Page

NUMBER XII.

J. D.-Argument 5.-[That the theory of Necessity leaves no room for
reward or punishment.

.

64

ib.

ib.

The power of God alone is sufficient to justify any action He doth. 65
There is no difference between a will active and a will permissive, or a
will causing the act and a will causing the sin.

J. D.'s Reply.

The passage of St. Paul explained, as to its general scope.
in its particular passages.

1. How Jacob was loved and Esau hated.

2. Of the freedom of God's mercy.

3. In what sense God's glory is either the end or the consequence

of man's sin.

ib.

66

. 67

ib.

68

ib.

69

4. In what sense God is said to harden men's hearts.

There is a real difference between an operative and a permissive will. 71

How God is the cause of the act, yet not of the sin of the act.

God's

's justice not measured by His power, but by His will, and that

the will of One Who is perfect.

J. D.-Argument 1.- [Story of Zeno :-necessity of sin implies necessity

of punishment.

T. H.'s Answer.

J. D.'s Reply.]

NUMBER XIV.

J. D.-Argument 2.-[The doctrine of necessity overthrows the frame-work

of all human society.

T. H.'s Answer.

The law not unjust because the violation of it is necessary.

Necessity does not supersede consultation.

Nor admonition.

Nor praise or dispraise.

Nor the use of means.

J. D.'s Reply.

T. H.'s answer both irrelevant and untrue.

Laws de facto may be unjust.

Not all laws made by consent of those subject to them.

Punishment unjust for sin committed through antecedent necessity.

Temptation does not involve an antecedent necessity of sin.

Law useless on the theory of necessity.

Punishment vindicatory, not corrective only.

T. H.'s inconsistencies.

94

Right and wrong antecedent to human pacts.

Consultation does imply liberty, and does not necessitate determination. 96

Admonitions do imply liberty, because they are addressed to those only
who are conceived to be free.

Praise moral, although not praise metaphysical, does imply liberty.

Of rewards and punishments;-the parallel of brute beasts not re-

levant.

1. All the actions of brute beasts not necessary.

2. The terms reward and punishment applied to them by analogy

only.

98

888

ib.

100

ib.

101

ib.

3. They act in such cases, not from reason, but from sense of

present or memory of past joy or pain.]

NUMBER XV.

J. D.—Argument 3.—[The opinion of necessity inconsistent with piety.

T. H.'s Answer.

The opinion of necessity doth not involve impiety in right-minded men.

Nor exclude repentance.

T. H. denieth prayer to be either a cause or a means of God's

blessings.]

ib.

. 102

. 103

ib.

ib.

104

ib.

ib.

ib.

. 105

ib.

107

NUMBER XVI.

J. D.-Argument 4.-[The opinion of necessity destroys the variety and per-

NUMBER XVII.

Page

J. D.-Argument 5.-[If there be no true liberty, there is no formal sin.

T. H.'s Answer.

J. D.'s Reply.

Sin, to be sin, must be an act of a free will against a just law.]

114

[III. DISTINCTIONS MADE BY NECESSITARIANS.]

NUMBER XVIII.

J. D.-[Distinction i.-Between Stoical and Christian necessity.

1. That the Stoics subject God to destiny, they subject

destiny to God. .

116

ib.

2. That the Stoics hold a necessary connection of causes,

they hold God to be the one pervading Cause.

3. That the Stoics deny contingents, they admit them.

Distinction ii.-Between the First Cause, which necessitates all things, and

second causes, which do not.

ib.

ib.

117

T. H.'s Answer.]-Certain distinctions, which he supposing may be

brought to his arguments, are by him removed.

[T. H. disavows both distinctions.

J. D.'s Reply.

Christian necessity (so called) only disguised Stoical necessity.

The terms are employed by Lipsius.

The First Cause not a necessary cause of all effects.]

NUMBER XIX.

J. D.-[Distinction iii.-Between liberty from compulsion and liberty from

Liberty of exercise and liberty of specification cannot exist apart.

J. D.'s Reply..

Actions proceeding from fear are not compulsory actions.

Liberty of exercise not necessarily accompanied by liberty of specifi-

T. H.'s presumptuous censure of the doctors of the Church.]

ib.

128

. ib.

NUMBER XX.

J. D.-[Election opposed to coarctation as well as to coaction.

Elicit acts of the will cannot be necessitated.

T. H.'s Answer.

Election not inconsistent with necessity.

The distinction vain, between imperate and elicit acts of the will.

J. D.'s Reply.

Compulsion and necessitation both opposite to liberty.

Of mixed actions.

Of fear and other passions.

Motives cannot compel the will.

Liberty not ignorance of necessitation.

[IV. THEORIES CONCERNING THE CAUSE OF A SUPPOSED NECESSITY.]

NUMBER XXIII.

J. D.-[iv. The natural efficacy of the last dictate of the understanding.

The case otherwise in point of fact.

Such a cause neither extrinsecal nor antecedent.

The understanding may be equally balanced between two

alternatives.

T. H.'s Answer.

J. D.'s Reply.

The last feather breaketh the horse's back.

T. H.'s example of a man that strikes.

Of Medea's choice.

And Cæsar's.

Affection sometimes prevails against reason.

Page

147

ib.

ib.

148

ib.

J. D.'s Reply..

The aspect of God.

Events necessarily determined by antecedent and extrinsecal causes.

Eternity not an indivisible point but a succession.

A certain and received truth not to be deserted because it is hard to

be understood.

How contingent events are reconcileable with God's prescience and

decrees.

Necessity not identical with God's decrees.

Other explanations have been offered of the subject besides the
author's.

Of actions done without present deliberation.

Actions done in passion justly punished, because done through past

or present choice.]

NUMBER XXVI.

T. H.-[ii. Of actions done with deliberation.

J. D.'s Reply.].

ib.

ib.

160

161

162

ib.

. 163

. 164