III. PART mine himself, contrary to the sense of the whole world, let him enjoy it. Some men have conceited themselves to be urinals, and suffered none to touch them for fear of breaking them. But he must not think to obtrude his phlegmatic fancies upon all other men, who understand themselves better. If he were not resolved to oppose all the world without any ground, he would never have denied a "moral" efficacy, or metaphorical "motion," or have affirmed that motives, that is to say, persuasives or reasons, weighed in the understanding, do determine the free agent naturally". Is the persuading of a man to eat, and the thrusting of it down his throat, the same thing? Do an argument and a cannon bullet work after the same manner? Did he ever hear a bullet called a "motive" to the beating down of the wall, or flowers called "motives" to the production of the fruits, or meat a "motive" to nourishment? Natural efficacy is always necessary, and determinate, and active to the height of its power; but moral agents act not necessarily, nor determinately, nor always to the height of their power. The lawyer that he speaketh of, may refuse to plead, or delay his pleading, or plead better or worse; and when he hath done his uttermost, it may so fall out that he effecteth nothing for his client. I am ashamed of such silly verbal objections, contrary to the known principles of arts. [The more reason, the more liberty.] He complaineth, that I put his notions oftentimes into mine own terms. I had thought I had done him a favour to render him more intelligible, and put his sense into the common language of scholars. The understanding being the root of liberty, and the will being but "intellectus extensus ad habendum aut faciendum quod cognoscit"-"the understanding extended to enjoy or do that which it knoweth," it must needs be, that the more reason, the less passion, the less reluctance, and consequently the more liberty. He saith, "When we mark not the force that moves us, we think.. that it is not causes but liberty, that produceth the action." I rendered him thus,-"The ignorance of the true causes and their power is the reason that we ascribe the effect to [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 231.] [Ibid.] Scalig., [De Subtilitate &c.,] Exerc. cccvii. c. 3. [p. 923.] z [Above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xx. p. 132.] 1 II. liberty." Where lieth the fault? That which he calleth DISCOURSE "force" and "strength," I call "power;" and for "that which moves us,” I say "causes," as he himself doth express himself in the same place. Where I say "the will causeth," he saith "the man chooseth." As if there were any difference between these two, 'the eye seeth,' and 'the man seeth.' This, and a confounding of voluntas with volitio, the faculty of willing with the act of willing, and a young suckling contradiction which he hath found out,-that "the will hath power to refuse what [it] willeth"," that is, before it have willed it, not after,—is the substance of this Animadversion; which deserve no other answer, but that a man should change his risibility into actual laughter. sity as well compul I produced two reasons, to prove that true liberty is a [True liberty, a freedom not only from compulsion but from necessity: the freedom former drawn from the nature of election, or the act of the from neceswill, which is always inter plura; the latter, which I called a as from "new" argument, because it had not formerly been touched in sion.] this treatise, taken from the nature of the faculty of the will, or of the soul as it willeth; which is not capable of any other compulsion but necessitation, and if it be physically necessitated, it is thereby acquitted from all guilt, and the fault transferred upon those causes that did necessitate it. This argument indeed began with a distinction, but proceeded to a demonstration, which was reduced by me into form in my Defence, to which he hath given no show of satisfaction, either in his first answer, or in these Animadversions, except it be a 'concedo omnia,' or a granting of the conclusion. The same ground which doth warrant the names of "tyrant, præmunire, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday d" (that is, use, “Quem penes arbitrium est et vis et norma loquendi e”), doth likewise justify these generally received terms of the "elicit" and "imperate acts of the will," there being scarcely one author, who hath written upon this subject in Latin, that doth not use them, and approve them. In the Council of Dort (which he himself mentioneth) he may find this truth III. PART positively maintained,-that "voluntas elicit actum suume." Where he may likewise find, what "moral persuasives" or motives are, if he have a desire to learn. T. H. maketh God of sin. Amos iii. 6. h Although he be convicted, that it followeth from his prin- 817 the cause ciples, that God is the cause of all sin in the world, yet he is loth to say so much; for that is "an unseemly phrase, to say that God is the cause of sin, because it soundeth so like a saying that God sinnethi." Yea, it is even as like it as one egg is like another; or rather it is not like it, for it is the very same. "Nullum simile est idem." He that is the determining cause of sin in others, sinneth himself. It is as well against the eternal law, that is, the rule of justice which is in God Himself, to make another to sin, as to sin. Yet, though he will not avow such "an unseemly phrase,”—that "God is the cause of sin,"-yet he doth endeavour to prove it by four texts of Holy Scripture, which are altogether impertinent to his purpose. The first is that of the Prophet Amos, "Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it?" But that is clearly understood of the evil of punishment, not of the evil of sin. To the three other places2 Sam. xvi. that "the Lord said unto Shimei, curse David," and that "the Lord put a lying spirit into the mouth of" Ahab's 1 Kings xii. "prophets," and that of Rehoboam's not "hearkening to the people," the reader may find a satisfactory answer formerly. But because he seemeth to ground much upon those words which are added to the last place-" for the cause was from the Lord,"-conceiving some singular virtue to lie in them, and an ovation at least to be due unto himself (" I will not say, lest the Bishop exclaim against me"), applauding himself like the fly upon the cart-wheel-" See what a dust I do raise,”— I will take the liberty to tell him further, that there is nothing of any "cause of sin" in the text, but of a cause of Jeroboam's advancement; as he might have perceived plainly by the words immediately following,-"The cause was from the 10. 1 Kings xxii. 23. 15. [1 Kings xii. 15.] [Judic. Theol. Britann. de III. et IV.Articulis Remonstrantium, De Conversione quâ denotat actionem hominis &c., thesis i; ap. Act. Syn. Dordr., P. ii. p. 171. 4to. Dordr. 1620.] [Id., Ibid., Thes. Heterod., thes. ii; ibid., pp. 173, 174.] i [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 235.] [Ibid., p. 234.] k [Answ. to] Fount of Arg., [above pp. 230, 231.] I [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 234.-"That which God sayeth of Himself 1 Kings xii. 15," &c., "I will not say, lest the Bp. exclaim against me; but leave it to be interpreted by those that have authority," &c.] II. Lord, that He might perform His saying, which the Lord DISCOURSE spake by Ahijah the Shilonite unto Jeroboam the son of Nebat;" which saying was this, "I will rent the kingdom [1 Kings out of the hand of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee." So he hath produced an evil effect of punishment for an evil effect of sin, and a cause of advancement for a cause of sin, and a permitting or ordering or disposing of sin for a necessitating or determining to sin. ses for uni Yet he produceth six witnesses, to prove that liberty is not Six witnesopposed to necessity, but to compulsion;-Luther, Zanchy, versal neBucer, Calvin, Moulin, and the Synod of Dortm First, reader, I desire thee to judge of the partiality of this man; cessity answered. who rejecteth all human authority in this cause (as he hath reason, for it were an easy thing to overwhelm and smother him, and his cause, with testimonies of Councils, Fathers, doctors, of all ages and communions, and all sorts of classic authors), and yet seeks for protection under the authority of a few neoteric writers. "A double weight and a double [Prov. xx. measure are an abomination." "Aut hæc cum illis sunt habenda, aut illa cum his amittenda sunt. If he will reap the benefit of human authority, he must Secondly, a man may see by his citing of these testimonies, that he hath taken them up upon trust, without ever perusing them in the authors themselves. I demand therefore, whether he will be tried by his own witnesses in this case in difference between him and me; that is, concerning universal necessity, in natural, civil, and external actions, by reason of a necessary connexion of second causes, and a natural determination of 10;-" Divers weights and divers measures,' &c.] PART the will. If he will not, he doth not deserve to have so much as one of his testimonies looked upon. III. Thirdly, I answer, that supposing (but not granting) that all his testimonies were true as he citeth them, yet none of them will advantage his cause at all. Luther his first witness disclaimed it, and recanted what he had said"; and the necessity which he speaketh of, is only "a necessity of immutability:" and the Synod of Dort speaketh only of "a necessity of infallibility:" both which do imply no more than a consequent hypothetical necessity, which we also maintain. Zanchy, Bucers, Calvin, Moulin", speak of a necessity of sinning in 818 respect of our original corruption. This concerneth not the liberty of the will, whether it be free or not free, but the power of free will, whether it can without grace avoid sin and determine itself to moral or supernatural good; which is nothing to the question between him and me. And for an essay what he may expect from his witnesses, Calvin, who is the least disfavourable to him of them all, saith no more but this ;-" Deum, quoties viam facere vult Suæ providentiæ, etiam in rebus externis hominum voluntates flectere et versare; nec ita liberam esse ipsorum electionem, quin ejus libertati Dei arbitrium domineturv”—“That God," (not always but) as often as He will make way for His providence, even in external things doth bow and turn the wills of men; neither is their election so free, but that the good pleasure of God hath a dominion over their liberty." Calvin did know no universal determination of all external acts by God, but only in some extraordinary cases. He acknowledged, that the will of man was free to elect in external things, but not so free as to be exempt from the dominion of God; which two by T. H., ibid.] P Visit. Saxon. [See above p. 218. notes u, y. The passage quoted by Hobbes (Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 235) is in the tract De Servo Arbitrio (Op. tom. iii. p. 165. b.).] ۹ [Syn. Dordr. as quoted by T. H., ibid. The sentence quoted is not the doctrine of the Synod of Dort, but of the deputies from one of the Dutch provincial Churches there present; being taken from the Judic. Orthod. Eccles. Nassovio-Weteravicarum de III. et IV. Artt. Remonstr., thes. de Lib. Arb., ap. Act. Syn. Dordr. P. ii. p. 196.] [Tract. Theol., lib. I. c. vi. thes. 1. (Op. tom. iv. p. 90. ed. 1605); quoted [Lib. de Concordiâ (viz. De Verâ Eccles. in doctrinâ &c. Reconciliatione et Compositione, Respons. ad Alb. Pighium, Art. de Lib. Arb., p. 34. b."Non necessitas sed coactio libertati voluntatis adversatur"),quoted by T.H., ibid.] [Instit., lib. II. c. ii. § 6, Op. tom. ix. p. 63; quoted by T. H., ibid.] u[Bouclier de la Foi, Art. ix. (Part. I. § xxi. p. 112. first ed. Genev. 1619); quoted by T. H., ibid.] v Calvin, Instit., lib. II. c. iv. dist. 7. [Op. tom. ix. p. 77.] |