III.

PART several cases or questions between us. First, the general or main question; which is already stated by consent,-whether the will of man be free from extrinsecal determination to one antecedently; and not, as it is here proposed by him fondly and ambiguously, "whether a man can now choose what shall be his will anon." For, first, a man is not certain, James iv. that he shall live so long to be able to choose his will. And although he were certain to live so long, yet succeeding time may make such a change of affairs, that he may have just reason to choose otherwise.

13, 14.

[The Jews might recover their former estate.]

"Quemquam posse putas mores narrare futuros?

"Dic mihi, si fias tu leo, qualis eris"."

But besides the main general question, there are likewise
many particular subordinate questions; as this in this sec-
tion,—whether this opinion of universal necessity do not
make all punishment to be unjust, because, if a man be
necessitated antecedently and unavoidably to do what he
doth, he is punished without his own fault, and consequently
unjustly. To escape this argument, he is driven to seek
shelter under the omnipotence of God:-" Power irresis-
tible justifieth all actions really and properly, in whomso-
ever it be found;" and, "when God afflicted Job, He did
object no sin to him;" that "which He doth is justified by
His doing its." So the present dispute was, whether man's
sin, or God's omnipotence, were the just ground of punish-
ment. This was all I said, and more than I said. But he
can set down nothing without either mistaking it or con-
founding it. God's power is not the rule of His justice, but
His will; not because His will maketh that to be just, which
otherwise was unjust, but because He can will nothing but 780
that which is just. But he addeth not one grain of weight
more in these Animadversions about this subject to what he
had formerly said; all which hath been fully and clearly
satisfied in my former Defencet, to which he hath replied
nothing.

That which I said of the Jews-that "it was in their own

[See above in the Answ. to the
State of the Quest., p. 219.]

[Martial., Epigr., XII. xciv. 3, 4.]
[In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xii.

above p. 65.]

t

[Defence,] Numb. xii. [above pp. 75, &c.; Disc. i. Pt, iii.]

II.

power by their concurrence with God's grace to prevent DISCOURSE those judgments, and to recover their former estate","-is so Rom. xi. true, and so plainly affirmed by St. Paul, that no man but 23. himself durst have cavilled against it. But he who knows no liberty but from outward impediments, no general power of motion without a necessitation to kill Uriah, no grace but that which is irresistible; who hath never heard of the concurrence of grace and free will in the conversion of a sinner; it is no marvel if he think, that God will save men without themselves, as well as He made them without themselves.

Himself.

28.- Lev.

I said, God "may oblige Himself freely to His creature." God may Who ever doubted of it before himy? What doth he think of oblige God's promise to Abraham-I will "be the God of thee and [Gen. xvii. 3.] of thy seed after thee?" Or of the legal covenant-" Do this [Luke x. and thou shalt live?" Or of the evangelical covenant-" He xviii. 5.1 that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved?" But he [Mark xvi. 16.] saith, "He that can oblige, can also release when he will, and he that can release himself when he will, is not obliged." Is not this comfortable doctrine, and suitable to the truth and majesty of Almighty God, "in Whom there is no variable- James i. 17. ness nor shadow of turning?" Nothing is impossible to God's absolute power; but according to His ordinate power, which is disposed by His will, He cannot change His own decrees, nor go from His promise. If God's decrees were changeable, what would become of his universal necessity? But he shooteth at random, not much regarding, so it fit his present humour, whether it make for his cause or against it.

do any

But now I am to expect a heavy charge; hitherto he hath God cannot been but in jest ;-that I am "driven to words ill becoming" unrightme "to speak of God Almighty, for" I "make Him unable to eous thing. do that which hath been within the ordinary power of man to do." How is this? I said, "God cannot destroy the righte- [Gen. xviii. ous with the wicked,' which nevertheless is a thing done The great "mountain hath brought Might not I say, that God cannot

ordinarily by armies." forth a little mouse."

25.]

III.

Tit. i. 2. xxiii. 19.

Numb.

13.-Heb.

vi. 10.

2.

[Ezek. xviii. 25.]

PART sin, though men can do it? Why might not I say, that God cannot do unrighteous things, or God cannot be unrighteous (which is the same thing in effect), as well as the Scripture saith, God "cannot lie," God "cannot repent," God "cannot deny Himself," and, "God is not unrighteous to forget your 2 Tim. ii. works?" As if he should say, If God could break His promise, God could be unrighteous, but He cannot be unrighteous. Yea, the Lord doth submit Himself, as it Micah vi. were, to a trial upon this point;-"The Lord hath a controversy with His people, and He will plead with Israel." And He doth challenge them upon this very point;—" Hear now, O house of Israel, is not My way equal? are not your ways unequal?"—And in the same chapter He protesteth,[vv. 2-4.] "As I live, saith the Lord, ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel, . . the fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge ;" but, "the soul that sinneth shall die." And Abraham saith the same that I say (though he deny it), by way of interrogation Gen. xviii. indeed, but with much more vehemency ;— "Wilt Thou also destroy the righteous with the wicked?" &c.; "that be far from Thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous should be as the wicked; that be far from Thee; shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" Neither can he except, because it is not said, Canst Thou? but, "Wilt Thou?" for we speak of the ordinate power of God, which is ordered by His will.

23, 25.

Jude 7.

That which he saith of an armyd weigheth less than nothing. For, first, that destruction which an army maketh, is not like that destruction whereof Abraham speaketh, which fell upon Sodom and Gomorrah, which the Apostle calleth "the vengeance of eternal fire." The destruction made by an army may be a punishment to some, a chastisement or a blessing to others. Jeremy the prophet was involved with the rest of the Jews in the same Babylonian captivity; but the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah was an express punishment for sin. Thirdly, an army acteth by way of public justice, regarding the justice of the cause, not of particular persons; for it is not possible in the height of war to do justice according to the particular merits of single 781 d [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 110.]

persons.

II.

But after this necessity is over, and particular jus- DISCOURSE tice can take place, then no man ought to suffer but according to his guilt; then it is no more lawful to "destroy the righteous with the wicked." Necessity may justify the sufferings of innocent persons in some cases; but no necessity can warrant the punishment of innocent persons. "Innocentium lachrymæ diluvio periculosiores."

Whether they did well or ill for the manner of the act, who put out their bodily eyes because they supposed them to be an impediment to the eye of the soul, is not pertinent to our purpose, yet was apt enough to prove my intention,that bodily blindness may sometimes be a benefit.

irrelevant

the brute

His instance, in "brute beasts, which are afflicted, yet can- [T. H.'s not sine," is extravagant. I did not go about to prove, that instance of universal necessity doth take away afflictions: it rather ren- beasts.] dereth them unavoidable. But I did demonstrate (and he hath not been able to make any show of an answer to it), that it taketh away all just rewards and punishments; which is against the universal notion and common belief of the whole world. Brute beasts are not capable of punishment: they are not knocked down out of vindictive justice for faults committed, but for future use and benefit. I said there was "a vast difference between the light and momentary pangs" of brute beasts, "and the intolerable and endless pains of Hell." Sure enough, Dionysius the tyrant, seeing an ox knocked down at one blow, said to his friends, "what a folly it is to quit so fair a command for fear of dying, which lasts no longer a spaces." He himself, when his wits are calmer, doth acknowledge as much as I, and somewhat more :-" Perhaps" (saith he), "if the death of a sinner were an eternal life in extreme misery, a man might, as far as Job hath done, expostulate with God Almighty, not accusing him of injustice," &c., "but of little tenderness and love to mankind." But now he is pleased to give another judgment of it;"As if the length or greatness of the pain made any

[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 110.] [Defence, Numb. xii. above p. 79; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

Plut., [Apophthegm. Reg. &c.;

Op. Moral., tom. i. p. 488. ed. Wyt-
tenb.]
[Qu., Animadv. upon] Numb. x.

[p. 79.]

PART

III.

afflict inno

cent per

sons for

difference of the justice or injustice of inflicting it." Yes, very much. According to the measure of the fault ought to be the number of the stripes. If the punishment exceed It is just to the offence, it is unjust. On the other side, it is not only an act of justice, but of favour and grace, to inflict temporary pains for a greater good. Otherwise a master could not justly correct his scholar; otherwise a chirurgeon might not lance an impostume, or put a man to pain to cure him of the stone. If God afflict a man with a momentary sickness, and maketh this sickness a means to fit him for an eternal weight of glory, he hath no cause to complain of injustice.

their own good.

Sin is properly irregularity.

He is angry, that I "would make men believe, that" he "holds all things to be just, that are done by them who have power enough to avoid punishment." He doth me wrong. I said no such thing. If he be guilty of this imputation, either directly or by consequence, let him look to it. He hath errors enough which are evident. I did indeed confute this tenet of his, that "irresistible power is the rule of justice';" of which he is pleased to take no notice in his Animadversions. But whereas he doth now restrain this privilege to that power alone which is absolutely irresistible, he forgetteth himself over much, having formerly extended it to all sovereigns and supreme councils, within their own dominions :"It is manifest therefore, that in every commonwealth there is some one man or council which hath," &c., "a sovereign and absolute power, to be limited by the strength of the commonwealth and by no other thing." What? Neither by the law of God, nor nature, nor nations, nor the municipal laws of the land, nor by any other thing but his "power" and "strength ?" Good doctrine! "Hunc tu Romane caveto"."

Lastly, to make his presumption complete, he endeavoureth to prove, that God "is not only the author of the law,"--which is most true;—and "the cause of the act,"--which is partly true, because He is the only fountain of power, but that He is "the cause of the irregularity," that is, in "plain English" (which he delighteth in), the sin itself;-"I think"

i [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. pp. 110, 111.]

[Ibid., p. 111.]

1 [Defence, Numb. xii. above pp. 75, &c.; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

m

Lib. de Cive, tit. Imper., c. vi. num. 18. [p. 70.]

n [Horat., Sat., I. iv. 85.]

[See above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxiv. p. 155.]