II. law of God, recorded in Holy Scriptures. All the ten Com- DISCOURSE mandments, in respect of their substantials, are acknowledged by all men to be branches of the law of nature. I hope he will not say, that these laws of nature were made by our suffrages though he be as likely to say such an absurdity as any man living; for he saith, "the law of nature is the assent itself which all men give to the means of their preservation"." Every law is a rule of our actions; a mere "assent" is no rule. A law commandeth or forbiddeth, an "assent" doth neither. But to shew him his vanity: since he delighteth so much in definitions, let him satisfy himself out of the definition of the law of nature;-"The law of nature is the prescription of right reason, whereby, through that light which nature hath placed in us, we know some things to be done because they are honest, and other things to be shunned because they are dishonest." He had forgotten what he had twice cited and approved out of Cicero, concerning the law of nature; which Philo calls "the law that cannot lie, not mortal, made by mortals, not without life, or written in paper or columns without life, but that which cannot be corrupted, written by the immortal God in our understandings." Secondly, if this which he saith did deserve any considera- [Their antiquity.] tion, it was before the Bible was admitted, or assented unto, or received as the Word of God. But the Bible hath been assented unto and received in England sixteen hundred years. A fair prescription. And in all that time, I do not find any law to authorize it, or to underprop heaven from falling with a bulrush. This is undeniable, that for so many successive ages we have received it as the law of God Himself, not depending upon our assents, or the authority of our law makers. [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 137.] C ["Lex naturalis.. specialiter dicitur de dictamine seu judicio nostræ rationis, quo per lumen nobis ab æternâ lege impressum, aliqua esse bona seu naturæ nostræ consentanea certo cognoscentes statuimus ea agi debere, aut cognoscentes esse mala, seu naturæ nostræ dissentanea minimeque congrua, statuimus debere vitari." Reginaldus, Praxis Fori Pœnitentialis, lib. xiii. tractat. 2. in procemio; tom. i. p. 511. a. fol. Mogunt. 1617.] d [Cic., Pro Milone, cc. iv, xi.; quoted by Hobbes (Qu., Animadv. upon e [Philo Judæus, Liber Quod Omnis PART [Catholic Thirdly, we have not only a national tradition of our own III. Church for the Divine authority of Holy Scripture, but consent for (which is of much more moment) we have the perpetual them.] constant universal tradition of the Catholic Church of Christ, [T. H. his standard of truth is the civil magistrate.] ever since Christ Himself did tread upon the face of the earth. This is so clear a proof of the universal reception of the Bible for the genuine Word of God, that there cannot justly be any more doubt made of it, than whether there ever was a William the Conqueror or not. But this is his opinion,-that 'true religion in every country religious is that which the sovereign magistrate doth admit and enjoin. I could wish his deceived followers would think upon what rock he drives them. For if this opinion be true, then that which is true religion to-day, may be false religion tomorrow, and change as often as the chief governor or go-787 vernors change their opinions; then that which is true religion in one country, is false religion in another country, because the governors are of different opinions; then all the religions of the world, Christian, Jewish, Turkish, Heathenish, are true religions in their own countries; and if the governor will allow no religion, then atheism is the true religion. Then the blessed Apostles were very unwise to suffer for their conscience, because they would "obey God rather than man ;" then the blessed martyrs were ill advised, to suffer such torments for a false religion, which was not warranted, or indeed which was forbidden, by the sovereign magistrates. And so I have heard from a gentleman of quality, well deserving credit, that Mr. Hobbes and he talking_of_selfpreservation, he pressed Mr. Hobbes with this argument drawn from holy martyrs, to which Mr. Hobbes gave answer, "they were all fools." This bolt was soon shot: but the primitive Church had a more venerable esteem of the holy martyrs, whose sufferings they called palms, their prison a paradise, and their death-day their birthday of their glory, to whose memory they builded Churches, and instituted [Acts v. 29.] [See below in the Catching of the Mr. R. H. [Possibly Mr. Richard in 1654 (at the end of Bray's Memoirs of Evelyn, pp. 148, 151, 156. 4to. ed.). A presentation copy of the Castigations "for Mr. Harding" exists in a private library.] festivals, whose monuments God Himself did honour with DISCOURSE frequent miracles. He asketh, "why the Bible should not be canonical in Constantinople as well as in other places," if it were not as he saith b? His question is apocryphal, and deserveth no other answer, but another question-why a ship, being placed in a stream, is more apt to fall down the stream than to ascend up against the stream. It is no marvel, if the world be apt to follow a sensual religion, which is agreeable to their own appetites; but that any should embrace a religion, which surpasseth their own understandings, and teacheth them to deny themselves, and to sail against the stream of their own natural corruptions, this is the mere goodness of God. II. He saith, that "a conqueror makes no laws over the con- [Law of quered by virtue of his power and conquest, but by virtue of conquest.] their assenti." Most vainly urged, like all the rest. Unjust conquerors gain no right, but just conquerors gain all right. "Omnia dat, qui justa negat." Just conquerors do not use to ask the assent of those, whom they have conquered in lawful war, but to command obedience. See but what a pretty liberty he hath found out for conquered persons ;— they may choose whether they will obey or die. "Una salus victis nullam sperare salutem!." What is this to the purpose, to prove that conquerors make laws by the assent of those whom they have conquered? Nothing at all. And yet even thus much is not true upon his principle. Conquered persons are not free to live or die indifferently, according to his principles; but they are necessitated either to the one or the other, to live slaves or die captives. catechist for disloyal and unnatural per He hath found out a much like assent of children, to the T. H. a fit laws of their ancestors, without which he would make us believe that the laws do not bind :-"When children come to strength enough to do mischief, and to judgment" that they sons. are preserved from mischief "by fear of the sword that doth protect them, in the very act of receiving protection, and not renouncing it, they oblige themselves to the laws of their protectors." And here he inserteth further some of his PART peculiar errors; as this, that "parents who are not subject III. to others, may lawfully take away the lives of their children," and magistrates take away the lives of their subjects, without. any fault or crime, "if they do but doubt of their obedience"." Here is comfortable doctrine for children,-that their parents may knock out their brains lawfully; and for subjects,—that their sovereigns may lawfully hang them up or behead them without any offence committed, "if they do but doubt of their obedience;" and for sovereigns,—that their subjects are quitted of their allegiance to them, so soon as they but receive actual protection from another; and for all men,-if they do receive protection from a Turk, or a heathen, or whomsoever, they are obliged to his Turkish, heathenish, idolatrous, sacrilegious, or impious laws. Can such opinions as these live in the world? Surely no longer than men recover their right wits. Demades threatened Phocion, that the Athenians would destroy him, when they fall into their mad fits. And thee, Demades (said Phocion), when they return to their right minds. [Not all law-givers elective.] He saith, that I "would have the judge to condemn no man for a crime that is necessitated; as if" (saith he) "the judge could know what acts are necessary, unless he knew all that had anteceded both visible and invisible"." If all acts be 788 necessary, it is an easy thing for the judge to know what acts are necessary. I say more, that no crime can be necessitated; for if it be necessitated, it is no crime. And so much all judges know firmly, or else they are not fit to be judges. Surely he supposeth there are, or have been, or may be, some Stoical judges in the world. He is mistaken; no Stoic was ever fit to be a judge, either capital or civil. And in truth, Stoical principles do overthrow both all judges and judgments. He denieth that he "ever said, that all magistrates at first were elective'." Perhaps not in so many words; but he hath told us again and again, that no law can be unjust, because II. every subject chooseth his law in choosing his law-givers. DISCOURSE If every law-giver be elective, then every sovereign magistrate is elective, for every sovereign magistrate is a law-giver. And he hath justified the laws of the kings of Egypt, of Assyria, of Persia, upon this ground, because they were made by him, to whom the people had given the legislative powert." He addeth, that "it appears that" I "am of opinion that a law may be made to command the will"." Nothing less, if he speaks of the law of man. My argument was drawn from the lesser to the greater; thus,-If that law be unjust, which commands a man to do that which is impossible for him to do, then that law is likewise unjust, which commands him to will that which is impossible for him to will*. He seeth I condemn them both, but much more the latter. Yet, upon his principles, he who commandeth a man to do impossibilities, commandeth him to will impossibilities; because without willing them he cannot do them. My argument is ad hominem, and goes upon his own grounds,-that "though the action be necessitated, nevertheless the will to break the law maketh the action unjust." And yet he maintaineth, that the will is as much or more necessitated than the action, because he maketh a man free to do if he will, but not free to will. If a man ought not to be punished for a necessitated act, then neither ought he to be punished for a necessitated will. ecuted a cause of justice.] I said truly, that "a just law justly executed," is "a cause [A just law of justice." He inferreth, that he hath "shewed that all laws justly exare just, and all just laws are justly executed;" and hereupon he concludeth, that I "confess that all" I "reply unto here is true." Do I "confess," that "all laws are just ?" No, I have demonstrated the contrary. Or do I believe, that "all just laws are justly executed?" It may be so in Plato's Commonwealth, or in Sir Thomas More's Utopia, or in my Lord Verulam's Atlantis; but among us mortals, it is rather to be wished, than to be hoped for. He who builds partly upon |