voked to wrath against the latter, and had determined to destroy him, (1 Sam. xxv. 24,) fell at David's feet and said, 'Upon me let this iniquity be, and let thy handmaid, I pray thee, speak in thy audience, and hear the voice of thy handmaid." And in verse 28 she calls Nabal's iniquity her iniquity. By this it appears, that a mediator putting himself in the stead of the offender, so that the offended party should impute the offence to him, and look on the mediator as having taken it upon him, and looking on him as the debtor for what satisfaction should be required and expected, was, in those days, no strange notion, or considered as a thing in itself absurd and inconsistent with men's natural notion of things." President Edwards, vol. viii. p.

515.

Again, observes this profound theologian in the same page: "The word translated here in Isaiah liii. 4 and 12, is : the same word and the same phrase of bearing sin and bearing iniquity, is often used concerning things which are the types of

L

Christ's priesthood and sacrifice, viz. the Levitical priests and sacrifices. It was no uncommon phrase, but usual, and well understood among the Jews; and we find it very often used in other cases and applied to others besides either Christ or the types of him. And when it is so, it is plain, that the general meaning of the phrase is lying under the guilt of sin, having it imputed and charged upon the person, as obnoxious. to the punishment of it, or obliged to answer and make satisfaction for it; or liable to the calamities and miseries to which it exposes. In such a manner it seems always to be used, unless in some few places it signifies to take away sin by forgiveness." Edwards, vol. viii. p. 515.

In my next I shall proceed to show that Christ bore the penalty of the law, or endured the punishment due to our sins.

Affectionately yours.

LETTER VI.

Nature of the Atonement.

MY DEAR BROTHER,

Agreeably to promise, I am to show, in

this letter,

III. That Christ, as our Redeemer, bore the penalty of the law, or endured the punishment of our sins.

It is admitted by the new school, that one person may suffer for another, but not that one can suffer the punishment due to another; and accordingly, while they affirm that Christ died and suffered for us, they strenuously deny that he was punished for us. "If," says one, "another person, of his own accord, offers to bear the suffering, which was due to me for my offences, he may do so. But it cannot be punishment to him. Punishment supposes guilt. He cannot take my actions upon himself, so that they shall become his own actions, and

cease to be mine. He cannot become guilty without his own personal transgression. If he suffers in my place, therefore, his sufferings are not punishment to him."* This reminds me of the manner in which Dr. Fuller attempts to prove that the sufferings of our blessed Redeemer were not the punishment of our sins. It was done by the magic of a definition. His definition is this: "Punishment is natural evil inflicted for PERSONAL guilt." Admitting the definition to be correct, his point was gained. But suppose his definition to be altered so as to suit our taste, and to read thus: Punishment is natural evil inflicted for personal, or IMPUTED sin: and what then becomes of his argument? To the author of the argument in the above quotation we readily concede that punishment supposes sin; we deny what he maintains, that it always supposes personal transgression. Jesus Christ, it has been proved, had the sins of his people imputed to him, and thus became

* Dialogues on Atonement, p. 20.

but

subject to the punishment of them. By this we do not mean, that he took their actions upon himself so that they became his own personal actions, and no longer the actions of his people. The absurdity of such a supposition has already been exposed. He consented to have them so charged to his account, that the punishment of them might be justly required of him. To maintain that punishment, in all cases, supposes personal guilt, is as unreasonable as to maintain that a person can never become responsible for any actions but his own personal actions. This, however, the common occurrences of civil life will prove unfounded. It is well known, that when a citizen has incurred the penalty of a violated law, and being unable to pay the fine, is liable to imprisonment, a friend may release him by assuming his obligation and paying his fine. When this is done there is no transfer of moral character; and no one is so absurd as to imagine the transaction implies that the offender's friend committed the trespass.

A man is apprehended as a murderer.