tion of the effect may be wanting, and that every sufficient DISCOURSE cause is not a necessary cause.

1.

inclusive

to of will, only hypohe thetically necessary.]

Lastly, if any man be disposed to wrangle against so clear 4. [A suffilight, and say, that though the free agent be sufficient 'in cient cause sensu diviso,' yet he is not sufficient in sensu composito,' produce the effect without the concurrence of the will, says true: but, first, he bewrays the weakness and the fallacy of the former argument, which is a mere trifling between sufficiency in a divided sense and sufficiency in a compounded sense and seeing the concurrence of the will is not predetermined, there is no antecedent necessity before it do concur; and when it hath concurred, the necessity is but hypothetical, which may consist with liberty.

NUMBER XXXII.

agency a

cause it im

T. H.-Lastly, I hold, that the ordinary definition of a free [viii. Free agent,—namely, that a free agent is that, which, when all self-contrathings are present which are needful to produce the effect, diction, becan nevertheless not produce it,-implies a contradiction, and plies a suffi is nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be without an "sufficient," that is, "necessary," and yet the effect not follow. effect.]

cient cause

actual

719 J. D.-This last point is but a corollary or an inference [Reply.] from the former, doctrine,-that "every sufficient cause produceth its effect necessarily;" which pillar being taken away, the superstructure must needs fall to the ground, having nothing left to support it. "Lastly, I hold," saith he—(what he is able to prove is something; so much reason, so much trust; but what he "holds," concerns himself not others; but what holds he?" I hold," saith he),-" that the ordinary definition of a free agent implies a contradiction, and is nonsense." That which he calls the "ordinary definition" of liberty, is the very definition which is given by the much greater part of philosophers and schoolmen. And doth he think that all these spake "nonsense?" or had no more judgment than to 'contradict' themselves in a definition? He might much better suspect himself, than censure so many.

["Illa est potentia libera, quæ, Bellarm., De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iii. omnibus positis quæ requiruntur ad c. 7; Op. tom. iii. p. 663. B.] agendum, potest agere et non agere."

III.

PART Let us see the definition itself:-"A free agent is that, which, when all things are present that are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it." I acknowledge the old definition of liberty, with little variation: but I cannot see this "nonsense," nor discover this "contradiction;" for in these words, "all things needful," or "all things requisite,” [Sufficient the actual determination of the will is not included. But clude not by "all things needful or requisite," all necessary power, the actual either operative or elective, all necessary instruments and tion of the adjuments extrinsecal and intrinsecal, and all conditions, are will.]

causes in

determina

4.

intended. As he that hath pen, and ink, and paper, a table, a desk, and leisure, the art of writing, and the free use of his hand, hath all things requisite to write if he will, and yet he may forbear if he will. Or as he that hath men, and money, and arms, and munition, and ships, and a just cause, hath all things requisite for war, yet he may make peace if he will. Matt. xxii. Or as the King proclaimed in the Gospel,-"I have prepared My dinner, My oxen and My fatlings are killed, all things are ready, come unto the marriage." According to T. H. his doctrine, the guests might have told him, that he said not truly, for their own wills were not ready. And indeed, if the will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated extrinsecally to every act of willing, if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth will, nor to will what it doth not will, then, if the will were wanting, something requisite to the producing of the effect was wanting. But now, when science and conscience, reason and religion, our own and other men's experience, doth teach us, that the will hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill without extrinsecal necessitation; if the power to will be present in actu primo,' determinable by ourselves, then there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of the effect.

[And refer

to the producibility, not to the production, of the

effect.]

Secondly, these words 'to act or not to act, to work or not to work, to produce or not to produce,' have reference to the effect, not as a thing which is already done or doing, but as a thing to be done. They imply not the actual production, but the producibility, of the effect. But when once the will hath actually concurred with all other causes and conditions and circumstances, then the effect is no more possible or producible, but it is in being, and actually produced.

I.

Thus he takes away the subject of the question. The ques- DISCOURSE tion is, whether effects producible be free from necessity. He shuffles out 'effects producible,' and thrusts in their places effects produced,' or, 'which are in the act of production.' Wherefore I conclude, that it is neither "nonsense" nor "contradiction" to say, that a free agent, when all things requisite to produce the effect are present, may nevertheless not produce it.

NUMBER XXXIII.

necessity,

of their own

T. H.-For my first five points,-where it is explicated, first, [Proof of what spontaneity is; secondly, what deliberation is; thirdly, from men's what will, propension, and appetite is; fourthly, what a free experience agent is; fifthly, what liberty is;-there can be no other proof meaning in the use of offered but every man's own experience, by reflecting on words. ] himself, and remembering what he useth to have in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth, when he saith, an action is spontaneous, a man deliberates, such is his will, that agent or that action is free. Now he that so reflecteth on himself cannot but be satisfied, but that "deliberation" is the considering of the good and evil sequels of the action to come; that by "spontaneity" is meant inconsiderate proceeding (for else nothing is meant by it); that "will" is the last act of our deliberation; that a "free agent" is he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will; and that "liberty" is the absence of external impediments. But to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains, to consider what they think when they hear such words, no argument can be sufficient; because experience and matter of fact is not verified 720 by other men's arguments, but by every man's own sense and memory. For example, how can it be proved, that to love a thing and to think it good are all one, to a man that does not mark his own meaning by those words? Or how can it be proved, that eternity is not "nunc stans," to a man that says these words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind? Also the sixth point,―that

PART

III.

a man cannot imagine anything to begin without a cause,can no other way be made known but by trying how he can imagine it. But if he try, he shall find as much reason (if there be no cause of the thing) to conceive it should begin at one time as another; that is, he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible. And therefore he must think there was some special cause, why it began then rather than sooner or later, or else that it began never, but was eternal.

[Reply.]

in reason,

not in vulgar

J. D.-Now at length he comes to his main proofs. He that hath so confidently censured the whole current of schoolmen and philosophers of "nonsense," had need to produce strong evidence for himself. So he calls his reasons (Numb. xxxvi2) "demonstrative proofs." All demonstrations are either from the cause or the effect, not from private notions and conceptions, which we have in our minds. That which he calls a 'demonstration,' deserves not the name of an intimation. He argues thus :-'That which a man conceives in his mind by these words, spontaneity, deliberation, &c., that they are.' [Truth to This is his proposition, which I deny. The true natures of be sought things are not to be judged by the private ideas or conceptions of men, but by their causes and formal reasons. Ask an notions.] ordinary person what "upwards" signifies, and whether our antipodes have their heads upwards or downwards; and he will not stick to tell you, that if his head be upwards, theirs must needs be downwards. And this is because he knows not the formal reason thereof;-that the heavens encircle the earth, and what is towards heaven is upwards. This same erroneous notion of "upwards" and " downwards," before the true reason was fully discovered, abused more than ordinary capacities; as appears by their arguments of "penduli homines" and "pendulæ arbores." Again, what do men conceive ordinarily by this word "empty," as when they say an empty vessel; or by this word "body," as when they say, there is no body in that room? They intend not to exclude the air either out of the vessel or out of the room. Yet reason tells

I.

us, that the vessel is not truly empty, and that the air is a DISCOURSE true body. I might give a hundred such like instances. He who leaves the conduct of his understanding to follow vulgar notions, shall plunge himself into a thousand errors: like him, who leaves a certain guide to follow an ignis fatuus, or a willwith-the-wisp. So his proposition is false. His reason,"that matter of fact is not verified by other men's arguments, but by every man's own sense and memory,”-is likewise maimed on both sides. Whether we hear such words or not, is matter of fact, and sense is the proper judge of it; but what these words do or ought truly to signify, is not to be judged by sense, but by reason. Secondly, reason may and doth oftentimes correct sense, even about its proper object. Sense tells us, that the sun is no bigger than a good ball; but reason demonstrates, that it is many times greater than the whole globe of the earth. As to his instance,-"How can it be proved, that to love a thing and to think it good is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by these words?"-I confess it cannot be proved, for it is not true. Beauty, and likeness, and love, do conciliate love as much as goodness. 'Cos amoris amor.' Love is a passion of the will, but to judge of goodness is an act of the understanding. A father may love an ungracious child, and yet not esteem him good. A man loves his own house better than another man's, yet he cannot but esteem many others better than his own. His other instance," How can it be proved, that eternity is not 'nunc stans,' to a man that says these words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind?"-is just like the former; not to be proved by reason, but by fancy, which is the way he takes. And it is not unlike the counsel, which one gave to a novice about the choice of his wife, to advise with the bells: as he fancied, so they sounded, either take her or leave her.

perience

Then for his assumption, it is as defective as his proposition; [Men's ex-that by these words, spontaneity, &c., men do understand contrary to T. H.'s conas he conceives. No rational man doth conceive a spon- clusions. ] taneous" action and an "indeliberate" action to be all one. Every "indeliberate" action is not "spontaneous." The fire 721 considers not whether it should burn, yet the burning of it is not "spontaneous." Neither is every "spontaneous" action