PART should weigh each action thus, yet he doth not; so still there is liberty.

III.

[The understand

equally balanced between

Thirdly, I conceive it is possible, in this mist and weakness ing may be of human apprehension, for two actions to be so equally circumstantiated, that no discernible difference can appear between them upon discussion. As suppose a chirurgeon should give two plasters to his patient, and bid him apply either of them to his wound; what can induce his reason more to the one than to the other, but that he may refer it to chance, whether he will use?

two alternatives.]

[Answer.]

But leaving these probable speculations, which I submit to better judgments, I answer the philosopher briefly thus:— admitting that the will did necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding, as certainly in many things it doth; yet, first, this is no extrinsecal determination from without, and a man's own resolution is not destructive to his own liberty, but depends upon it. So the person is still free. Secondly, this determination is not antecedent, but joined with the action. The understanding and the will are not different agents, but distinct faculties of the same soul. Here is an infallibility, or a hypothetical necessity; as we say, "Quicquid est, quando est, necesse est esset:" a necessity of consequence, but not a necessity of consequent. Though an agent have certainly determined, and so the action be become infallible, yet, if the agent did determine freely, the action likewise is free.

T. H.-The fourth opinion which he rejecteth, is of them that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding. But it seems he understands that tenet in another sense than I do. For he speaketh, as if they that held it did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every action they do, great and small, to the least grain; which is a thing that he thinks with reason to be untrue. But I understand it to signify, that the will follows the last opinion or judgment immediately preceding the action, concerning whether it be good to do it or not; whether he hath weighed it long before or not at all. And that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it. As, for example,

t [See above, p. 25. note c.]

when a man strikes, his will to strike follows necessarily that DISCOURSE thought he had of the sequel of his stroke immediately before the lifting of his hand. Now, if it be understood in that sense, the last dictate of the understanding does certainly necessitate the action; though not as the whole cause, yet as the last cause; as the last feather necessitates the breaking of a horse's back, when there are so many laid on before as there needeth but the addition of that one to make the weight sufficient. That which he allegeth against this, is, first, out of a poet, who in the person of Medea says, "Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor." But the saying (as pretty as it is) is not true; for though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her judgment was, that the present revenge of her husband outweighed them all. And thereupon that wicked action followed necessarily. Then the story of the Roman, that of 708 two competitors said, one had the better reasons, but the other must have the office. This also maketh against him; for the last dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing of the office, was this, that it was better to take a great bribe than reward a great merit. Thirdly, he objects, that "things nearer the senses move more powerfully than reason." What followeth thence but this, that the sense of the present good is commonly more immediate to the action, than the foresight of the evil consequents to come? Fourthly, whereas he says, that "do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his son than for the sin of his soul;" it makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding, but it argues plainly, that sorrow for sin is not voluntary: and, by consequence, repentance proceedeth from causes.

J. D.-The fourth pretence alleged against liberty was, [Reply. ] that the will doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding. This objection is largely answered before in several places of this reply; and particularly, Numb. vii." In my former discourse, I gave two answers to it: the one certain and undoubted, that supposing the last dictate of the understanding did always determine the will, yet this determination being not antecedent in time, nor proceeding from [Above pp. 42-44.]

III.

PART extrinsecal causes, but from the proper resolution of the agent, who had now freely determined himself, it makes no absolute necessity, but only hypothetical,-upon supposition that the agent hath determined his own will after this or that manner. Which being the main answer, T. H. is so far from taking it away, that he takes no notice of it. The other part of mine answer was probable: that it is not always certain, that the will doth always actually follow the last dictate of the understanding, though it always ought to follow it. Of which I gave then three reasons. One was, that actions may be so equally circumstantiated, or the case so intricate, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, but leaves the election to liberty or chance. To this he answers not a word. Another of my reasons was, because reason doth not weigh, nor is bound to weigh, the convenience or inconvenience of every individual action to the uttermost grain in the balance of true judgment. The truth of this reason is confessed by T. H.; though he might have had more abettors in this than in the most part of his discourse-that nothing is indifferent, that a man cannot stroke his beard on one side, but it was either necessary to do it, or sinful to omit it: -from which confession of his it follows, that in all those actions, wherein reason doth not define what is most convenient, there the will is free from the determination of the understanding, and by consequence the "last feather" is wanting, "to break the horse's back." A third reason was, because passions and affections sometimes prevail against judgment, as I proved by the example of Medea and Cæsar, by the nearness of the objects to the senses, and by the estimation of a temporal loss more than sin. Against this reason his whole answer is addressed.

[The last feather

the horse's back.]

And, first, he explaineth the sense of the assertion by the breaketh comparison of the "last feather," wherewith he seems to be delighted, seeing he useth it now the second time. But let him like it as he will, it is improper, for three reasons. First, the determination of the judgment is no part of the weight, but is the sentence of the trier. The understanding weigheth all things, objects, means, circumstances, convenience, inconvenience; but itself is not weighed. Secondly, the sensitive

* [See above, Numb. xi. p. 62; and T. H. Numb. xi. p. 59.]

I.

passion in some extraordinary cases may give a counterfeit DISCOURSE weight to the object, if it can detain or divert reason from the balance; but ordinarily the means, circumstances, and causes concurrent,-they have their whole weight from the understanding; so as they do not press "the horse's back" at all until reason lay them on. Thirdly, he conceives, that as each feather hath a certain natural weight, whereby it concurs not arbitrarily but necessarily towards the overcharging of the horse, so all objects and causes have a natural efficiency, whereby they do physically determine the will; which is a great mistake. His objects, his agents, his motives, his passions, and all his concurrent causes, ordinarily do only move the will morally, not determine it naturally; so as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion over itself.

ample of a

His other example,—of a man that strikes, "whose will to [T. H.'s exstrike followeth necessarily that thought he had of the sequel man that of his stroke immediately before the lifting up of his hand," strikes.] -as it confounds passionate, indeliberate thoughts, with the dictates of right reason, so it is very uncertain; for between the cup and the lips, between the lifting up of the hand and the blow, the will may alter, and the judgment also: and, 709 lastly, it is impertinent; for that necessity of striking proceeds from the free determination of the agent, and not from the special influence of any outward determining causes. And so it is only a necessity upon supposition.

dea's

Concerning Medea's choice, the strength of the argument [of Medoth not lie either in the fact of Medea, which is but a fic- choice.] tion, or in the authority of the poet, who writes things rather to be admired than believed, but in the experience of all men, who find it to be true in themselves :-that sometimes reason doth shew unto a man the exorbitancy of his passion, that what he desires is but a pleasant good, that what he loseth by such a choice is an honest good, that that which is honest is to be preferred before that which is pleasant; yet the will pursues that which is pleasant, and neglects that which is honest. St. Paul saith as much in earnest as is feigned of Rom. vii. Medea;-that he "approved not that which" he "did," and that he "did that which" he "hated." The Roman story is [And mistaken; there was no bribe in the case but affection. Caesar's. ]

15.

PART Whereas I urge, that those things which are

III.

prevails

against reason. ]

nearer to the senses," do "move more powerfully," he lays hold on it; and without answering to that for which I produced it, infers, "that the sense of present good is more immediate to the action than the foresight of evil consequents:" which is true, but it is not absolutely true by any antecedent necessity. Let a man do what he may do, and what he ought to do; and sensitive objects will lose that power which they have by his own fault and neglect. Antecedent or indeliberate concupiscence doth sometimes (but rarely) surprise a man, and render the action not free. But consequent and deliberated concupiscence, which proceeds from the rational will, doth render the action more free, not less free; and introduceth only a necessity upon supposition.

[Affection Lastly, he saith, that a man's mourning "more for the loss sometimes of his child than for his sin, makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding." Yes, very much. Reason dictates, that a sin committed is a greater evil than the loss of a child, and ought more to be lamented for; yet we see daily, how affection prevails against the dictate of reason. That which he infers from hence,-that "sorrow for sin is not voluntary, and by consequence that repentance proceedeth from causes," —is true, as to the latter part of it, but not in his sense. The "causes" from whence repentance doth proceed, are God's grace preventing, and man's will concurring. God prevents freely, man concurs freely. Those inferior agents, which sometimes do concur as subordinate to the grace of God, do not, cannot, determine the will naturally. And therefore the former part of his inference,-that "sorrow for sin is not voluntary,"-is untrue, and altogether groundless. That is much more truly and much more properly said to be voluntary, which proceeds from judgment, and from the rational will, than that which proceeds from passion, and from the sensitive will. One of the main grounds of all T. H. his errors in this question is, that he acknowledgeth no efficacy but that which is natural. Hence is this wild consequence-"repentance hath causes," and therefore it "is not voluntary." Free effects have free causes; necessary effects necessary causes; voluntary effects have sometimes free, sometimes necessary causes.