felt to be as pleasing and as regular translated into the same tongue by Joufas their own rich fields bounded by hedge froy, who had prefixed a preface of great rows. In England he has so far been of judgment and acuteness. It thus appears, use in creating a philosophical spirit, where that the great reäction in favor of sound none existed before, and in checking the philosophy, commenced by Royer Collard, utilitarianism of Paley. He is also enti- and conducted by Cousin and Jouffroy, tled to a share of the credit of the great has made large and profitable use of the measures of reform, which such pupils as Scottish school, and rejoices to acknowHorner, Brougham, Lord John Russell, ledge its obligations to Scotland. No Palmerston, Jeffrey, and Lansdowne, have doubt, it has also called in aid from carried in Parliament. Perhaps these other quarters. Cousin has been indebteminent men have never estimated the ed to the school of Kant, as well as to the amount of wholesome impulse which they school of Reid, and has derived some of received in early life from the prelections his favorite principles immediately from and lofty character of the Edinburgh pro- the great metaphysician of his own counfessor. try, Descartes; and he has besides, carefully examined the human mind, in an inductive manner; and he has been able to give a unity to these materials, because he is possessed of great original genius, acuteness, and comprehensiveness of mind. We are sometimes inclined to think, however, that he has got the most precious element in his eclectic system, from the school of Scotland. We are greatly gratified to observe, that after he had been drawn aside for a time from his attachment to the Scottish philosophy, by a later affection for German Transcendentalism, (this is very visible in his course of In France the influence of Reid and Stewart has been considerable, and has been of the most beneficial character. In that country, Locke's philosophy, unfortunately introduced by Voltaire, and accepted in its worst side, had wrought only mischief, partly by its drawing away the attention of thinkers from the more spiritual philosophy of Descartes, and partly by its tempting a set of speculators to derive all men's ideas from sensation, and to deny the existence of all ideas which could not be derived from this sourcesuch as the idea of Moral Good, of Infi which still abides, must he have seen that his country needs something deeper and more influential than any system of moral science, even though it should be as pure and elevated as that which he has been living to inculcate. lectures delivered in 1828 and 1829,) he is | precepts may be also a reflection from the now returning to his first love-and this same light. Often, we should think, when at a time when Scotland is rather forsak- M. Cousin has looked around him on these ing the inductive method, and turning scenes of revolution through which France its regards towards the à priori method has passed, and on those terrible attempted of Germany. We regard Cousin's review assassinations which burst out from time to of the Scottish school, as the most fault-time, and that grinding military despotism less, as it is certainly the most generous, of all his historical criticisms. In his review of Locke, he has scarcely done justice to the Essay on the Human Understanding, which he always judges from the consequences to which the system led in France; in his review of Kant, he has not always been able successfully to wrestle with that powerful logical mind; but in his review of the Scottish Metaphysicians, he has shown a most hearty appreciation of their excellencies, while he has offered strictures which are very commonly correct. In the preface to the last edition (1857) of his volume on the Scottish philosophy, he declares that the true modern Socrates has not been Locke, but Reid, that modest and laborious pastor of a poor Scottish parish, who, after passing seven years in the study of himself, in a profound retreat, came forth with a full consciousness of his enterprise, to accomplish a revolution at once great and durable. "Kant," he says, "has commenced the German philosophy, but he has not governed it. It early escaped him to throw itself in very opposite directions. The name of Kant rests only on the ruins of his doctrines. Reid has impressed on the Scottish mind a movement less grand, but this movement has had no re actions." Yes, he says, Reid is a man of genius, and of a true and powerful originality; so we said in 1819, and so we say in 1857, after having held long converse with mighty systems, discovered their secret, and taken their measure. We feel proud, we confess, of the eulogiums which have been pronounced on Scotland, not only by Cousin, but by Jouffroy and Remusat. But these philosophers have scarcely seen, after all, wherein lies the peculiar strength of the Scottish nation. This is not to be found in its systems of moral philosophy, but in its religion, of which the high moral tone of its philosophy is but a reflection, which would soon wax dim and vanish were the original light extinguished; nay, in remembering that Kant was descended from Scottish parentage, we have sometimes thought that his high moral In Germany Stewart has been little known, and has exercised no power for good or for evil. The only English philosopher familiarly referred to in that country is Locke, and even he is known, we suspect, more through his French consequences than from the study of his work. The German professors speak of him, under the name of Locké, as the representative of sensationalism, overlooking the constant reference which he makes to reflection as a separate source of ideas, and to the lengthened account which he gives of intuition -a much juster account, in some respects, of its function than that given by Kant or Schelling. The great English ethical writer, Butler, who has established forever the great truth of the supremacy of conscience in the human constitution, is either altogether unknown in Germany, or referred to by such writers as Tholuck only to show that he is not understood or appreciated. The only Scottish metaphysician thoroughly known in Germany is David Hume. Reid is occasionally spoken of, only to be disparaged in his system and its results. Stewart is scarcely ever named. We must be allowed to regret this. Such a body of carefully inducted fundamental truth, as we have in the philosophy of Reid and Stewart, is precisely what was and is needed to preserve thought from the extravagancies of the transcendental schools in the last age, and now, in the natural recoil which has taken place since 1848, from the tide of materialism which is setting in so strongly, and with no means or method of meeting it. The philosophy of Germany must ever go by oscillations, by actions and reäctions, till the unfortunate critical method of Kant is abandoned, and the inductive method is used to determine the rule and law of those à priori principles of which so much use is made, while there has been so little careful in quiry into their precise nature and mode | mises which Stewart as well as Kant had of operation. furnished. He would have adhered, after knowing all, to his decision: This may be the proper place for referring to the relation in which Stewart stood toward Kant. We have already expressed our regret that Stewart should have entered on a criticism of Kant without a "We are irresistibly led to ascribe to the thing itself (space) an existence independent of the will of any being." It is an "incompredeeper acquaintance with his system. No hensible doctrine which denies the objective redoubt it might be retorted, that the criti-stance, nor an accident, nor a relation, may be ality of time." "That space is neither a subcisms of Stewart upon Kant are not more safely granted; but it does not follow from this ignorant and foolish than those of the dis- that it is nothing objective." Our first idea of ciples of Kant upon Reid; but it is better space or extension seems to be formed by abto admit that Stewart committed a blunder stracting this attribute from the other qualities in his review of the Kantian system. of matter. The idea of space, however, in what Some have supposed that, if he had known manner formed, is manifestly accompanied with an irresistible conviction that space is necessamore of Kant, he would have formed a rily existent, and that its annihilation is impostotally different opinion of his philosophy. sible," etc. He adds: "To call this proposition And we admit that a further acquaintance in question, is to open a door to universal skepwith Kant's works would have raised Kant ticism."-Diss., pp. 596-597. in his estimation-would have kept him from describing his nomenclature as The great work which the school of "jargon," and his philosophy as "incom- Reid has done, consists in its careful inprehensible" from affirming that Kant vestigation, in the inductive manner, first, has "thrown no new light on the laws of of the faculties of the mind; and, secondthe intellectual world" would have ly, and more particularly, of man's primashown him many curious points of corre- ry and intuitive convictions. For this spondence between the views of Kant and they ought to be honored in all time. the profoundest of his own doctrines, and Kant did a work similar to this last, but have enabled him, when he did depart in a different manner. Rejecting (as Reid from Kant, to give fair and valid reasons, had done) the combined dogmatic and deand thus to help in what must be one of ductive method of Descartes, he introthe tasks of philosophy in this age-the duced the critical method, affirming that work of taking from Kant what is good Reason can criticise itself, and proceeding and true, and casting away what is evil, to criticise Reason by a kind of logical because false. While we admit all this, process of a most unsatisfactory kind. we are convinced at the same time that Criticism has succeeded criticism, each Stewart would never have given an adhe- new critic taking a new standing-point, or sion to the peculiarities of Kantism. He advancing a step farther, till Hegel's would have said, My method of induction system became the reductio ad absurdum is better than your method of criticism, of the whole method of procedure inauguand my account of the intuitive convic- rated by Kant. We admit that Kant was tions of the mind is correct, when I repre- right in affirming that à priori principles sent them as fundamental laws of thought should be examined before they are asand belief; whereas you are giving a sumed in philosophical investigation. We wrong account of them, when you repre- are not at liberty to assume a first truth sent them as à priori forms imposing on till we have shown it to be a first truth; the objects in all cognition something and we have no right to use it in argument which is not in the objects. We can not or deduction till we have determined its conceive him, in any circumstances, allow- precise nature and law; but this is to be ing to Kant (as Hamilton unfortunately done, we maintain, in the inductive mandid) that Space, and Time, and Causation ner, with its accompanying analysis and are laws of thought and not of things, exclusions. The Scottish school comand may have merely a subjective exist- menced this work, but they do not profess ence. His caution, his good sense, and to have completed it. Stewart every his careful observation, would have pre- where proclaims that it is to be done by vented him from ever falling into a system the combined efforts of successive inquirof nescience such as that to which the ers, pursuing the same method for ages. relentless logic of Hamilton has carried Reid and Stewart no where profess to him, founding, we acknowledge, on pre-give a full list, or even a rigid classifica |
