NUMBER XXIV. DISCOURSE crees of God.] J. D.-Fifthly, and lastly, the divine labours to find out a [v. The prescience way, how liberty may consist with the prescience and decrees and deof God. But of this I had not very long since occasion to write a full discourse, in answer to a treatise against the prescience of things contingent. I shall for the present only repeat these two things. rance a sufficient an First, we ought not to desert a certain truth, because we [Our ignoare not able to comprehend the certain manner. God should be but a poor God, if we were able perfectly to comprehend swer.] all His actions and attributes. ever pre Secondly, in my poor judgment, which I ever do and ever [Futurity shall submit to better, the readiest way to reconcile contin- sent to gence and liberty with the decrees and prescience of God, God.] and most remote from the altercations of these times, is to subject future contingents to the aspect of God, according to that presentiality which they have in eternity. Not that things future, which are not yet existent, are co-existent with God but because the infinite knowledge of God, encircling all times in the point of eternity, doth attain to their future being; from whence proceeds their objective and intelligible beingy. The main impediment which keeps men from subscribing to this way is, because they conceive eternity to be 710 an everlasting succession, and not one indivisible point. But if they consider, that "whatsoever is in God is God," that there are no accidents in Him, for that which is infinitely perfect cannot be further perfected; that as God is not wise but wisdom itself, not just but justice itself, so He is not eternal but eternity itself: they must needs conclude, that therefore this eternity is indivisible, because God is indivisible and therefore not successive, but altogether an infinite point, comprehending all times within itself. : T. H.-The last part of this discourse containeth his opi- [Answer.] nion about reconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees of God, otherwise than some divines have done, against whom he had formerly written a treatise, out of which he only "repeateth two things." One is, that "we ought not to desert [So Boethius, De Consolat., lib. v. Prosa 6.] PART III. [Events necessarily determined a certain truth for not being able to comprehend the certain manner" of it. And I say the same; as, for example, that he ought not to desert this certain truth,-that there are certain and necessary causes, which make every man to will what he willeth,-though he do not yet conceive in what manner the will of man is caused. And yet, I think, the manner of it is not very hard to conceive; seeing that we see by antece daily, that praise, dispraise, reward, punishment, good and extrinsecal evil, sequels of men's actions retained in memory, do frame causes.] and make us to the election of whatsoever it be that we elect; and that the memory of such things proceeds from the senses; and sense from the operation of the objects of sense, which are external to us, and governed only by God Almighty; and by consequence, all actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are necessary. dent and [Eternity not an indivisible succession.] The other thing he repeateth is, that the best way "to reconcile contingency and liberty with the prescience and point but a decrees of God, is to subject future contingents to the aspect of God." The same is also my opinion, but contrary to what he hath all this while laboured to prove; for hitherto he held liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty and the decrees of God, irreconcileable: unless "the aspect of God" (which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signify somewhat else besides God's will and decree, which I cannot understand. But he adds, that we must subject them "according to that presentiality which they have in eternity;" which he says cannot be done by them that "conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession," but only by them that conceive it an "indivisible point." To this I answer, that as soon as I can conceive eternity "an indivisible point," or any thing but "an everlasting succession," I will renounce all I have written in this subject. I know St. Thomas Aquinas calls eternity "nunc stans"—"an ever abiding now2;" which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, I never could conceive it. They that can, are more happy than I. But in the mean time he alloweth hereby all men to be of my opinion, save only those that conceive in their minds a nunc stans," which I think are none. I understand as little how it can be true, that "God is not just but * [Summ., P. Prima, Qu. x. art. 2.] I. justice itself, not wise but wisdom itself, not eternal but eter- DISCOURSE nity itself;" nor how he concludes thence, that eternity is a point indivisible, and not a succession; nor in what sense it can be said, that an infinite point, &c., wherein is no succession, can comprehend all times though time be successive. These phrases I find not in the Scripture. I wonder therefore, what was the design of the School-men, to bring them up; unless they thought a man could not be a true Christian, unless his understanding be first strangled with such hard sayings. And thus much in answer to his discourse, wherein I think not only his "squadrons"," but also his reserves of distinctions, are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question, with my reasons for it, positively and briefly as I can, without any terms of art, in plain English. and re truth not to be de cause it is under J. D. That poor discourse which I mention was not writ- [Reply.] ten against any "divines," but in way of examination of a French treatise, which your Lordship's brother did me the honour to shew me at York. My assertion is most true, [A certain that " we ought not to desert a certain truth because we are ceived not able to comprehend the certain manner." Such a truth is that which I maintain, that the will of man in ordinary serted beactions is free from extrinsecal determination; a truth de- hard to be monstrable in reason, received and believed by all the world. stood.] And therefore, though I be not able to comprehend or express exactly the certain manner how it consists together with God's eternal prescience and decrees, which exceed my weak capacity, yet I ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest. But T. H. his opinion of the absolute necessity of all events, by reason of their antecedent determination in their extrinsecal and necessary causes, is no such certain truth, but an innovation, a strange paradox, without probable grounds, rejected by all authors, yea, by all the world. Neither is the manner how the second causes do operate, so obscure, or so transcendent above the reach of reason, as the [See above, Numb. v. p. 37.] b [Sir Charles Cavendish of Wallington, the brother of the Marquis (afterwards Duke) of Newcastle, died Feb. 4, 1653, and was buried at Bolsover (Col- III. PART eternal decrees of God are. And therefore in both these 711 respects he cannot challenge the same privilege. I am in possession of an old truth derived by inheritance or succession from mine ancestors. And therefore, though I were not able to clear every quirk in law, yet I might justly hold my possession until a better title were shewed for another. He is no old possessor, but a new pretender; and is bound to make good his claim by evident proofs, not by weak and inconsequent suppositions, or inducements, such as those are which he useth here, of "praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, the memory of good and evil sequels, and events;" which may incline the will, but neither can nor do necessitate the will; nor by uncertain and accidental inferences, such as this," the memory of praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, good and evil sequels, do make us" (he should say, dispose us) "to elect what we elect, but the memory of these things is from the sense, and the sense from the operation of the external objects, and the agency of external objects is only from God, therefore all actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are necessary." To pass by all the other great imperfections which are to be found in this sorites, it is just like that old sophistical piece, he that drinks well sleeps well, he that sleeps well thinks no hurt, he that thinks no hurt lives well, therefore he that drinks well lives well. In the very last passage of my discourse I proposed mine events are own private opinion, how it might be made appear, that the reconcile- eternal prescience and decrees of God are consistent with God's pre- true liberty and contingency. And this I set down in as decrees.] plain terms as I could, or as so profound a speculation would permit; which is almost wholly misunderstood by T. H., and [The aspect many of my words wrested to a wrong sense. As, first, [Intuitus where I speak of "the aspect of God," that is, His view, His Dei."] knowledge, by which the most free and contingent actions Heb. iv. 13. were manifest to Him from eternity,--" All things are naked and open to His eyes;"-and this not discursively, but intuitively, not by external species, but by His internal essence; he confounds this with the will and the decrees of God. Though he "found not the word 'aspect' before in this dis[Necessity course," he might have found prescience. Secondly, he [Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xiv. art. 13; and see also art. 7.] [How con tingent able with science and of God.] not identi I. cal with chargeth me, that hitherto I have maintained, that "liberty DISCOURSE and the decrees of God are irreconcileable." If I have said any such thing, my heart never went along with my God's decrees.] pen. No; but his reason why he chargeth me on this manner, is because I have maintained, that "liberty and the absolute necessity of all things are irreconcileable." That is true indeed. What then? "Why" (saith he), "necessity and God's decrees are all one." How? "All one?" That were strange indeed. Necessity may be a consequent of God's decrees; it cannot be the decree itself. But to cut his argument short. God hath decreed all effects which come to pass in time; yet not all after the same manner, but according to the distinct natures, capacities, and conditions of His creatures, which He doth not destroy by His decree some He acteth, with some he co-operateth by special influence, and some He only permitteth. Yet this is no idle or bare permission; seeing He doth concur, both by way of general influence, giving power to act, and also by disposing all events, necessary, free, and contingent, to His own glory. Thirdly, he chargeth me, that I " allow all men to [Other explanations be of" his "opinion, save only those that conceive in their have been minds a nunc stans,"" or how eternity is an indivisible point, the subject rather than an everlasting succession. But I have given no besides such allowance. I know there are many other ways pro- thor's.] posed by divines for reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees of God with the liberty and contingency of second causes; some of which may please other judgments better than this of mine. Howsoever, though a man could comprehend none of all these ways, yet remember what I said, that "a certain truth ought not to be rejected," because we are not able, in respect of our weakness, to understand "the certain manner," or reason of it. I know the load-stone hath an attractive power to draw the iron to it; and yet I know not how it comes to have such a power. offered of the au divisible But the chiefest difficulty which offers itself in this section [That eteris, whether eternity be "an indivisible point" (as I maintain succession it) or "an everlasting succession" (as he would have it). but an inAccording to his constant use, he gives no answer to what point.] was urged by me, but pleads against it from his own incapacity;-"I never could conceive," saith he, "how eternity |