III. PART but more judicious and discreet; and of so much more value in the eyes of others as he setteth a less value upon himself. Now I have a copy, if God bless me with life and health, I shall endeavour in a short time to let the world see, that my religion is as much better than his, as my charity is greater. AN ANSWER TO HIS RELATION OF THE OCCASION OF gross mis few lines. old philo 1. HERE is nothing of moment to advantage his cause. An- Eleven other man would say, here is nothing alleged by him which is takes in a true. Whereas he saith, that the "question disputed among [Concernthe old philosophers" was,-" whether all things that come ing the to pass proceed from necessity, or some from chance","-it sophers.] was as well debated among the old philosophers, whether all things come to pass by chance, and nothing proceed from necessity, and likewise,-whether some events proceed from necessity, and some come to pass by chance,-as that which he mentions,-"whether all events proceed from necessity, or some" come to pass "by chance." That is the first error. 2. His second error is, that he opposeth "chance" to "necessity;" as if all things came to pass by necessity, which come not to pass by chance: whereas those ancient philosophers (of whom he speaks) did oppose contingency to necessity, and not chance alone. Chance is but one branch of contingency. Free acts are done contingently, but not by chance. 3. Thirdly, he is mistaken in this also, that he saith, those ancient philosophers did never "draw into argument the almighty power of the Deity." For we find in Tully, and in III. PART Chrysippus (as he is alleged by Eusebius), that one of the main grounds of the Stoics was the prescience of God; and that the predictions of their oracles and prophets could not be certain, unless all things came to pass by inevitable necessity. [Concerning the primitive 4. Fourthly, he erreth in this, that liberty is a "third way of bringing things to pass, distinct from necessity and contingency." For liberty is subordinate to contingency. They defined contingents to be those things which might either come to pass or not come to pass; that is, either freely or casually and in all their questions of contingency, liberty was principally understood. 5. His fifth error is, that "free will is a thing that was never mentioned among them." I believe it was never mentioned by them in English, by the name of "free will;" but he may find “ αὐτεξούσιον” and “ προαίρεσιν.” Let him read Aristotle alone; and he shall find not only this free elective power of the will, but also the difference between voluntary or spontaneous (which is all the liberty he admitteth), and free or that which is elected upon deliberation. 736 Hear Calvin,-" Semper apud Latinos liberi arbitrii nomen extitit, Græcos vero non puduit arrogantius usurpare vocabulum, siquidem avтeğovolov' dixerunt." 6. Sixthly, he erreth yet more grossly in saying, that "free will was never mentioned by Christians in the beginning Christians.] of Christianity," but "for some ages [past]" brought in by "the doctors of the Roman Church." Whereas it is undeniably true, that sundry ancient Fathers have written whole treatises expressly of free will'; that there is scarcely one Father that doth not mention it; and sundry of the first e [Chrysipp., ap. Euseb.,] De Præ- f [Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 1. " dis- h [Aristot.,] Ethic., lib. III. cc. iii, [Calvin,] Instit., [lib.] II. c. ii. sect. 4. [Op. tom. ix. p. 62. ed. Amst.] k [Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 1.] [Compare the list given by Bellarmine in c. 1. bk. iii. of his Treatise De Grat. et Lib. Arb.: viz. St. Basil (Serm. de Lib. Arb.), St. Chrysostom (Orationes V. de Provid. et Fato), St. Augustin (De Lib. Arb., lib. iii., and De Gratiâ et Lib. Arb.), St. Prosper (Epist. de Grat. et Lib. Arb. ad Ruffinum), St. Anselm (Lib. de Concord. Gratiæ et Lib. Arb., and Dial. de Lib. Arb.), St. Bernard (Tractat. de Grat. et Lib. Arb.); and of Fathers who have treated the subject incidentally, Origen (De Princip., lib. iii.), Eusebius (Præp. Evang., lib. vi.), St. John Damascene (De Fide Orthod., lib. ii. c. 25, sq.), Boethius (De Consolat. Philosoph., lib. v.), &c.] II. heretics, as Simon Magus m, the Manichees, the Marcionites, DISCOURSE &c.", and their followers, have been condemned for maintaining absolute necessity against free will. 7. His seventh error is, that "St. Paul never useth the [Concerning St. term of free will, nor did hold any doctrine equivalent" to it. Paul.] Hear himself;-"Am I not an Apostle? am I not free? have we not power to lead about a sister, a wife, as well as the other Apostles? . . or I only and Barnabas, have not we power to forbear working?" St. Paul did those things freely upon his own election, which he was not necessitated to do; and did forbear those things freely, which he was not necessitated to forbear. This doctrine is "equivalent" to ours, of the freedom of the will from necessitation. Take another place, wherein you have both the name and the thing;"Nevertheless, he that standeth steadfast in his heart, having no necessity, but hath power over his own will." The words in the original are a plain description of the old "aνTEŽOVσLOV” (which name Calvin did so much dislike) or free will;ἐξουσίαν δὲ ἔχει περὶ τοῦ ἰδίου θελήματος.” Here is not only freedom, but power and dominion. Mr. Hobbes teacheth us, that a man is free to do, but not free to will. St. Paul teacheth us, that a man "hath power over his own will." Then he is free to will; then his will is not extrinsecally predetermined. ing the doctors of the 8. Eighthly, he wrongs the doctors of the Roman Church, [Concernas if they "exempted the will of man from the dominion of God's will"." They maintain, that the freedom of the will of Roman Church.] man is expressly from the will of God, Who made it free. They teach, that God can suspend the act of the will, can determine the will, can change the will, doth dispose of all the acts of the will, can do anything but compel the will, which implieth a contradiction. 9. Ninthly (to let us see what a profound clerk he is in ecclesiastical controversies), Mr. Hobbes thinks he hath hit the nail on the head, of the difference between the Church of III. PART Rome and us concerning free will, in this disputation'. Just as the blind senator in Juvenal made a large encomium of the goodly turbot which lay before Cæsar, but (as ill luck would have it) turned himself the quite contrary way: [Concerning the Reformed At illi dextra jacebat" "Bellua... The controversy lies on the other side; not about the freedom of the will in natural or civil actions, which is our question, but (if it be not a logomachy) about the power of free will in moral and supernatural actions without the assistance of grace. 10. In the tenth place, he misinforms his readers, that "this opinion" (of freedom from necessitation and deterChurches.] mination to one) was cast out by the Reformed Churches instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others." Where have the Reformed Churches, or any of them, in their public confessions, cast out this freedom from necessitation whereof we write? Indeed Luther" was once against it, and so was Melancthon; but they grew wiser, and retracted whatsoever they had written against it. And so would Mr. Hobbes do likewise, if he were well advised. Either he did know of Luther's retraction, and then it was not ingenuously done to conceal it; or (which I rather believe) he did not know of it, and then he is but meanly versed in the doctrine and affairs of the Protestants. [Concerning Arminius.] 11. Lastly, he accuseth "Arminius" to have been a restorer or "reducer" of the Romish doctrine of free will by a postliminium. I do not think that ever he read one word of Arminius in his life, or knoweth distinctly one opinion that Arminius held. It was such deep controvertists as him [Qu., Occ. of Controv., pp. 1, 2.] t [Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 2.] u [See the Assert. Omn. Art. D. M. Lutheri a Leone X. Damnat., art. 36; inter Opera M. Lutheri, tom. ii. pp. 310. b, &c. fol. Jenæ, 1564;- and the Quæstio de Viribus et Voluntate Hominis sine gratiâ, disputata Wirtembergæ Anno 1516, Conclus. ii. Coroll. 1; ibid. tom. i. p. 1, a ;-and the celebrated tract De Servo Arbitrio, 8vo. Witemb. 1526.] Arb., as it stands in the first edition of the book, 12mo. 1521: and Bellarm., De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iv. c. 5, Op. tom. iii. pp. 718, 719.] y [By Luther, in his Liber de] Visitat. Saxon., [viz. his Apolog. pro Confess. Aug., A.D. 1538, Artic. de Lib. Arb. ; Op. tom. iv. p. 248].-[By Melanchthon, in his] Loci Commun., [artt. De Lib. Arbit. et de Caussâ Peccati,] edit. poster. [scil. 12mo. 1546.-The book was first published in 1521, and the first article of those just referred to was almost wholly rewritten for the later edition.] [Qu. Occ. of Controv., p. 2.] |