as to " 28. II. mined; but I had not thought before this, that any man had DISCOURSE made the body also to be like a clock, or a jack, or a puppet in a play, to have the original of his motion from without itself, so as to make a man in his animal motion to be as mere a passive instrument as the sword in his hand. If by "originally" he do understand independently, so suppose that a man hath his locomotive faculty from himself and not from God, we all affirm, that the original of a man's locomotive faculty is from God, "in Whom we live, and move, Acts xviii. and have our being." But if he understand "originally, not in relation to the faculty, but to the act of moving (as he must mean unless he mean nonsense), then we affirm, that a man doth "move himself originally," and desire not to "taste" of his paradoxical "knowledge of motion." It is folly to dispute with such men, and not rather to leave them to their own phantastical chimeras; who deny all principles and rules of art, whom an adversary cannot drive into greater absurdities than they do willingly plunge themselves into. Thus they do on purpose put out the lights, and leave men to fence in the dark; and then it is all one, whether a man have skill at his weapon or not. tingent That he would have contingency to depend upon our know- [Of conledge, or rather our ignorance, and not upon the accidental and free concurrence of causes; that he confoundeth free causes, causes.] which have power to suspend or deny their concurrence, with contingent causes, which admit only a possibility to concur or not concur, rather out of impotence than power; that he maketh free causes, which are principal causes, to be guided by inferior and instrumental causes; as if a man should say, that a man is guided by the sword in his hand, and not the sword by the man2;-deserves no other answer but contempt or pity, that a man should so poison his intellectuals, and entangle himself in his own errors. Such another mistake is his argument to prove, that contingent causes could not have concurred otherwise than they did; I know not whether more pedantical or ridiculous. "For I conceive not" (saith he), "how, when this runneth this way and that another, they can be said to concur, that is, run [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 37.] III. PART together." Wheresoever there are divided parties, as in a court, or a camp, or a corporation, he who "concurreth" with one party, doth thereby desert the other. The instance in hath lost T. H. his game. Concerning his instance of the necessity of casting ambsambs-ace aceb, if he can shew, that the caster was antecedently necessitated to cast, so that he could not possibly have denied his concurrence, and to cast so soon, so that he could not possibly have suspended his concurrence, and to cast just with so much force, so that he could not possibly have used more force or 760 less force, and to cast into that table and that very individual place (it may be whilst he winked, or looked another way),— I say, if he can shew that all these contingent accidents were absolutely predetermined, and that it was not at all in the caster's power to have done otherwise than he did, then he hath brought contingency under the jurisdiction of fate. But if he fail in any one of these (all men see that he must fail in all of these), then I may have leave to tell him, that his casting of ambs-ace hath lost him his game. But now, reader, I desire thee to observe his answer, and to see him plainly yield the cause. Though the subject -"ambs-ace"-be mean and contemptible, yet it yieldeth thee light enough to see what notorious triflers these are. Thus he saith,-"The suspending of the caster's concurrence, or altering of his force, and the like accidents, serve not to take away the necessity of ambs-ace, otherwise than by making a necessity of deux-ace, or some other cast that shall be thrown." This is ingenuously answered; I ask no more of him. He confesseth, that the caster might have suspended his concurrence, or have altered his force, or the accidents might have fallen out otherwise than they did; and that if these alterations had happened, as they might have happened, then there had been as great a "necessity of deux-ace or some other cast," as there was of ambs-ace. Where he saith, that the alteration of the accidents "serveth not to take away the necessity of ambs-ace, otherwise than by making a necessity of deux-ace or some other cast," he confesseth, that by making "a necessity of deux-ace or some other cast," they might "serve to take away the necessity of [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. b [Ibid.] p. 37.] с [Ibid.] II. ambs-ace." What is now become of his antecedent determi- DISCOURSE nation of all things to one "from eternityd?" and of the absolute impossibility that any event should come to pass otherwise than it doth? If this be all his necessity, it is no more than a necessity upon supposition, where the thing supposed was in the agent's power; and where, the contrary determination by the agent being supposed, the event must necessarily have been otherwise. And so he is come unwittingly under the protection of that "old foolish rule," which even now he renounced,-"whatsoever is, when it is, is necessary so as it is." foundeth thetical ne I said most truly, that "that is not the question which he [T. H. conmaketh to be the question." For although at some times he absolute assent to the right stating of the question, yet at other and hypotimes, like a man that doth not understand himself, he cessity.] varieth quite from it: and in the place of an absolute antecedent necessity, he introduceth a consequent hypothetical necessity; as we have seen even now in the case of "ambsace;" and where he argueth from presciences; and where he reasoneth thus, that which shall be, shall beh; as if the manner how it should be, were not material: and where he maketh "deliberation and persuasioni" to determine the will. All these do amount to no more than a necessity upon supposition. The question is as much or more of the liberty of doing what we will, as willing what we will. But he makes it to be only of willing. will is no more than the bias of a bowl. He proceedeth like another Jehu ;-" He that cannot un- T. H. his derstand the difference between free to do if he will, and free to will, is not fit to hear this controversy disputed, much less to be a writer in it." Certainly I think he meaneth himself, for he neither understandeth what 'free' is, nor what the 'will' is. A bowl hath as much free will as he, the bowl is as much an agent as he; neither of them according to his move themselves originally'." The bias is as much to the bowl, as his will is to him. The bias is determined to the one, so is his will. The bowl doth not bias opinion do " III. PART itself, no more hath he the government of his own will, but the outward causes. It is not the fault of the bowl, if it have too much bias, or too little bias, but his fault that biassed it; so, if he choose evil, it is not his fault, but the causes, which biassed him over much, or over little, or on the wrong side. And this is all his "freedom;" a determinate propension to one side, without any possibility to incline the other way: as a man that is nailed to a post, is free to lay his ear to it. Then as Diogenes called a displumed cock "Plato's man,” a “living creature with two feet without feathers "," so I may call a bowl Mr. Hobbes his free agent. [His absurd pre And yet he glorieth in this silly distinction, and hugs himsumption.] self for the invention of it :-"It is true, very few have learned from tutors, that a man is not free to will, nor do they find it much in books"." Yea, when I call "shepherds, poets, pastors, doctors, and all mankindo" to bear witness for liberty, he answereth, that "neither the Bishop, nor they, 761 ever thought on this questionP." If he make much of his own invention, I do not blame him; the infant will not live long before it be hissed out of the world. In all my life I never saw a little empty boat bear so great a sail, as if he meant to tow the world after him; but when the sun is at the lowest, it makes the longest shadows. Take notice (by the way), that his freedom is such a freedom, as none of mankind, from the shepherd to the doctor, ever dreamed of before himself. This vain unprofitable distinction, which wounds himself and his cause more than his adversary, and leaves him open to the blows of every one that will vouchsafe to assault him, which contradicts both the truth and itself, hath been twice taken away already in a voider' (whither I refer the reader), and ought not, like twice sodden coleworts, to have been served up again in triumph so quickly, upon his single authority, and before this treatise be ended. I shall meet with it again to some purpose. I wonder whether he do never cast away a thought upon the poor woman that was II. drowned by mischance, whose dead body, whilst her neigh- DISCOURSE bours sought for down the river, her husband, who knew her conditions better than they, advised them to seek up the river; for all her life long she loved to be contrary to all others, and he presumed she would swim against the stream being dead. Is it not hard, that he, who will not allow to other men any dominion over themselves or their own acts, will himself needs usurp an universal empire over the wills and understandings of all other men? more to be than T. H. "Is it not freedom enough" (saith he), "unless a man's St. Austin will have power over his will, and that his will must have credited another power within it, to do voluntary acts?" His error proceedeth from the confounding of voluntas and volitio, the faculty of the will, and the act of willing. Not long after he reiterateth his mistake, taxing me for saying that "our wills are in our power;" adding, that "through ignorance" I "detect the same fault in St. Austint." If he mean my "ignorance" to mistake St. Austin, let St. Austin himself be judge;— "Voluntas igitur nostra nec voluntas esset nisi esset in nostrá potestate," &c.-"Therefore our will should not be our will, unless it were in our power; because it is in our power, it is free to us, for that is not free to us which is not in our power"," &c. If he mean that it is an error in St. Austin, he sheweth his insolence and vain glory. If this be an error in him, it is an error in all the rest of the Fathers; I will not bate him one of them in this cause. Mr. Calvin (whom he citeth sometimes in this treatise) professeth, that he will not differ a syllable from St. Austin; I do not say, in this question of natural necessity or liberty, which no man then doubted of, but even in that higher question of the concurrence of grace with free will. So here is neither error in St. Austin, nor ignorance in me. two, and Whereas I demanded thus,-" If whatsoever a man doth To give liberty to and willeth be predetermined to one precisely and inevitably, to what purpose is that power" whereof T. H. speaketh, to do limit to one, is a contradic libera est nobis; non enim est nobis tion. * [Instit., lib. II. c. iii. § 8; Op. |