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I.

will, and purpose of man, had a sufficient and therefore a DISCOURSE necessary cause; and consequently every voluntary action was necessitated. An action therefore may be voluntary and a sin, and nevertheless be necessary. And because God may afflict by right derived from His omnipotency, though sin were not; and the example of punishment on voluntary sinners is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less frequent; for God to punish such sinners, as I have shewed before, is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his objections, both out of Scripture and reason.

J. D.-" Scis tu simulare cupressum, quid hoc1?" It was [Reply.] shrewd counsel which Alcibiades gave to Themistocles, when he was busy about his accounts to the state, that he should rather study how to make no accounts". So, it seems, T. H. thinks it a more compendious way to baulk an argument, than to satisfy it. And if he can produce a Rowland against an Oliver, if he can urge a reason against a reason, he thinks he hath quitted himself fairly. But it will not serve his turn. And that he may not complain of misunderstanding it, as those who have a politic deafness, to hear nothing but what liketh them, I will first reduce mine argument into form, and then weigh what he saith in answer or rather in opposition to it. That opinion which takes away the formal reason of sin, and by consequence sin itself, is not to be approved.—This is clear, because both reason and religion, nature and Scripture, do prove, and the whole world confesseth, that there is sin.But this opinion of the necessity of all things, by reason of a conflux of second causes ordered and determined by the First Cause, doth take away the very formal reason of sin.-This is proved thus. That which makes sin itself to be good and just and lawful, takes away the formal cause, and destroys the essence, of sin; for if sin be good and just and lawful, it is no more evil, it is no sin, no anomy. But this opinion of the necessity of all things makes sin to be very good and just and lawful: for nothing can flow essentially by way of physical determination from the First Cause, which is the law

[Above T. H. Numb. xiv. p. 85.] [Horat., A.P., 19, 20.]

BRAMHALL.

I

m [Plut., in Vitâ Alcib., tom. ii. pp. 11, 12. ed. Bryant.]

III.

PART and rule of goodness and justice, but that which is good and just and lawful; but this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by way of physical determination from the First Cause, as appears in T. H. his whole discourse. Neither is it material at all, whether it proceed immediately from the First Cause, or mediately; so as it be by a necessary flux of second and determinate causes, which produce it inevitably. To these proofs he answers nothing, but only by denying the first "consequence," as he calls it; and then sings over his [Sin, to be old song, that "the nature of sin consisteth in this, that the be the act action proceeds from our will, and be against the law:" which of a free will in our sense is most true, if he understand a just law, and a just law.] free rational will; but supposing (as he doth), that the law enjoins things impossible in themselves to be done, then it is an unjust and tyrannical law, and the transgression of it is no sin, not to do that which never was in our power to do; and supposing likewise (as he doth), that the will is inevitably determined by special influence from the First Cause, then it is not man's will, but God's will, and flows essentially from the law of goodness.

sin, must

against a

That which he adds of a "judge," is altogether impertinent as to his defence. Neither is a civil judge the proper judge, nor the law of the land the proper rule, of sin. But it makes strongly against him. For the judge goes upon a good ground. And even this which he confesseth,—that the judge "looks at no higher cause than the will of the doer,"-proves, that the will of the doer did determine itself freely, and that the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would. Certainly, a judge ought to look at all material circumstances, and much more at all essential causes. Whether every

"sufficient cause" be a necessary cause, will come to be
examined more properly Numb. xxxi. For the present it 692
shall suffice to say, that liberty flows from the sufficiency,
and contingency from the debility, of the cause. Nature
never intends the generation of a monster.
concur sufficiently, a perfect creature is produced; but by
reason of the insufficiency, or debility, or contingent aber-
ration of some of the causes, sometimes a monster is pro-
duced. Yet the causes of a monster were sufficient for the

b [Below pp. 171-173.]

If all the causes

I.

5.-Rom.

production of that which was produced, that is, a monster; DISCOURSE otherwise a monster had not been produced. What is it then? A monster is not produced by virtue of that order which is set in nature, but by the contingent aberration of some of the natural causes in their concurrence. The order set in nature is, that every like should beget its like. But supposing the concurrence of the causes to be such as it is in the generation of a monster, the generation of a monster is necessary; as all the events in the world are, when they are; that is, by a hypothetical necessity. Then he betakes himself to his old help,-that God may punish "by right of omnipotence, though there were no sin." The question is not now, what God may do, but what God will do, according to that covenant which He hath made with man,-" Fac hoc [Lev. xviii. et vives"—" Do this and thou shalt live;"-whether God doth x. 5.] punish any man contrary to this covenant. "O Israel, thy Hosea xiii. destruction is from thyself, but in Me is thy help." He that 9. "wills not the death of a sinner," doth much less will the death of an innocent creature. By death or destruction in this discourse, the only separation of soul and body is not intended, which is a debt of nature, and which God, as lord of life and death, may justly do, and make it not a punishment but a blessing to the party; but we understand the subjecting of the creature to eternal torments. Lastly, he tells of that benefit which redounds to others from exemplary justice which is most true, but not according to his own grounds; for neither is it justice to punish a man for doing that which it was impossible always for him not to do, neither is it lawful to punish an innocent person "that good may [Rom. iii. 8.] come" of it and if his opinion of absolute necessity of all things were true, the destinies of men could not be altered, either by examples or fear of punishment.

[DISTINCTIONS MADE BY NECESSITARIANS.]

NUMBER XVIII.

J. D. But the patrons of necessity being driven out of the plain field with reason, have certain retreats or distinctions, which they fly unto for refuge.

PART
III.

[Distinc

tion i. Between

Stoical and

Stoics sub

ject God to destiny,

they subject destiny to God.]

1. First, they distinguish between Stoical necessity and Christian necessity, between which they make a threefold difference.

First, say they, the Stoics did "subject Jupiter to destiny," Christian necessity.] but we "subject destiny to God." I answer, that the Stoical 1.[That the and Christian destiny are one and the same;—“fatum quasi effatum Jovis." Hear Seneca ;-"Destiny is the necessity of all things and actions, depending upon the disposition of Jupiter," &c. I add, that the Stoics left a greater liberty to Jupiter over destiny, than these Stoical Christians do to God over His decrees; either for the beginnings of things, as Euripides, or for the progress of them, as Chrysippus', or at least of the circumstances of time and place, as all of them generally. So Virgil,-" Sed trahere et moras duceres," &c. So Osiris, in Apuleius, promiseth him to prolong his life "ultra fato constituta tempora"-"beyond the times set down by the destinies h."

2.[That the

Stoics hold

of causes,

they hold

God to be the one pervading cause.]

Next, they say, that the Stoics did "hold an eternal flux and a necessary necessary connexion of causes," but they believe that God connexion doth act "præter et contra naturam”—“ besides and against nature." I answer, that it is not much material, whether they attribute necessity to God, or to the stars, or to a connexion of causes, so as they establish necessity. The former reasons do not only condemn the ground or foundation of necessity, but much more necessity itself, upon what ground soever. Either they must run into this absurdity,-that the effect is determined, the cause remaining undetermined,or else hold such a necessary connexion of causes as the Stoics did.

3. [That the Stoics

Lastly, they say, the Stoics did "take away liberty and deny con- contingence," but they "admit" it. I answer, what liberty or

tingents,
[From Lipsius, De Constantiâ,
they admit lib. i. c. 20, Op. tom. ii. p. 12. fol.
them.]
Lugd. 1613 from whom what follows
in the text is taken.]

d ["Quid enim intelligis fatum?
existimo necessitatem rerum omnium
actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat."
Senec., Nat. Quæst., lib. ii. c. 36;-
"Hunc eundem" (Jovem) "et fatum
si dixeris non mentieris; nam cum
fatum nihil aliud sit quam series im-
plexa causarum, ille est prima omnium
causa, ex quâ cæteræ pendent." Id.,
De Benef., lib. iv. c. 7.]

[See e. g. his Supplices, vv. 734— 736. ed. Barnes; &c.]

f [See Aul. Gell., vi. 2; and Euseb., Præp. Evang., lib. vi. c. 7. pp. 255, B, C, 257. C. fol. Paris, 1628; and Plut., De Placit. Philos., § 28, Op. Moral. tom. iv. p. 376. ed. Wyttenb.]

[" At trahere atque moras tantis licet addere rebus." Virg., Æn., vii. 315.]

h["Scies ultra statuta fato tuo spatia vitam quoque tibi prorogare mihi tantum licere." L. Apul., Metam., lib. xi. p. 367. in usum Delph.-"Osiris" in the text is a mistake for "Isis."]

I.

contingence was it they admit, but a titular liberty, and an DISCOURSE empty shadow of contingence? who do profess stiffly, that all actions and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, in any other place, time, number, order, measure, nor to any other end, 693 than they are; and that in respect of God, determining them to one. What a poor ridiculous liberty or contingence is this! 2. Secondly, they distinguish between the First Cause and [Distincthe second causes. They say, that in respect of the second Between causes many things are free, but in respect of the First Cause the First all things are necessary. This answer may be taken away two ways.

tion ii.

Cause, which necessitates all things, and second

which do

not.]

1. [The two parts of

this dis

tinction

each

First, so contraries shall be true together: the same thing causes, at the same time shall be determined to one, and not determined to one; the same thing at the same time must necessarily be, and yet may not be. Perhaps they will say, not in the same respect. But that which strikes at the root of this contradict question is this;-if all the causes were only collateral, this other.] exception might have some colour; but where all the causes, being joined together and subordinate one to another, do make but one total cause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series or subordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt makes the effect necessary. Necessity or liberty is not to be esteemed from one cause, but from all the causes joined together. If one link in a chain be fast, it fastens all the rest.

First Cause

second

must be so

Secondly, I would have them tell me, whether the second 2. [The causes be predetermined by the First Cause or not. If they being be determined, then the effect is necessary, even in respect of necessary, the second causes. If the second cause be not determined, causes how is the effect determined, the second cause remaining un- likewise.] determined? Nothing can give that to another which it hath not itself. But, say they, nevertheless, the power or faculty remaineth free. True, but not in order to the act, if it be once determined. It is free in sensu diviso,' but not ' in sensu composito.' When a man holds a bird fast in his hand, is she therefore free to fly where she will, because she hath wings? Or a man imprisoned or fettered, is he therefore free to walk where he will, because he hath feet and i [Lips., De Const., lib. i. c. 19; Op. tom. ii. p. 11.]

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