I. content, that there may be a freedom from compulsion and DISCOURSE yet no freedom from necessitation; as hath been proved in that, that a man may be necessitated to some actions without threats and without fear of danger. But how he can avoid the consisting together of freedom and necessity, supposing God and good angels are freer than men and yet do good necessarily, that we must now examine. "I confess" (saith he), "that God and good angels are [Degrees of liberty immore free than we; that is, intensively, in degree of free- possible.] dom, not extensively, in the latitude of the object; according to a liberty of exercise, not of specification." Again, we have here two distinctions, that are no distinctions; but made to seem so by terms, invented by I know not whom to cover ignorance and blind the understanding of the reader. For it cannot be conceived, that there is any liberty greater than for a man to do what he will, and to forbear what he will. One heat may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than another. He that can do what he will, hath all liberty possible; and he that cannot, has none at all. exercise cation can apart.] Also liberty (as he says the Schools call it) of "exercise," [Liberty of which is (as I have said before) a liberty to do or not to and liberty do, cannot be without a liberty (which they call) of "speci- of specifification," that is to say, a liberty to do or not to do this or not exist that in particular; for how can a man conceive, that he has liberty to do anything, that hath not liberty to do this or that or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this and that and every other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than he that hath no licence at all? 696 You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the Schools. And I do not doubt, but that the imposing of them by authority of doctors in the Church hath been a great cause that men have laboured, though by sedition and evil courses, to shake them off: for nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannising over man's reason and understanding; especially when it is done, not by the Scripture, but by pretence of learning and more judgment than that of other men. [See above T. H. Numb. iv. p. 34.] PART [Reply.] 1. [Actions proceeding from fear are not compulsory actions.] J. D.-He who will speak with some of our great undertakers about the grounds of learning, had need either to speak by an interpreter, or to learn a new language (I dare not call it "jargon" or canting), lately devised, not to set forth the truth, but to conceal falsehood. He must learn a new liberty, a new necessity, a new contingency, a new sufficiency, a new spontaneity, a new kind of deliberation, a new kind of election, a new eternity, a new compulsion, and, in conclusion, a new nothing. This proposition,—“ The will is free,'-may be understood in two senses; either that the will is not compelled, or that the will is not always necessitated for if it be ordinarily or at any time free from necessitation, my assertion is true, that there is freedom from necessity. The former sense-that the will is not compelled -is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable. "Voluntas non cogitur." For, if the will may be compelled, then it may both will and not will the same thing at the same time under the same notion; but this implies a contradiction. Yet this author (like the good woman whom her husband sought up the stream when she was drowned, upon pretence that when she was living, she used to go contrary courses to all other people), -he holds, that true compulsion and fear may make a man will that which he doth not will, that is, in his sense, may compel the will; "as when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed." I answer, that T. H. mistakes sundry ways in this discourse. First, he erreth in this,-to think, that actions proceeding from fear are properly compulsory actions; which in truth are not only voluntary but free actions, neither compelled, nor so much as physically necessitated. Another man, at the same time, in the same ship, in the same storm, may choose, and the same individual man otherwise advised might choose, not to throw his goods overboard. It is the man himself, who chooseth freely this means to preserve his life. It is true, that if he were not in such a condition, or if he were freed from the grounds of his present fears, he would not choose neither the casting of his goods into the sea nor the submitting to his enemy. But considering the present exigence of [See above T. H. Numb. iv. p. 31.] Secund., Qu. vi. art. 6.] s [See Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prim. I. his affairs, reason dictates to him, that of two inconveniences DISCOURSE the less is to be chosen, as a comparative good. Neither doth he will this course as the end or direct object of his desires, but as the means to attain his end. And what fear doth in these cases, love, hope, hatred, &c., may do in other cases; that is, may occasion a man to elect those means to obtain his willed end, which otherwise he would not elect. As Jacob, to serve seven years more, rather than not to enjoy [Gen. xxix. his beloved Rachel; the merchant, to hazard himself upon 28.] the rough seas, in hope of profit. Passions may be so violent, that they may necessitate the will; that is, when they prevent deliberations; but this is rarely, and then the will is not free: but they never properly compel it. That which is compelled, is against the will; and that which is against the will, is not willed. sion extrin Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that "a 2. [Proper man is then only said to be compelled when fear makes him compul willing to" an action. As if force were not more prevalent secal.] with a man than fear. We must know therefore, that this word "compelled" is taken two ways: sometimes improperly, that is, when a man is moved or occasioned by threats or fear, or any passion, to do that which he would not have done, if those threats or that passion had not been: sometimes it is taken properly, when we do anything against our own inclination, moved by an external cause, the will not consenting nor concurring but resisting as much as it can; as in a rape, or when a Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the idol's temple, or as in the case of St. Peter-" Another shall John xxi. gird thee, and carry thee whither thou wouldst not." This is that compulsion which is understood when we say, the will may be letted, or changed, or necessitated; or that the im697 perate actions of the will (that is, the actions of the inferior faculties which are ordinarily moved by the will') may be compelled, but that the immanent actions of the will, that is, to will, to choose, cannot be compelled, because it is the nature of an action properly compelled to be done by an extrinsecal cause without the concurrence of the will". 18. Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man 3. [Men orbe free, but whether they be ordinarily free. Suppose some not always, 131. [ See [See below Numb. xx. pp. 130, u [Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Secund., Qu. vi. art. 4.] dinarily, free.] III. [Wisdom upon PART passions are so sudden and violent, that they surprise a man, and "betray the succours" of the soul, and prevent deliberaxvii. 12.] tion; as we see in some "motus primo primi," or antipathies, how some men will run upon the most dangerous objects the first view of a loathed creature, without any power to contain themselves. Such actions as these, as they are not ordinary, so they are not free; because there is no deliberation nor election. But where deliberation and election are, as when a man throws his goods overboard to save the ship, or submits to his enemy to save his life, there is always true liberty. [Hypothe Though T. H. slight the two reasons which I produce in tical neces- favour of his cause, yet they who urged them, deserved not to sity.] be slighted, unless it were because they were Schoolmen. The former reason is thus framed ;-a necessity of supposition may consist with true liberty, but that necessity which flows from the natural and extrinsecal determination of the will is a necessity of supposition. To this my answer is in effect,that a necessity of supposition is of two kinds. Sometimes the thing supposed is in the power of the agent to do or not to do as for a Romish priest to vow continence, upon supposition that he be a Romish priest, is necessary, but because it was in his power to be a priest or not to be a priest, therefore his vow is a free act. So, supposing a man to have taken physic, it is necessary that he keep at home; yet, because it was in his power to take a medicine or not to take it, therefore his keeping at home is free. Again, sometimes the thing supposed is not in the power of the agent to do or not to do. Supposing a man to be extremely sick, it is necessary that he keep at home; or supposing that a man hath a natural antipathy against a cat, he runs necessarily away so soon as he sees her. Because this antipathy and this sickness are not in the power of the party affected, therefore these [Gen. xlix.] acts are not free. Jacob blessed his sons; Balaam blessed [Numb. xxiii,xxiv.] Israel; these two acts, being done, are both necessary upon supposition: but it was in Jacob's power not to have blessed his sons; so was it not in Balaam's power not to have blessed Israel. Jacob's will was determined by himself; Balaam's will was physically determined by God. Therefore Jacob's benediction proceeded from his own free election; and Balaam's from God's determination. So was Caiaphas his Numb. xxii. 38. I. John xi. 51. prophecy. Therefore the text saith, "He spake not of him- DISCOURSE self." To this T. H. saith nothing: but only declareth by an impertinent instance, what "hypothetical" signifies; and then adviseth your Lordship to take notice, how errors and ignorance may be cloaked under grave scholastic terms. And I do likewise entreat your Lordship to take notice, that the greatest fraud and cheating lurks commonly under the pretence of plain dealing. We see jugglers commonly strip up their sleeves, and promise extraordinary fair dealing, before they begin to play their tricks. [Of God, and of good angels.] Concerning the second argument, drawn from the liberty of God and the good angels, as I cannot but approve his modesty in suspending his judgment concerning the manner how God and the good angels do work, necessarily or freely, because he "finds it not set down in the articles of our faith, or the decrees of our Church;" especially in this age, which is so full of atheism, and of those scoffers which St. Peter prophesied of, who neither believe that there is God or angels, 2 Pet. iii. 3. or that they have a soul, but only as salt, to keep their bodies from putrefaction; so I can by no means assent unto him in that which follows: that is to say, that he hath "proved" that liberty and necessity of the same kind may "consist together," that is, a liberty of exercise with a necessity of exercise, or a liberty of specification with a necessity of specification. Those actions, which he saith are necessitated by passion, are for the most part dictated by reason, either truly or apparently right, and resolved by the will itself. But it troubles him that I say, that "God and the good angels are more free than men intensively, in the degree of freedom, but not extensively, in the latitude of the object, 698 according to a liberty of exercise but not of specification;" which, he saith, "are no distinctions," but "terms invented to cover ignorance." Good words. Doth he only see? Are all other men stark blind? By his favour, they are true and necessary distinctions. And if he alone do not conceive them, it is because distinctions, as all other things, have their fates according to the capacities or prejudices of their readers. But he urgeth two reasons. "One heat," saith he, "may [Degrees be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than possible.] of liberty |