III. PART if he will, and not to do if he will; which is never deduced into act indifferently, and in utramque partem, and consequently frustraneous'? He answereth, that "all those things may be brought to pass, which God hath from eternity predetermined." In good time; he might as well say, that God hath given man a liberty to both parts, to do or not to do, to choose or to refuse, and yet hath limited him punctually and precisely to one part; which is a pure contradiction, -to give him choice of two, and yet restrain him to one. [He who is free to act, is much more free to will.] He addeth, that though "the will be necessitated," yet "the doing what we will is libertya." Yes, it is the liberty of a bowl, it is his mock liberty, but it is no wise man's liberty, where all deliberation is vain, and all election is impossible. I argued thus,-" If a man be free to act, he is much more free to will, because, 'quod efficit tale, illud magis est taleb.'" to which he answereth with an ignorant jeer,—“ As if he should say, if I make him angry, then I am more angry." Pardon me, I will free him from this fear; I see nothing in him that should move a man to anger, but rather to pity. That canon holdeth only in causis per se, such causes as by nature or the intention of the free agent are properly ordained to produce that effect; such as his outward causes are supposed by him to be in the determination of the will; and therefore my instance was proper: not in causis per accidens, where the effect is not produced naturally, or intentionally, but accidentally; as in his ridiculous instance. My last argument which he vouchsafeth to take notice of, 762 was this;-" If the will be determined, then the writing is determined; and then he ought not to say, he may write, but, he must writed." His answer is,-" It followeth that he must write, but it followeth not that I ought to say, he must write; unless he would have me say more than I know, as he himself dothe." What poor crotchets are these, unworthy of a man that hath anything of reality in him! as if my argument did regard the saying of it, and not the thing it II. self. If it follow precisely that he must write, then he hath Discourse no freedom in utramque partem, either to write or not to write; then he is no more free to do, than to will; both which are contrary to his assertion. I demanded, if a man's will be determined without his will, "why we do ask him, whether he will do such a thing or not?" His answer is, "because we desire to knowg." But he wholly mistaketh the scope of the question. The emphasis lieth not in the word "we," but in the word "his;" how it is "his will." For if his will be "determined by natural causes without his will," then it is the will of the causes, rather than his own will. to T. H. I demanded further, "why we do represent reasons to According men, why we do intreat them." He answereth, "because his princiwe think to make them have the will they have noti." ples all persuasions So he teacheth us, first, that the will is determined by a ne- are vain. cessary influence of natural causes; and then prateth of changing the will by advice and moral persuasions. Let him advise the clock to strike sooner or later than it is determined by the weight of the plumb and motion of the wheels; let him dissuade the plants from growing; and see how much it availeth. He saith, the will doth will "as necessarily as the fire burneth." Then let him intreat the fire to leave burning at his request. But thus it falleth out with them, who cannot, or will not, distinguish between natural and moral efficacy. we can man justly. I asked then, why do we blame free agents; since no man [Upon his principles] blameth fire for burning cities, nor accuseth poison for destroying men'. First, he returneth an answer,-"We blame blame no them because they do not please us"." Why? May a man blame every thing that doth not please his humour? Then I do not wonder why T. H. is so apt to blame others without cause. So the scholar may blame his master for correcting him deservedly for his good. So he who hath a vicious stomach may blame healthful food. So a lethargical person may blame his best friend for endeavouring to save his life. PART A lame compari son. And now, having shot his bolt, he begins to examine the case;" Whether blaming be any more than saying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect"." Yes, moral blame is much more; it is an imputation of a fault. If a man be born blind or with one eye, we do not blame him for it; but if a man have lost his sight by his intemperance, we blame him justly. He enquireth, "May not we say, a lame horse is lame?" Yes, but you cannot blame the horse for it, if he was lamed by another without his own fault. "May not a man say, one is a fool or a knave" (saith he), "if he be so, though he could not help it?" If he made himself a sot, we may blame him; though if he be a stark sot, we lose our labour. But if he were born a natural idiot, it were both injurious and ridiculous to blame him for it. Where did he learn, that a man may be "a knave," and "cannot help it?" Or that knavery is imposed inevitably upon a man without his own fault? If a man put fire to his neighbour's house, it is the fault of the man, not of the fire. He hath confessed formerly, that "a man ought not to be punished but for crimes" the reason is the very same, that he should not be blamed for doing that which he could not possibly leave undone; no more than a servant whom his master hath chained to a pillar, ought to be blamed for not waiting at his elbow. No chain is stronger than the chain of fatal destiny is supposed to be. That piece of eloquence which he thinks I borrowed from Tully, was in truth taken immediately out of St. Austin, who applieth it most properly to this case now in question. He urgeth, that a man might "as well say, that no man halteth which cannot choose but halt," as say, that no man sinneth in those things which he cannot shun; "for what is sin but haltingu?" This is not the first time that he hath contradicted himself. Before, he told us, that "there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left un[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. n p. 39.] [See Aristot., Ethic., III. vii. 15. [Ibid.] [Ibid., Fount. of Arg,, p. 13. See above p. 242, note q.] s [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. II. done;" now he telleth us, that a man may sin, who cannot DISCOURSE choose but sin: then sin is not a punishable crime. He 763 might even as well say, that there is no such thing as sin in the world; or if there be, that God is the author of it. Reader, whosoever thou art, if thou reverence God, eschew such doctrines. His comparison of "halting" is frivolous and impertinent. Halting is not against the eternal rule of God's justice, as sinning is. Neither doth a man choose his halting freely, as he doth his sinning. eth himself wooden In the conclusion of his Animadversions upon Numb. iii. T. H. makthere is nothing that is new, but that he is pleased to play no better with a "wooden topy." He calleth my argument from Zeno's than a cudgelling of his man, "a wooden argument"." Let him top. choose, whether I shall call his a wooden, or a boyish, comparison. I did never meet with a more unfortunate instancer than he is. He should produce an instance of natural agents, and he produceth an instance of voluntary agents. Such are the boys that whip his "wooden top." He should produce an instance of a natural determination (so he affirmeth that the will is determined); and he produceth an instance of a violent determination, for such is the motion of his top. I hope he doth not mean, that the will is compelled. If he do, he may string it up with the rest of his contradictions. Hath not he brought his hogs to a fair market? when God hath created him a free man, a noble creature, to make himself like a wooden top! Deserveth not he to be moved, as the top is, with a whip, until he confess his error, and acknowledge his own liberty? If this wooden top should chance to hit T. H. on the shins, I desire to know whom he would accuse. The top? That were as mad a part, as it is in the dog to run after the stone and bite it, never looking at the man who did throw it. What then? Should he accuse the boys that whipped the top? No, that were equally ludibrious, seeing the boys are as much necessitated, and (to use his own phrase) as much "lashed"," to what they do by the causes, as the top is by the boys. So he may sit down patiently, and at last think upon his liberty which he had abandoned; Numb. xiii. p. 82.] [See above p. 242, note q.] A p. 41.] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. 2 p. 41.] [See above in the Defence, T. H. PART and if the causes will give him leave, get a plantain leaf to heal his broken shin. III. Such an unruly thing as this top, which he fancieth, is he himself, sometimes dictating errors, sometimes writing paradoxes, sometimes justling out metaphysics, sometimes wounding the mathematics; and, in a word, troubling the world, and disordering all things, logic, philosophy, theology, with his extravagant conceits. And yet he is offended, that men will go about to keep possession of their ancient principles against his upstart innovations; and is ready to implead them (with that quarrelsome Roman), because they would not receive his weapon fairly with their whole bodies". It were a much more Christian contemplation, to elevate his thoughts from this "wooden top" to the organical body of a man, wherein he may find God a hundred times; from the external form or figure of the one, which affords it only an aptitude to move and turn, to the internal and substantial form of the other, which is the subordinate beginning of animal motion; from the turning of his top, which is so swift that it prevents the discovery of the sharpest eye-sight, and seemeth to stand stock still, to the eternity of God, where motion and rest do meet together, or all motion is swallowed up into rest; lastly, from these boys, who hold the top up by their continued lashings, to the infinite power of an Almighty God, Who is both the procreating and conserving cause of all our life, being, and motion, and to magnify Him for His wonderful works, wherein He hath manifested to the world His own power and wisdom. Liberty of exercise and of spe AN ANSWER TO HIS ANIMADVERSIONS UPON number IV. These Animadversions will produce no great trouble either to me or the reader. I did demonstrate in this section the cification. difference between liberty of exercise or contradiction, and liberty of specification or contrariety. He only takes notice of it, and calls it "jargone;" and so without one word more, shaketh hands and withdraweth himself. b [Cic., Pro Rosc. Amer., c. xii. "Caius Fimbria . . diem Scævolæ dixit, . . . quod non totum telum corpore recepisset."] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. p. 47; and see above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. iv. p. 34.] |