II. "the will" there. Here he will have but "one will," there DISCOURSE he admitteth two distinct wills-" to will is an act of the will." Here he will not endure, that the "faculty" should be the will; there he saith expressly, that "the will is a faculty." All this wind shaketh no oats. Whatsoever he saith in this section, amounteth not to the weight of one grain. scence. 8.- Col. iii. If he had either known what concupiscence doth signify, Of concupi which really he doth not, or had known how familiar it is [Rom. vii. (both name and thing) in the most modest and pious au- 5.-1Thess. thors, both sacred and profane, which he doth not know, he iv. 5.] would have been ashamed to have accused this expression as unbecoming a grave person. But he, who will not allow me to mention it once to good purpose, doth take the liberty to mention it six times in so many lines to no purposey. There hath been an old question between Roman Catholics and Protestants, whether concupiscence without consent be a sin or not. And here cometh he, as bold as blind, to determine the difference; committing so many errors, and so gross, in one short determination, that it is a shame to dispute with him; thrashing those doctors soundly, whom he professeth to honour and "admire," not for ill will, but because he never read them. He maintaineth that which the Romanists themselves do detest, and would be ashamed of: as, first, that concupiscence without consent is no sina, contrary to all his much "admired doctors";" secondly, that there is no "concupiscence without consent," contrary to both parties, which we use to call the taking away the subject of the question; thirdly, that "concupiscence with consent" may be "lawful"," contrary to all men ;-(though the Church of Rome do not esteem it to be properly a sin, yet they esteem it a defect, and not altogether lawful, even without consent, much less with consent ;)—fourthly, that "concupiscence makes not the sin, but the unlawfulness of satisfying such concupiscence," or the "design to prosecute what he knoweth to be unlawfulf;" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvii. [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvii. p. 282.] p. 281.] [Ibid., pp. 281, 282.] 2 [See Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. v. cc. 5-14.] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvii. p. 282.] b [Viz. Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Perkins. Sec above p. 382, note 1.] с d [Ibid.] e [Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. v. c. 10; Op. tom. iii. p. 396. D.] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvii. p. 282.] PART III. Jam. i. 15. which last errors are so gross, that no man ever avowed them before himself. "When lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin;" that is, when a man hath consented to the suggestion of his own sensuality. Though he scorn the Schoolmen, yet he should do well to advise with his doctors, whom he professeth to "admires," before he plunge himself again into such a whirlypool. CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;-NUMBER XXVIII. If I should give over the well known terms of the "rational" or intellectual "will," so well grounded in nature, so well warranted by the authority and practice of all good divines and philosophers, to comply with his humour or distempered imaginations, I should right well deserve a bable'. The intellectual appetite and "the sensitive appetite" are both appetites, and in the same man they both proceed from the same soul, but by divers faculties, the one by the intellectual, the other by the sensitive; and proceeding from several faculties, they do differ as much as if they proceeded from several souls. The sensitive appetite is organical, the intellectual appetite is inorganical. The sensitive appetite followeth the judgment of the senses, the intellectual appetite followeth the judgment of the understanding. The sensitive appetite pursueth present, particular, corporal delights; the intellectual appetite pursueth that which is honest, that which is future, that which is universal, that which is immortal and spiritual. The sensitive appetite is determined by the object. It cannot choose but pursue that object which the senses judge to be good, and fly that which the senses judge to be evil. But the intellectual appetite is free to will, or nill, or 837 suspend, and may reject that which the senses say to be good, and pursue that which the senses judge to be evil, according to the dictate of reason. Then, to answer what he saith in particular," the appetite and the will" are not always "the same thing." Every will is an appetite, but every appetite is not a will. Indeed, in i [Bable bauble. Nares' Glossary.] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxviii. p. 284.] 8 [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 212.] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxviii. p. 283.] the same man, appetite and will is the same thing (secluding DISCOURSE natural appetite, which concerneth not this question); but the sensitive appetite and the intellectual appetite are not the same thing; following several guides, pursuing several objects, and being endowed with several privileges. He demandeth, whether "sensual men and beasts do not deliberate and choose one thing before another, in the same manner that wise men do?" Although he hath found out a brutish kind of deliberation, if we take the word in the right sense, beasts cannot deliberate. "Sensual men" may deliberate, but do not deliberate as they ought. And by consequence beasts act necessarily, and cannot choose; sensual men do choose, or may choose, but do not choose as they ought, nor as "wise men do." He saith, it "cannot be said of wills, that one is rational, another sensitive'." Not very properly; but it may be said of appetites, "that one is rational, another sensitive." And why not a rational will, as well as a rational discourse? The will of a rational creature, rationally guided, is a rational will; and so will be, when we are dead and gone. ration is no He concludeth, "If it be granted that deliberation is always His delibe(as it is not), there were no cause to call men rational more deliberathan beasts, for it is manifest by continual experience, that tion. beasts do deliberatem." Such a deliberation as he fancieth is not worth contending for, good for nothing but to be thrown to the dogs or the swine;" an alternate imagination, alternate hope and fear, an alternate appetite"." Here is a heap of "alternates," every one unlike another, and all of them as far distant from deliberation as reason is from sense. Imagination is seated in the head, fear and hope in the heart; appetite is neither the one nor the other. Yet this is all the deliberation, and all the reason, which he attributeth to man. And he attributeth the same to brute beasts, but not at all times;-if they had this deliberation at all times, "there were no cause to call men rational more than beasts"." So the III. PART difference between a man and beast is this, that man, or rather some men, are reasonable creatures at all times, thanks to their own industry, and brute beasts are reasonable creatures at some times. If he had said, that some men are but reasonable creatures at some times, I should rather have believed him for this discourse. His liberty no true liberty. He is beholden to his catachrestical expressions for all the rest of his discourse in this section. I take liberty to be a power of the rational soul, or of the free agent, to choose or refuse indifferently, upon deliberation. And he maketh liberty to be no more than the bias of a bowl, a strong inclination to one side, affixed by deliberation. And by this abusive expression he thinketh to avoid the two arguments which were brought against him in this section. The former argument was this, "If every agent be necessitated to act what [he] doth act by extrinsecal causes, then he is no more free before deliberation than after;" which is demonstratively true of true liberty; but applying it to his new-fangled acception of liberty, he answereth, "He is more free" but "he is no less necessitated"." Yet withal he confesseth, that he is necessitated to deliberate as he doth, and to will as he doth; that is to say, he is necessitated to be free. This is a freedom of a free stone, not of a free man. If this be all the freedom which a man hath, we must bid adieu to all election. Then there is neither freedom of our will, nor of our actions, more than an inclination extrinsecally necessitated; and then all those absurdities which he hath sought so carefully to avoid, tumble upon his head thick and threefold. The second argument was this,-"Deliberation doth produce no new extrinsecal impediment, therefore either the agent is free after deliberation, or he was not free before"." He answereth, that he "cannot perceive any more force of inference in these words than of so many words put together at adventures." I wonder at his dulness. He defineth liberty to be an "absence of extrinsecal impediments." If this definition [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. r [Defence, Numb. xxviii. above p. 166; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] s [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxviii. p. 284.-"Of so many other words," &c.] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxix. above p. 166.] 838 II. be true, then, wheresoever there is the same absence of ex- DISCOURSE trinsecal impediments, there is the same liberty; but if deliberation produce no new extrinsecal impediments, there is the same absence of extrinsecal impediments after deliberation, which was before; therefore, upon his grounds, there is the same liberty after deliberation, which was before. What he telleth of "thoughts" that "arise in him that deliberateth"," is nothing to the purpose. The last judgment is more than bare "thoughts." But this maketh but an intrinsecal determination, and a necessity upon supposition, not an extrinsecal determination, and an antecedent necessity, of which the question is between him and me. A man cannot "have liberty to do, or not to do, that which at the same time is already done." But a man may do that which he doth freely from all antecedent necessity; and necessity upon supposition is not destructive to liberty. He "profaneth the Name of God," who maketh Him to be corporal and divisible, to be compounded of substance and accidents, to be mutable, and to acquire and lose daily; not he who argueth soberly and submissively from the attributes or works of God. CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XXIX. tion of He hath given a proof lately of his theology, now he His definipretendeth to shew his skill in logic and philosophy. He liberty. needeth not to tell us, that he acquired his knowledge by his own "meditation";" he is so long fumbling and spelling of every word. In the first place, he giveth us the definition of a definition;-"A right definition is that" (what? a right definition without a genus?) "which determineth the signification of the word defined"." This definition agreeth as much to a lexicon as to a definition. By his leave, a right definition is an explication of the thing defined by the essential terms; those are, the genus and the difference. His definition is but a poor description. He "confesseth," that "the rule is good" in defining to |