II. he will not admit this to be "matter of fact," let him try DISCOURSE if he can persuade us, that it is matter of right. A man's "sense and memory" doth teach him, that the lightning is long done before the thunderclap begin; but being better instructed, we know it to be otherwise. In vain were so many 845 rules and precepts in logic, if they did not teach us to reason better, as well as to "reason in more numerous and various matters." He inveigheth against impostors, as bad "masters, deceivers or deceived, that teach for truth all that hath been dictated to them by their own interestd;" and doth not see, or will not see, that no man is so much concerned in this reprehension as himself, who without these paradoxes had continued still a cypher and signified nothing. If there be any changelings," it is no other than himself, not by any "enchantment of words not understood," but by his own overweening and vain-glorious conceits. He reciteth it as a saying of mine, that "matter of fact is not verified by sense and memory but by arguments f." I never said so; and 'until he produce my words,' I must put it into the catalogue of his "untruths8." Neither did I, nor any Schoolman, ever say, that "the testimony of a witness is the only verifier of matter of fact," or that it doth "not consist in sense and memory," or that it doth "consist in arguments and syllogismsh. These are his own collections and consequences, which hang together like ropes of sand. " He asketh, "how can an unlearned man be brought to think the words he speaks ought to signify, when he speaks sincerely, any thing else but that which he himself meaneth by them?" Right, he cannot "be brought to think" that they do signify otherwise than they do signify. But although he meant never so sincerely, he may be "brought to think," that the signification by him used was improper, and that which he said according to the right sense of the words was untrue. As a man might say, sincerely enough, that water is moister or more humid than air, by the seeming warrant of his [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 308; and in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxxiii. above p. 175.] [Ibid.] e [Ibid.] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxii. p. 301.] h [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 308.] i [Ibid.] PART sense; and yet, upon better instruction, reform his judgment, III. and acknowledge that then he did not understand truly what moist or humid did signify. His gross mistakes about eternity. [Of spontaneity.] To that which I urged,—that "to love any thing and to think it good" is not the same thingk,-he answereth no more but this, that he "doth not think" so'; as if he were some oracle of truth, or some great lawyer declaring his opinion to his poor ignorant clients. Let him reserve his thoughts for his credulous scholars. His next mistake is much worse. This was but in a word, but that is in a thing, eternity. He would have his reader believe, that somebody holdeth, that "eternity is this present instant of time," and that "the next instant" is eternity after this, "and consequently that there are as many eternities as there be instants in timem." He doth but dream waking. Surely never any man since the beginning of the world did hold any part of this;-that eternity should be a part of time. Time is but the measure of motion, eternity was before motion. Time succeeding doth repair the losses of time passing; but God, Who is infinite, can acquire nothing, can lose nothing. Suppose a body to be infinite actually, it could have no middle, no extremities, but every point of it should be a centre. So, in the infinite eternity of God, there can be no extremities of past or to come, but a present interminable possession of life. His ignorance is his best plea. Let him learn to cite his adversary's sayings more ingenuously, or hold his peace for ever, and keep his paradoxes to himself; and not shew himself like the Athenians, who being well beaten by the Cretans, and having no other way to revenge themselves, invented feigned stories of bulls and minotaurs. Being taken tripping in an apparent contradiction about spontaneity, making it to be considerate proceeding, and “inconsiderate proceeding or nothing"," he hath no more mind to meddle with it, but quitteth his hands of it in these terms; -it is no "English," but "let it signify what it will, provided it be intelligible, it would make against" me°. Had not this II. man need to have credulous readers, who, before he knoweth DISCOURSE what the word signifieth, knoweth by instinct that it "would make against" me? Just like that mountebank, who having made a long oration to his hearers of the rare virtues of a feather, which he affirmed to have dropt from the wing of Michael the Archangel; and the feather being stolen from under his sleeve out of drollery, and a cinder put in the place of it, to try his humour, he went on confidently with his discourse; telling them, that though it was not the feather which he had mentioned, yet it was one of the coals which St. Lawrence was broiled with, and had all those virtues which he had formerly ascribed to the feather. So, whether spontaneity be a feather or a coal, it hath still the same 846 virtue; and "if it be any thing, it would make against” me. If it be "all one" to consider of the fittest means to obtain a desired end or object, and "consider of the good and evil sequels of an action to comer," why did he change. the definition generally received, to make a show of difference where there is none by his own account? I was willing to have brought him to his right wits, that he might have acknowledged himself a reasonable man: but seeing he is so peremptory, that all "the reason and understanding" which man hath, is but "imagination9;" and weighing his ground,—that he "finds it so" in himself, "by considering" his own thoughts and "ratiocinations";" and (which worketh with me more than all his confidence) finding his writings more full of fantasy than of judgment; I begin to relent, and am contented to come to an accord with him, that he, and such as he can gain to be of his mind, shall have the privilege of fantastics, provided that other men may still retain their old reason. Moreover, I confess, that when I left other "business" to examine his writings, I did meet with greater "trifles "" than I did before. delibera I would gladly save his credit, but he plungeth himself what is hist into so many gross errors, that "ipsa si cupiat salus servare, tion. prorsus non potest." Now he telleth us, that "deliberation is nothing else but so many wills alternatively changed;" as P[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 309.] г [Ibid.] [Ibid.] [Ibid." When he is about those III. PART if deliberation was but the measuring of a rod by inches with his thumbs" alternatively," he wills, he wills not, he wills, he wills not, &c.,-and as the last thumb-breadth happeneth, so the agent either willeth or nilleth. Before, he made but one will; now he maketh I know not how many alternate wills. Before, he made deliberation to be a "consideration of the good or evil sequels of an action." The will is an appetite, not a "consideration." The will is blind, and cannot "consider." Wise men use to look before they leap, and "consider" before they "will." But he may Man is free to will, or he is not have the privilege to have his will stand for his reason;— "Stat pro ratione voluntas "" So, whilst the bias of his bowl is changing from the one side to the other alternatively by extrinsecal causes, the bowl is deliberating. I confess, I "wondered" at his definition of a free agent,— "He that can do if he will, and forbear if he will:" not that free to do. I did not foresee what paradoxical sense he would give it, but why he should retain the ancient terms. I remember well his distinction between freedom to do if a man will and forbear to do if he will, and freedom to will if he will and to nill if he will; and have made bold now and then to represent, what a vain, false, useless, contradictory distinction it is: and I believe it lieth at the last gasp. But I might have saved my labour. I used but one short argument in this place;-"Either the agent can will and forbear to will, or he cannot do and forbear to do";"-and it driveth him into a contradiction,-"There is no doubt, a man can will one thing or other, and forbear to will it." If a man can will and forbear to will the same thing, then he can will if he will and forbear if he will. Where he maketh the state of the question to be, whether a man "to-day can choose to-morrow's will"," either he feigneth or mistaketh grossly. I will never trust him with stating of questions, or citing of testimonies. He maketh a stone as Although it be his turn now to prove, and mine to defend free to as myself and my cause from his objections, yet he is still calling cend as de- for proofs; and (which is worse) would have me to prove scend. negatives, when he himself cannot prove affirmatives::"How doth it follow" (saith he), "that a stone is as free to ascend as descend, unless he prove there is no outward impediment to its ascent? which cannot be proved, for the contrary is true;" or "how proveth he, that there is no outward impediment to keep that point of the loadstone, which. placeth itself towards the north, from turning [to] the south?" First, for the stone, the case is clear: there is no other extrinsecal impediment to the stone ascending or descending, but the medium through which it passeth; now the medium is supposed to be the same, that is, the air equally disposed; the air is as easily driven upwards as downwards; and therefore, though the air give some impediment to the motion upwards, yet it giveth the same impediment at least to the motion downwards; and therefore, the impediment being as vincible upwards as downwards, if the cause of motion were the same, and the presence or absence of extrinsecal impediments being the same, it followeth clearly, upon his grounds, that the stone is as free to ascend as descend. Next, for the loadstone, I prove, that there is no extrinsecal 847 impediment which holdeth it from turning to the south, by sense and reason, both mine own and all other men's, by the common consent of the world, and by his silence, who is not able to pretend any impediment that is probable, without the stone, except it be in some other body far distant, which will render the difficulty the same. DISCOURSE II. -A hawk wants "liberty A hawk, saith he, is say, free to fly So when her wings are His next passage is ridiculous :— to fly when her wings are tied," but it is "absurd to she wants liberty to fly when her wings are pluckede." she wanted no liberty to fly when she was naked and newly plucked. hatched. So he himself wanteth no liberty to fly from hence to China. He saith, "Men that speak English use to say, when her wings are plucked, that she cannot flyd." So they "use to say" likewise, "when her wings are tied." He demandeth, whether it be not "proper language, to say a bird or a beast are set at liberty from the cage, wherein they were imprisoned?" What it may be at another time, when men |