I. said in English, a voluntary action; but that they that DISCOURSE invented the term, understood not anything it signified. Secondly, you may observe, that "actus elicitus" is exemplified by these words, "to will, to elect, to choose," which are all one; and so to will is here made an act of the will. And indeed, as the will is a faculty or power in a man's soul, so to will is an act of it according to that power. But as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or "drawn" by fair means out of the ability to dance; so it is also to say, that to will is an act allured or "drawn out" of the power to will, which power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the sum of his distinction is, that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion, that is to say, by foul means, but to will that, or any act, cannot be but by allurement or fair means. Now, seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements, produce the action which they do produce, as necessarily as threatening and foul means, it follows, that to will may be made as necessary as anything that is done by compulsion. So that the distinction of "actus imperatus," and "actus elicitus" are but words, and of no effect against necessity. sion and tion both J. D.-In the next place follow two reasons of mine own [Reply. ] against the same distinction; the one taken from the former grounds, that election cannot consist with determination to one. To this (he saith) he hath "answered already." No, truth is founded upon a rock; he hath been so far from prevailing against it, that he hath not been able to shake it. Now again he tells us, that "election is not opposite to [Compuleither" (necessitation or compulsion). He might even as necessitawell tell us, that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally; opposite to or that a woman can be ravished with her own will. Consent liberty.] takes away the rape. This is the strangest liberty that ever was heard of;-that a man is compelled to do what he would not, and yet is free to do what he will. And this he tells us upon the old score, that he "who submits to his enemy for fear of death, chooseth to submit." But we have seen formerly, that this, which he calls compulsion, is not compulsion properly, nor that natural determination of the will to one, which is opposite to true liberty. He who submits to [Above T. H. Numb. xix. pp. 124, &c.] PART [Of mixed actions.] an enemy for saving his life, doth either only counterfeit ;— and then there is no will to submit; this disguise is no more than a stepping aside to avoid a present blow; or else he doth sincerely will a submission, and then the will is changed. There is a vast difference between compelling and changing the will. Either God or man may change the will of man, either by varying the condition of things, or by informing the party otherwise; but compelled it cannot be: that is, it cannot both will this and not nill this, as it is invested with the same circumstances, though, if the act were otherwise circumstantiated, it might nill that freely which now it wills freely. Wherefore these kind of actions are called mixed 701 actions, that is, partly voluntary, partly unvoluntary. That which is compelled, is a man's present condition or distress; that is not voluntary nor chosen. That which is chosen, is the remedy of [his] distress; that is voluntary. So, hypothetically, supposing a man were not in that distress, they are involuntary; but absolutely, without any supposition at all, taking the case as it is, they are voluntary. His other instance, of "a man forced to prison," that he "may choose whether he will be haled thither upon the ground or walk upon his feet," is not true. By his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it pleaseth them who have him in their power. If they will drag him, he is not free to walk; and if they give him leave to walk, he is not forced to be dragged. [Of fear, Having laid this foundation, he begins to build upon it;-passions.] that "other passions do necessitate as much as fear." But he errs doubly; first, in his foundation. Fear doth not determine the rational will naturally and necessarily. The last and greatest of the five terrible things is death; yet the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to do a dishonest action, which is worse than death. The fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three children to worship an idol; nor the fear of the lions necessitate Daniel to omit his duty to God. It is our frailty, that we are more afraid of empty shadows than of substantial dangers, because they are nearer our senses; as little children fear a mouse or a vizard, and other [Dan. iii. 16-18.] [Dan. vi. 4 [“Όσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τε, . . . μικταὶ εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, Ἐοίκασι 8è uâλλov éкovolois." Aristot., Ethic., III. i. 4, 6.] ["its" in the original edition.] f [Scil. “Αδοξία, πενία, νόσος, ἀφιλία, Bávaros." Aristot., Ethic., III. vi. 3.]| I. 4, [5.] 26. xiii.] more than fire or weather. But as a fit of the stone takes DISCOURSE away the sense of the gout for the present, so the greater passion doth extinguish the less. The fear of God's wrath and eternal torments, doth expel corporal fear. "Fear not Luke [xii.] them who kill the body, but fear Him who is able to cast both body and soul into Hell."-" Da veniam imperator, tu carcerem, Ille gehennam minatur”—“ Excuse me, O emperor, thou threatenest men with prison, but He threatens me with hells." Secondly, he errs in his superstruction also. There is a great difference, as to this case of justifying or not justifying an action, between force, and fear and other passions. Force doth not only lessen the sin, but takes it quite away. He who forced a betrothed damsel was to die; "but unto the damsel" (saith He) "thou shalt do nothing, there is Deut. xxii, in her no fault worthy of death." Tamar's beauty, or Amnon's love, did not render him innocent; but Amnon's [2 Sam. force rendered Tamar innocent. But fear is not so prevalent as force. Indeed, if fear be great and justly grounded, such as may fall upon a constant man, though it do not dispense with the transgression of the negative precepts of God or nature, because they bind to all times, yet it diminisheth the offence, even against them, and pleads for pardon. But it dispenseth in many cases with the transgression of the positive law, either Divine or human; because it is not probable, that God or the law would oblige man to the observation of all positive precepts with so great damage as the loss of his life. The omission of circumcision was no sin, whilst the [Josh. v. 2-7.] Israelites were travelling through the wilderness. By T. H. his permission, I will propose a case to him. A gentleman sends his servant with money to buy his dinner; some ruffians meet him by the way, and take it from him by force; the servant cried for help, and did what he could to defend himself, but all would not serve. The servant is innocent, if he was to be tried before a court of Areopagites. Or suppose the ruffians did not take it from him by force, but drew their swords and threatened to kill him, except he delivered it himself; no wise man will conceive, that it was either the master's intention, or the servant's duty, to hazard his life, or his limbs, for saving of such a trifling sum. But, on the [Aug., De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxii; Op. tom. v. p. 362. F.] III. PART other side, suppose this servant, passing by some cabaret or tennis-court, where his comrades were drinking or playing, should stay with them, and drink or play away his money, and afterwards plead, as T. H. doth here, that he was overcome by the mere strength of temptation: I trow, neither T. H. nor any man else would admit of this excuse, but punish him for it; because neither was he necessitated by the temptation, and what strength it had, was by his own fault, in respect of that vicious habit which he had conJames i. 14. tracted of drinking or gaming. "Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed." ordered passions of anger, hatred, lust, if they be consequent (as the case is here put by T. H.) and flow from deliberation and election, they do not only not diminish the fault, but they aggravate it, and render it much greater. [Motives cannot compel the will.] Dis He talks much of "the motives to do, and the motives to forbear," how they "work upon" and determine a man: as if a 702 reasonable man were no more than a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by the rackets of the second causes; as if the will had no power to move itself, but were merely passive, like an artificial popinjay removed hither and thither by the bolts of the archers, who shoot on this side and on that. What are "motives" but reasons or discourses framed by the understanding, and freely moved by the will? What are the will and the understanding but faculties of the same soul? And what is liberty but a power resulting from them both? To say that the will is determined by these motives, is as much as to say, that the agent is determined by himself. If there be no necessitation before the judgment of right reason doth dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent, no extrinsecal necessitation at all. All the world knows, that when the agent is determined by himself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause. But if he determined himself freely, then the effect is free. Motives determine not naturally, but morally; which kind of determination may consist with true liberty. But if T. H. his opinion were true, that the will were naturally determined by the physical and special influence of extrinsecal causes,-not only motives were vain, but reason itself and deliberation were vain. No, saith he, they are not vain, because they are the " means." Yes, if I. necessita the means be superfluous, they are vain. What needed such DISCOURSE a circuit of deliberation to advise what is fit to be done, when it is already determined extrinsecally what must be done? He saith, that the ignorance of the true causes and their [Liberty not ignopower is the reason, why we ascribe the effect to liberty; but rance of when we seriously consider the causes of things, we acknow- tion.] ledge a necessity. No such thing, but just the contrary. The more we consider, and the clearer we understand, the greater is the liberty, and the more the knowledge of our own liberty. The less we consider, and the more incapable that the understanding is, the lesser is the liberty, and the knowledge of it. And where there is no consideration, nor use of reason, there is no liberty at all, there is neither moral good nor evil. Some men, by reason that their exterior senses are not totally bound, have a trick to walk in their sleep. Suppose such an one in that case should cast himself down a pair of stairs, or from a bridge, and break his neck, or drown himself, it were a mad jury that would find this man accessary to his own death. Why? Because it was not freely done; he had not then the use of reason. pertinent Lastly, he tells us, that "the will doth choose of necessity," [T. H.'s imas well as "the fire burns of necessity." If he intend no instance of more but this, that election is the proper and natural act of fire burning.] the will, as burning is of the fire, or that the elective power is as necessarily in a man as the ustive in the fire; he speaks truly, but most impertinently. For the question is not now of the elective power "in actu primo," whether it be an essential faculty of the soul; but whether the act of electing this or that particular object be free, and undetermined by any antecedent and extrinsecal causes. But if he intend it in this other sense,-that as the fire hath no power to suspend its burning, nor to distinguish between those combustible matters which are put unto it, but burns that which is put unto it necessarily if it be combustible, so the will hath no power to refuse that which it wills, nor to suspend its own appetite, he errs grossly. The will hath power either to will, or nill, or to suspend, that is, neither to will nor nill the same object. Yet even the burning of the fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances, is not otherwise so necessary an action as T. H. imagineth. |