III. Proper punishment is ever vin dictive in part. PART "just laws," which are "the ordinances of right reason,' active obedience is due. To unjust laws, which are the ordinances of reason erring,' passive obedience is due. Who shall hope to escape exception, when this innocent definition is quarrelled at? I wish his own principles were half so loyal. He saith, I "take punishment for a kind of revenge, and therefore can never agree with" him, "who takes it for nothing else but for a correction, or for an example," &c. I take punishment in the same sense, that all authors, both sacred and civil, Divines and philosophers, lawyers, and generally all classic writers, have ever taken it: that is, for "an evil of passion, which is inflicted for an evil of action." So, to pass by other authors, as slighted by him, the Holy Scripture doth always take it: as,- "Wherefore doth a living man comJob xxxi. plain? for the punishment of his sins ;"-and,-"This is a heinous crime, yea, it is an iniquity to be punished by the Ezra ix. 13. judges ;"-and,-" Thou hast punished us less than our iniquities deserved." Yea, punishment doth not only presuppose sin, but the measure of punishment, the degree of sin :Heb. x. 28. " He that despiseth Moses' law, died without mercy; of how much sorer punishment shall he be thought worthy, who hath trampled under foot the Son of God?" The judge was Deut. xxv. commanded to cause the offender "to be beaten according to the fault." This truth we learned from the ferulas and rods, which we smarted under when we were boys; and from the gibbets, and axes, and wheels, which are prepared for offenders. "Omnis pæna, si justa est, peccati pœna est1.” Lam. iii. 39. 11. That the punishment of delinquents hath other ends also, there is no doubt. "Nemo prudens punit quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur." Punishment respects the delinquent in the first place, either to amend him, or to prevent his doing of more mischief; secondly, it regardeth the party suffering, to repair his honour, or preserve him from contempt, or secure him for the time to come; lastly, it respects other persons, that the suffering of a few may be exemplary, and an admo i [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 134.] k["Malum passionis quod infligitur propter malum actionis." Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. II. c. xx. § 1; and Puffendorf, De Jure Naturæ et Gentium, lib. VIII. c. iii. § 4.] [Aug., De Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 18. § 51; and Retract., lib. i. c. 9. § 5: Op. tom. i. pp. 631. B, and 14. E.] m [Senec., De Irâ, lib. i. c. 16; Op. p. 547 from Plato, Protag., c. xxxix.] But herein lies his error,-that "punish- DISCOURSE II. nition to many. ment" is "for nothing else but for correction or example." "God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down 2 Peter ii. ↓. into Hell," that was no "correction;" and at the Last Judgment,-"Go ye cursed into everlasting fire,"-there is neither [Matt. xxv. "correction" nor" example:" but in both instances there is 41.] "punishment." Whence it is apparent, that some punishment, especially Divine, doth look only at the satisfaction of justice. [Exod.i.16. -Esth. iii. Johnix.22.] I gave five instances of "unjust laws:" Pharaoh's law, to Yet further of unjust drown the Israelitish children; Nebuchadnezzar's law, to laws. cast them who would not commit idolatry into the fiery Dan. iii. furnace; Darius his law, that whosoever prayed to God for 4-6; vi.6-9. thirty days should be cast into the den of lions; Ahasuerosh 12, 13.his law, to destroy the Jewish nation root and branch; the Pharisees' law, to excommunicate all those who confessed Christ". To all these he answereth nothing in particular, but in general, he giveth this answer,-that "they were just laws in relation to their subjects, because all laws made by him to whom the people have given the legislative power, are the acts of every one of that people, and no man can do injustice to himself; but they were unjust actions in relation to God"." He "feareth the Bishop will think this discourse too subtle"." Nay, rather, "the Bishop" thinketh it too flat and dull. I have answered his reason before;-that it is a sophistical fallacy, flowing from the accidental subordination of the causes. A man may will the lawgiver, and yet not will the law. That is one reply to his distinction. Secondly, I reply, that when the people did "give" them "the legislative power," they gave a kingly power, to preserve and protect their subjects; they meant not a power to drown them, to burn them, to cast them to the lions, to root them out from the earth by the means of unjust, bloody, tyrannical laws, made on purpose to be pitfalls to catch subjects. Hear himself;- No man can transfer or lay down his right to PART save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment'.' If the right be not transferred in such cases, then the law is groundless and unjust, and made without the consent of the 785 subject. They did not give, they did not intend to give, they could not give them a Divine power, or rather a power paramount above God,-to command idolatry, to forbid all prayer and invocation of God's holy name; and, therefore, though such laws do not warrant rebellion, because it is better to die innocent than to live nocent, yet that hindereth not but such laws are unjust both towards God and towards man. Thirdly, if these laws had been "just in relation to the subjects," then the subjects had been bound to obey them actively; but they were not bound to obey them actively; Exod. i. 17. yea, they were bound not to obey them. "The midwives feared God, and did not as the king of Egypt commanded Dan. iii. 18. them." The three children answered, "Be it known unto thee, O king, that we will not serve thy gods, nor worship thy golden image, which thou hast set up." The parents of Moses are commended for their faith in saving Moses conHeb. xi. 23. trary to "the king's commandment." 32. Fourthly, subjects have given to their sovereigns as well judiciary as legislative power over themselves; but their judiciary power doth not justify their unjust acts or sentences, 1 Kings xxi. even towards their subjects. Elias accused Ahab of murder; [19.] 2 Kings vi. and Elisha called his son Joram the "son of a murderer." Saul's injustice towards the Gibeonites did draw the guilt of blood upon his house; and the Lord was not satisfied, until the Gibeonites had received satisfaction. He himself styleth David's act towards Uriah "murders." Certainly, "murder" is not just, either towards God, or towards man. Therefore neither doth the legislative power justify their unjust laws. [2 Sam.xxi. 1, 14.] Fifthly, of all law-givers, those who are placed freely by the people, have the least pretence to such an absolute and universal resignation of all the property and interest of the subject. For it is to be presumed, that the people who did choose them had more regard to their own good than to the good of their law-giver, and did look principally at the protection of their own persons, and the preservation of their Leviath., Pt. i. c. 14. [pp. 65, 66. fol. Lond. 1651.] 8 [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 108.] II. own rights, and did contract accordingly. As we see in the DISCOURSE most flourishing monarchies of the world, as that of the Medes and Persians; they had their fundamental laws, which were not in the single power of the present law-giver to Dan. vi. 8. alter or violate by a new law or command, without injustice. If a pupil shall choose a tutor or guardian for himself, he investeth him with all his power, he obligeth himself to make good all his acts. Nevertheless he may wrong his pupil, or do him injustice. There is only this difference, that a pupil may implead his guardian and recover his right against him, but from a sovereign law-giver there lies no appeal but only to God; otherwise there would be endless appeals, which both nature and policy doth abhor, as in the instance of the Roman arbitrament formerly mentioned. An arbitrary power is the highest of all powers. Judges must proceed according to law; arbitrators are tied to no law, but their own reason, and their own consciences. Yet all the world will say, that the Romans dealt fraudulently and unjustly with the two parties. Lastly, the Holy Scriptures do everywhere brand wicked laws as infamous, as "the statutes of Omri," and "the Mich. vi. 16. statutes of Israel;" and styleth them expressly unjust laws, xvii. 19.— or "unrighteous decrees." -2 Kings Isai. x. 1. The Bible is The autho rity of the Scriptures He asketh, "to whom the Bible is a law?" not a law, but the positive laws of God are contained in the Bible. Doth he think the law of God is no law without his not de pendent on suffrage? He might have been one of Tiberius his council, the printer. when it was proposed to the Senate whether they should admit Christ to be a God or not". He saith, I "know that it is not a law to all the world"." Not de facto indeed. How should it? when the world is so full of atheists, that make no more account of their souls than of so many handfuls of salt, to keep their bodies from stinking. But de jure-by right, it is a law, and ought to be a law, to all the world. The heathens, and particularly the Stoics themselves, did speak with much more reverence of 'the Holy Books;' of which to suspect a falsehood, they held to be a heinous and detestable crime. And the first argument for necessity they [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 136.] [Euseb., Hist. Eccl., lib. ii. c. 2.] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvi. p. 136.] * Ammonius, in [Section. IIdam Aristotelis] lib. de Interpret., [pp. 93. b, 94. a. Venet. 1546: speaking of the III. [How they are a law to us.] PART produced from the authority of those books, because they said that "God did know all things, and dispose all things"." He asketh," how the Bible came to be a law to us? did God speak it vivá voce to us? have we seen the miracles? 786 have we any other assurance than the words of the Prophets, and the authority of the Church?" And so he concludeth, that "it is the legislative power of the Commonwealth," wheresoever it is placed, which "makes the Bible a law in England"." [Exod. xxi. If a man digged a pit, and covered it not again, so that an 33, 34.] ox or an ass fell into it, he was obliged by the Mosaical law to make satisfaction for the damage. I know not whether he do this on purpose to weaken the authority of Holy Scripture, or not. Let God and his own conscience be his triers. But I am sure he hath digged a pit for an ox or an ass without covering it again; and if they chance to stumble blindfold into it, their blood will be required at his hands. If a Turk had said so much of the Alcorân at Constantinople, he were in some danger. [Their Divine autho rity.] [The law of nature If it were within the compass of the present controversy, I should esteem it no difficult task to demonstrate perspicuously, that the Holy Scriptures can be no other than the Word of God Himself; by their antiquity, by their harmony, by their efficacy, by the sanctity and sublimity of their matter, such as could not have entered into the thoughts of man without the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, by the plainness of their style, so full of majesty, by the light of prophetical predictions, by the testimony of the blessed martyrs, by a multitude of miracles, by the simplicity of the penmen and promulgers, poor fishermen and shepherds, who did draw the world after their oaten reeds, and, lastly, by the judgments of God that have fallen upon such tyrants and others as have gone about to suppress or profane the sacred oracles. But this is one of those things, " de quibus nefas est dubitare;" which he that calleth into question, deserveth to be answered otherwise than with arguments a. But that which is sufficient to confute him is the law of coincident nature; which is the same in a great part with the positive with them.] |