II. it is the only piece of sense that is in this section. I made DISCOURSE this objection to myself in my Defence, and answered it in these words." Yet I do not deny, that there are other beginnings of human actions, which do concur with the will: some outward, as the First Cause by general influence, which is evermore requisite, angels or men by persuading, evil spirits by tempting, the object or end by its appetibility; some inward, as the understanding by directing; so passions and acquired habits. But I deny, that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by determining it physically to one, except God alone, Who doth it rarely in extraordinary cases and where there is no antecedent determination to one, there is no absolute necessity, but true liberty "." Where he maketh "the beginning of motion" in a stone thrown upwards and a stone descending downwards to be both "in the stoneh," it is but a poor trifling homonymy; as the most part of his treatise is. The beginning of motion in a stone ascending is in the stone subjectively but not effectively, because that motion proceedeth not from the form of the stone. But in the descent of the stone, the beginning of motion is both subjectively and effectively in the stone. And what he telleth us of "a former motion in the ambient body, air or water," to make the stone "descend'," is needless and frustraneous. Let him but withdraw the pin that holdeth the slate upon the house against its natural inclination, and he shall see presently there needeth no "motion in the ambient body" to make the stone drop down. causes do sarily. He adviseth me to "consider, with what grace" I "can Necessary say, that necessary causes do not always produce their not always effects, except those effects be also necessarily produced." act necesRather let him "consider, with what grace" he can misrecite that which I say, by leaving out the word "necessary." said, "necessary causes do not always produce necessary effects;" and I can say that with better grace than he can deny it. When necessary agents and free agents are conjoint in the production of the same effect, the effect is not [Defence, Numb. xxx. above p. 170; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] h [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxx. p. 292.] BRAMHALL. G g i [Ibid.] k [Defence, Numb. xxx. above p. 170.] III. PART antecedently necessary. I gave him an instance. Protagoras writ a book against the Gods,-" De Dis, utrum sint utrum non sint, nihil habeo dicere;" the senate ordered his 841 book to be burned for it'. Although the fire be a necessary agent, yet, because the senators were free agents, the burning of his book was not antecedently necessary. [The will not a ne- cause of Where I say, that "the will is not a necessary cause of what it willeth in particular actionsm," he inferreth, that there are no “universal actions," and if it be not "a necessary cause of lar acts.] particular actions," it is the necessary cause of no actions"; and again, he "would be glad" to have me "set down what voluntary actions (not particular) those are" which are “necessitated." It is scarcely possible for a man to express himself more clearly than I did; but clearly or unclearly, all is one to him, who is disposed to cavil. I did not oppose "particular acts" to "universal acts," but to a collection of all voluntary acts in general,' qua tales'—as they are voluntary. It is necessary, that all acts generally which proceed from the will, should be voluntary; and so the will is "a necessary cause of voluntary acts," that is, of the voluntariness of them. But the will is not a necessary cause of the particular acts themselves. As, upon supposition that a man be willing to write, it is necessary that his writing be voluntary, because he willeth it; but put the case without any supposition, and it is not necessary that he should write, or that he should will to write, because it was in his own power whether he would write or not. So the voluntariness of all acts in general, proceeding from the will, is necessary; but the acts themselves were not necessary before the free agent had determined himself, and then but upon supposition. His excepting against these common expressions, "the will willeth," or, "the will may either will or suspend its acts," is but seeking of a knot in a bulrush. It is all one, whether one say "the will willeth," or, "the man willeth," or, "the will may will or suspend its act," or, "the man may will or suspend his acts." Scaliger saith, that "volo velle" is a "proper" speech,-" I will will," and "received by the common II. consent of all nations." If he had any thing of moment to DISCOURSE insert into his Animadversions, he would not make use of such leptologies. "Canting"" is not chargeable upon him, who useth common and known terms of art, but upon him who deviseth new terms, as canters do, which die with their inventors. He asketh, "how can he that willeth at the same time suspend his wills?" Rather, why doth he insert into his demand "at the same time?" It is enough to liberty, if he that willeth could have suspended his will. All this answer of mine to his second argument was illustrated by the instance of the election of a Pope; to which he opposeth nothing but, "It may be," and, "It doth not follow," and, "I would be glad to know by what arguments he can prove" that "the election" was "not necessitated." I have done it sufficiently all over in this treatise. I am now answering to what he produceth, not 'proving.' If he have any thing to demand, let him go to the Cardinals, and inquire of them, whether they be such fools to keep such a deal of needless stir, if they were antecedently necessitated to choose one certain man Pope and no other. CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS ;-NUMBER XXXI. of suffi I join these two sections together, because they concern Two sorts one and the same thing: namely, whether every sufficient ciency. cause do necessarily effect whatsoever it is sufficient for; or, which is the same in effect, whether a free agent, when all things are present which are needful to produce an effect, can, nevertheless, not produce it. Which question may be understood two ways, either inclusively or exclusively either including and comprehending the will of the agent under the notion of sufficiency and among things requisite to the producing of the effect, so as the cause is not reputed to be sufficient, except it have both ability and will to produce the effect, and so as both requisite power and requisite will do : III. PART concur; and then there is no question but the effect will infallibly follow ;-" positá causá ponitur effectus ;"-or else it may be understood exclusively, not comprehending the will under the notion of sufficiency, or not reckoning it among the necessary requisites to the production of the effect, so as the agent is supposed to have power and ability to produce the effect, but no will; and then it is as infallibly true on the other side, that the effect cannot be produced. Thus far this question is a mere logomachy or contention about words, without any real difference. And T. H. doth but abuse his readers, to keep a jangling and a stir about nothing. But in truth "the water stoppeth" not here. If he should speak to the purpose, he should leave 842 these shallows. If the will of the free agent be included under the notion of sufficiency, and comprehended among those things which are requisite to the production of the effect, so as both sufficient ability and sufficient will are required to the making a sufficient cause, then it cometh to be considered, in the second place, whether the will in things external be (under God) in the power and disposition of the free agent himself, which is the common opinion of all men, who understand themselves; and then the production of the effect is only necessary hypothetically, or upon supposition that the free agent is willing; or else, whether the will of the free agent be not in his own power and disposition, but determined antecedently by extrinsecal causes, which is the paradoxical opinion of T. H.; and then the production of the effect is absolutely and antecedently necessary. So still the question is where it was, and all his bustling about "sufficiency" and "efficiency" and "deficiency "" is but labour in vain. If he would have spoken any thing at all to the purpose, he should have attempted to prove, that every sufficient cause (excluding the will), that is, every cause which hath sufficient power and ability, doth necessarily produce whatsoever it is able to produce, though the agent be unwilling to produce it; or that the will of the agent is not in his own power and disposition. We expect proofs, not words. But this he could not do; for he himself, in this very treatise, hath several times distinguished between liberty and power: telling us, that a "[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxi. pp. 296, 297.] II. "sick man" hath "liberty to go," but "wanteth power;" DISCOURSE and that "a man who is bound" hath "power" to go, but "wanteth liberty." If he that is bound hath "power to go," then he hath sufficient power to go; for unsufficient power cannot produce the effect and so, by his own confession, an agent may have sufficient power, and yet cannot necessarily nor yet possibly produce the effect. ent cause I urged, that "God is sufficient to produce many worlds, but [A sufficiHe doth not produce them;" therefore a sufficient cause doth not a necesnot necessarily produce all those effects which it is sufficient to sary cause. ] produce. He answereth, that "the meaning" is, "that God is sufficient to produce them if He willz." Doth he not see, that it followeth inevitably from hence, that there may be a sufficient cause without will? Doth he not see likewise from hence plainly, that for those things which are within the power of man, he is "sufficient" also "to produce them if he will?" So still he would obtrude a necessity of "supposition" -"if a man will”—for an absolute necessity. That which is but necessary conditionally-"if a man will"-is not necessary absolutely. And he confesseth, that "without this supposition if he will'-a man is not sufficient to produce. any voluntary action." 28. I added other instances; as this, that the Passion of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind, and so is acknowledged by all Christians, yet all mankind shall not be saved by virtue of His Passion, therefore there may be a sufficient cause without production of the effect". This is the language of Holy Scripture;-" Which of you, intending to build a tower, Luke xiv. sitteth not down first and counteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish it?" that is, as our Saviour expoundeth Himself in the next verse, whether he be "able to finish it." 2 Cor. ii. So St. Paul saith, "Who is sufficient for these things?" that is, who is able for these things? When God saith, "What Isai. v. 4. could I have done more for My vineyard, that I have not done?"-God had given them "sufficient" means, and could 16. |