III.

PART naughty quality; or, he is a wise man, but he hath committed one of the greatest follies. So here," The preface is a handsome one, but it appears even in this, that he hath mistaken the question." This is to give an inch, that one may take away an ell without suspicion; to praise the handsomeness of the porch, that he may gain credit to the vilifying of the house. Whether of us hath mistaken the question, I refer to the judicious reader. Thus much I will

maintain, that that is no true necessity, which he calls necessity, nor that liberty which he calls liberty, nor that the question which he makes the question.

First, for liberty, that which he calls liberty is no true liberty. For the clearing whereof it behoveth us to know the difference between these three, necessity, spontaneity, and liberty.

Necessity and spontaneity may sometimes meet together, so may spontaneity and liberty, but real necessity and true liberty can never meet together. Some things are necessary and not voluntary or spontaneous, some things are both necessary and voluntary; some things are voluntary and not free, some things are both voluntary and free; but those things which are truly necessary can never be free, and those things which are truly free can never be necessary. Necessity consists in an antecedent determination to one; spontaneity consists in a conformity of the appetite, either intellectual or sensitive, to the object; true liberty consists in the elective power of the rational will. That which is determined without my concurrence, may nevertheless agree well enough with my fancy or desires, and obtain my subsequent consent; but that which is determined without my concurrence or consent, cannot be the object of mine election.

I may like that which is inevitably imposed upon me by another; but if it be inevitably imposed upon me by extrinsecal causes, it is both folly for me to deliberate, and impossible for me to choose, whether I shall undergo it or not. Reason is the root, the fountain, the original of true liberty; which judgeth and representeth to the will, whether this or that be convenient, whether this or that be more convenient. Judge, then, what a pretty kind of liberty it is which is maintained by T. H. Such a liberty as is in little children, before they have the use of reason, before they can 652

1.

consult or deliberate of any thing. Is not this a childish DISCOURSE liberty? And such a liberty as is in brute beasts, as bees and spiders, which do not learn their faculties as we do our trades, by experience and consideration. This is a brutish liberty. Such a liberty as a bird hath to fly when her wings are clipped. Or (to use his own comparisons) such a liberty as a "lame" man who hath lost the use of his limbs hath to walk. Is not this a ridiculous liberty? Lastly (which is worse than all these), such a liberty as "a river" hath " to descend down the channels." What? Will he ascribe liberty to inanimate creatures also, which have neither reason, nor spontaneity, nor so much as sensitive appetite? Such is T. H. his liberty.

hypotheti

His necessity is just such another; a necessity upon suppo- [2. And sition, arising from the concourse of all the causes, including cal with the last dictate of the understanding in reasonable creatures. antecedent necessity.] The adequate cause and the effect are together in time; and when all the concurrent causes are determined, the effect is determined also, and is become so necessary, that it is actually in being. But there is a great difference between determining, and being determined. If all the collateral causes concurring to the production of an effect, were antecedently determined, what they must of necessity produce, and when they must produce it, then there is no doubt but the effect is necessary. But if these causes did operate freely, or contingently, if they might have suspended or denied their concurrence, or have concurred after another manner, then the effect was not truly and antecedently necessary, but either free or contingent. This will be yet clearer by considering his own instance of "casting ambs aceh;" though it partake more of contingency than of freedom. Supposing "the posture of the party's hand" who did throw the dice, supposing the figure of the table and of the dice themselves, supposing "the measure of force applied," and supposing all other things which did concur to the production of that cast, to be the very same they were, there is no doubt but in this case the cast is necessary. But still this is but a necessity of supposition; for if all these concurrent causes or some of them were contingent or free, then the cast was not abso

[See below T. H. Numb. xxix.

p. 715. fol. edit.]

[See below T. H. Numb. xxxiv. p. 722. fol. edit.]

PART lutely necessary. To begin with the caster;-he might have III. - denied his concurrence, and not have cast at all; he might have suspended his concurrence, and not have cast so soon; he might have doubled or diminished his force in casting, if it had pleased him; he might have thrown the dice into the other table. In all these cases what becomes of his "ambs ace?" The like uncertainties offer themselves for the maker of the tables, and for the maker of the dice, and for the keeper of the tables, and for the kind of wood, and I know not how many other circumstances. In such a mass of contingencies, it is impossible that the effect should be antecedently necessary. T. H. appeals to every man's experience. I am contented. Let every one reflect upon himself; and he shall find no convincing, much less constraining reason, to necessitate him to any one of these particular acts more than another, but only his own will or arbitrary determination. So T. H. his necessity is no absolute, no antecedent, extrinsecal necessity, but merely a necessity upon supposition.

3. [True liberty includes li

berty to will.]

If

Thirdly, that which T. H. makes the question, is not the question. "The question is not," saith he, whether a man may "write" if he will, and "forbear" if he will, "but whether the will to write or the will to forbear come upon him according to his will, or according to any thing else in his own power." Here is a distinction without a difference. his will do not "come upon him according to his will," then he is not a free, nor yet so much as a voluntary agent, which is T. H. his liberty. Certainly all the freedom of the agent is from the freedom of the will. If the will have no power over itself, the agent is no more free than a staff in a man's hand. Secondly, he makes but an empty show of a power in the will, either to write or not to write. If it be precisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever, what a man shall will and what he shall not will, what he shall write and what he shall not write, to what purpose is this power? God and nature never made anything in vain; but "vain and frustraneous is that power, which never was and never shall be deduced into act." Either the agent is determined before he acteth, what he shall will and what he shall not will, what he shall act and what he shall not act; and then he is no more free to act than he is to will: or else

1.

he is not determined; and then there is no necessity. NO DISCOURSE 653 effect can exceed the virtue of its cause. If the action be free, to write or to forbear, the power or faculty to will or nill must of necessity be more free. "Quod efficit tale illud magis est tale." If the will be determined, the writing or not writing is likewise determined; and then he should not say, he may write or he may forbear, but he must write, or he must forbear. Thirdly, this answer contradicts the sense of all the world;-that the will of man is determined without his "will," or without "any thing in his power." Why do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not? why do we represent reasons to them? why do we pray them? why do we entreat them? why do we blame them? if their will "come" not "upon them according to their will." "Wilt thou be made clean?" said our Saviour to the paraly- John v. 6. tic person; to what purpose, if his will was extrinsecally he ["made whole."] determined? Christ complains, "We have piped unto you, Matt. xi. 17. and ye have not danced." How could they help it, if their wills were determined without their wills to forbear? And, "I would have gathered your children together as the hen Matt. xxiii. gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not." 37. How easily might they answer, according to T. H. his doctrine,-Alas! blame not us; our wills are not in our own power or disposition; if they were, we would thankfully embrace so great a favour. Most truly said St. Austin, “Our will should not be a will at all, if it were not in our power." This is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned from our tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature. "We need not turn over any obscure books" to find out this truth. "The poets chant it in the theatres, the shepherds in the mountains; the pastors teach it in their churches, the doctors in the universities; the common people in the markets, and all mankind in the whole world, do assent unto it*;" except a handful of men, who have poisoned their intel

[Aristot., Analyt. Poster., lib. i. c. 2. § 15. Δι' ὁ ὑπάρχει ἕκαστον, ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει· οἷον, δι' δ φι λοῦμεν, ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον φίλον.”]

De Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 3. [§ 8; Op. tom. i. p. 613. F.-"Voluntas nostra nec voluntas esset, nisi esset in nostrâ potestate."]

["Etiamne hi libri obscuri mihi scrutandi eraut, unde discerem, neminem vituperatione suppliciove dignum, qui aut id velit quod justitia velle non prohibet, aut id non faciat quod facere non potest? Nonne ista cantant et in montibus pastores et in theatris poetæ et indocti in circulis et docti in bi

III.

PART lectuals with paradoxical principles. Fourthly, this necessity which T. H. hath devised, which is grounded upon the necessitation of a man's will without his will, is the worst of all others; and is so far from lessening those difficulties and absurdities which flow from the fatal destiny of the Stoics, that it increaseth them, and rendereth them unanswerable. No man blameth fire for burning whole cities; no man taxeth poison for destroying men; but those persons, who apply them to such wicked ends. If the will of man be not in his own disposition, he is no more a free agent than the fire or the poison. Three things are required to make an act or omission culpable: first, that it be in our power to perform it or forbear it; secondly, that we be obliged to perform it or forbear it respectively; thirdly, that we omit that which we ought to have done, or do that which we ought to have omitted. No man sins in doing those things which he could not shun, or forbearing those things which never were in his power. T. H. may say, that besides the power, men have also an appetite to evil objects, which renders them culpable. It is true; but if this appetite be determined by another, not by themselves, or if they have not the use of reason to curb or restrain their appetites, they sin no more than a stone descending downward according to its natural appetite, or the brute beasts, who commit voluntary errors in following their sensitive appetites, yet sin not. The question then is not, whether a man be necessitated to will or nill, yet free to act or forbear. But, leaving the ambiguous acceptions of the word "free," the question is plainly this-whether all agents, and all events, natural, civil, moral (for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that concerns not this question), be predetermined extrinsecally and inevitably without their own concurrence in the determination; so as all actions and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, or in any other place, time, number, measure, order, nor to any other end, than they are; and all this, in respect of the Supreme Cause, or a concourse of extrinsecal causes, determining them to one. So my preface remains yet unanswered. Either I was bliothecis et magistri in scholis et antistites in sacratis locis et in orbe terrarum genus humanum?" Aug., De Du

abus Animabus contra Manichæos, c. xi. § 15; Op. tom. viii. pp. 85. F, G, 86. A.]