III. PART And though Lipsius incurred some dislike by reason of some inusitate expressions, yet there is no cause why T. H. should please himself so much as to think that Lipsius was of his opinion. He was no such friend of any sort of destiny, as to abandon the liberty of the will. The Stoics themselves came short of T. H. his universal necessity. Yet I do not blame him, if he desire to have one partner in such a desperate cause as this is. What is said to be and what "extra Deum." [Acts xvii. 28.] That which "concerneth" him in the second distinction, is 807 this; that though he acknowledge a mock liberty, that is, a will or an appetite of the object, yet he maintaineth, that this appetite is neither moved, nor excited, nor determined to its act or appetibility of this or that, less or more, by the free agent, but altogether by extrinsecal causes; and so the pretended free agent is no more free, than a bird which a man holdeth fast in his hand is free to fly whithersoever she will. I said, "those things which God wills without Himself He "in Deo," Wills freely and not necessarily," which he censureth in this manner;" He says rashly and untruly; rashly, because there is nothing without God, Who is infinite, in Whom are all things, and in Whom we live, move, and have our being;' and untruly, because, whatsoever God foreknew from eternity, He willed from eternity, and therefore necessarily." What should I do? Should I fall down and thank this great Mogul (as the Ethiopian slaves do their emperor when they are lashed) for thinking on me? Although I know his Thrasonical humour very well, that his animal spirits are mere bubbles of vain glory, and that he knoweth right well that he cannot reign securely whilst there is one of a different opinion surviving; yet I am persuaded, that if he had been so well read, or so much versed in the writings of other men, as to know how many he wounded "rashly and untruly," in this "rash and untrue" censure, he would have foreborne it for his own sake. Hath he never heard of a common rule in theology, that "Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa”"—"The works or acts of the Trinity without Itself are undivided?" Or a [Defence, Numb. xviii. above p. 120; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] b [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xviii. p. 198.] [Borrowed from St. Augustin, In Johan. Evang., cap. xvi. Tract. xcv. §1; Op. tom. iii. P. ii. p. 731. A. (and elsewhere);" Sæpe diximus inseparabilia opera esse Trinitatis." And that "Alia a Se Deus non ex necessitate vult," see Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. I. Qu, xix. art. 3.] II. hath he never heard of that common distinction between a DISCOURSE necessary being and a necessary actingd? The most perfect manner of being is necessary, and therefore God is a necessary being; and that which He willeth within Himself, He willeth necessarily, because "whatsoever is in God is God":" but the most perfect manner of acting without the Deity is freely; and therefore the Schools do agree, that God is a free agent without Himself. [Free acts a tra Deum; of God ex -Creation, These free acts are principally two. The first is the creation, whereby things created do pass from a not being to being. The second is government, by which all things and Gocreated are moved and ordered to their ends. All men ac- vernment.] knowledge, that the Deity filleth all places by Its essence, by Its presence, by Its power; being within all places and things, but not included; and without all places and things, but not excluded. They acknowledge, that all things which have a real being, do depend upon God for their being, for their making, for their conservation. And therefore, when we speak of any thing that is without the Deity, we do not intend, that any thing is without the essence, or the presence, or the power, or the circumference of It. God is a circle, Whose centre is every where, the circumference no where. But by "the works of God without Himself," we understand the creation and the government of the world; which are not terminated in the Deity Itself, but in the creatures; which are from God as their efficient, and for God as their end, and in God or through God in respect of their necessary and perpetual dependance upon Him, Who is the original essence of all things,-"I am hath sent me unto you;"-yet they Exod. iii. are not of God as particles of the Divine essence, nor in God in that sense wherein we use to say, "Whatsoever is in God is God;" and so they are His works "ad extra”—“ without the Deity." To make good the second part of his censure, that it was "untruly" said,-he produceth nothing but his old threadbare argument taken from the prescience of God, which hath been answered over and over. Neither the prescience of God, d["Necessitas essendi- necessitas operandi." See above in the Answ. to Animadv. upon Numb. iii. pp. 264, 265; and note 1.] e [See above p. 159. note f.] 14. PART To will and the same willeth not could will. nor the will of God upon prescience, do imply any more than a mere hypothetical necessity, which will do his cause no good. In the conclusion of this section he confesseth, that "God do, in God, doth not all things that He can do if He will;" but he saith, thing. He God "cannot will that which He hath not willed from all He eternity;" understanding by eternity an everlasting succession, whereas in eternity nothing is past or to come. I have shewed often in these Castigations, the falsity, uselessness, and contradiction, of this absurd silly senseless distinction, in respect of men. But being here applied by him to God, nothing can be imagined more absurd. For to will efficaciously, and to do, in God are the same thing. What He doth, He doth by His will. To imagine, that many things are free to God to do, which are not free to Him to will, 808 sheweth that his "meditations" upon this subject were either none at all, or worth nothing. But it shall suffice for the present, to shew how absurd and how unappliable this exposition is to the two places by me produced. John Baptist told the Jews, that they might not flatter themselves with this, that they were the posterity of Abraham; that though all they should prove impenitent Luke iii. 8. and unbelievers, yet "God was able to raise up children to Abraham of stones." If it were impossible for God to will the doing of any such thing, how was this truly said? And how could this afford any supply to the seed of Abraham, in case his carnal posterity should continue obstinate? In the other place, St. Peter drawing his sword in defence of his Master, Christ reprehended him and told him that He could have a better guard to secure Him from all the attempts of the Jews, if it pleased Him not to lay down His life freely ;[Matt.xxvi. "Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to My Father, and 53.] He shall give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?" He saith not, I can if I would, but positively, "I can." Neither speaketh He of remote possibilities, but, "He shall give Me presently." Christ would shew by these words, that if it had not been His own will freely to suffer for the redemption of mankind, He could have "prayed to His Father," and He would have sent Him a guard of more [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xviii. p. 198.] [See above in the Defence, Numb. xxxvi. pp. 190-192; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] II. than "twelve legions of angels," and that "presently"— DISCOURSE without delay. If it was impossible for God to will any such thing, then our Saviour's plea to St. Peter was but a vain pretence, and had nothing of reality in it. If T. H. regarded the honour and veracity of Christ, he would not impose such a juggling delusory sense upon His clear assertion; as if our Saviour should have said, 'Peter, I have no need of thy endeavours to defend Me, for I could pray to My Father, and He would immediately send Me a guard of twelve legions of angels; but to say the truth, He is not willing to do it, and to say the whole truth, it is not possible for Him to be willing.' CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;-NUMBER XIX. the will to He professeth, that he "never said the will is compelled, T. H.makes but doth agree with the rest of the world that it is not com- be compelled." But, to let us see that he understandeth not what pelled. "the world" meaneth, in saying, the will "is not compelled," twice or thrice in the same page he maketh it to be compelled. 'Many things" (saith he) "may compel a man to do an action in producing the will'." If a man can be compelled to will, then the will can be compelled. This appeareth yet more plainly a little after, where he maketh the casting of one's goods into the sea in a storm to be a voluntary free elective act; and yet he confesseth, that "terror" was "a necessary cause of the election." To which if we add what he saith in his Answer,-"A man is then only said to be compelled, when fear maketh him willing to it',"-it appeareth, that (according to his grounds) it is a compulsory action also. If voluntary actions may be compulsory actions, then the will may be compelled. To help to bear off this blow, he distinguisheth between the compulsion of the will and the compulsion of the voluntary agent", denying the former, but acknowledging the latter;—"that is, not a compulsion of the will, but of the man"." The very same he hath again in these words, "The necessitation of the will is the same thing h I [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 208.] i [Ibid.] k Ibid.] 1 [See above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xix. p. 122.] m [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 208.] n [Ibid.] III. PART with the compulsion of the man"." If this be not plain "jargon," and "Bohu" (as he phraseth itP), let him tell me what is the compulsion of a man to will, but the compulsion of his will. Whether by the will he understand the soul as it willeth, or the faculty of the will, or the act of willing; every way, he that compelleth a man to will, compelleth his will. Let him call it what he please, either to compel a man to will or to compel the will; by his leave, it is a gross contradiction; for to compel implieth reluctance and opposition, and to will implieth inclination and appetition. To necessitate the will (as he doth) is to compel the will, so far as the will in the elicit acts of it is capable of compulsion. [What is properly compul sion. ] That is properly said to be compelled, "which hath its beginning from an extrinsecal cause, that which suffereth contributing nothing to it," but "resisting as much as he can." But he hath devised a new improper kind of compulsion, which is caused only by "fear"," which is not properly a compulsion; and such as it is, [is] common to many other causes with fear; as, to persuasion,-so Saul's servants compelled him" to eat ;-to command,-so, "the drinking was according to law, none did compel;"—to occasion,—so 2 Cor. xii. St. Paul saith, "I am become a fool in glorying, ye have compelled me." 1 Sam. xxviii. 23. Esth. i. 8. 11. I pass by his uncouth term of "creation of the wills" in every single act of willing: and his extravagant exception,— 809 if "the same individual man who did choose to throw his goods overboard," might "choose not to throw his goods overboard," then "he might choose to throw overboard and not throw overboardt." As if the liberty to throw or not to throw and the liberty to throw and not to throw, that is, the liberty to do either part of the contradiction or to do both parts of the contradiction, were the same liberty. And, secondly, as if a man who hath actually chosen, were as free to choose now, as he was at the same time when he did choose. I see, if he cannot find a knot in a bulrush, he will do his endeavour to make it. If "a man" (saith he) "by σθέντος.”] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 208.] P [See above p. 368. note f.] Aristot., Eth., lib. III. c. i. [§ 12.“Έοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βια [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 208.] • [Ibid.] t [Ibid., p. 209.] |