III. PART are discoursing upon another subject, is not material at this time; and as to this subject which we are about, it is most impertinent and "improper." He himself, as partial as he is, cannot think, that this liberty is any thing to that moral liberty which renders a man capable of reward or punishment; any more than a tailor's measure is to the measure of motion. A beginning of acting. I said, and say again, that nothing can "begin to be without being and a cause," and that "nothing can cause itself:" yet I say, many things do "begin to act of themselves f." This (he saith) is to "contradict" myself, because I make "the action" to "begin without a causes." This is not the first time that he hath noted this for a 'contradiction.' I shall sooner salve the contradiction, than he save his credit. As if the agent and the action were the same thing. Or as if the agent was not the cause of the action. Or as if there were any consequence in this,— the agent cannot begin to be of himself, therefore he cannot begin to act of himself,-or,-he cannot cause himself, therefore he cannot cause his action. Nothing can cause itself; but that which is caused by one thing, may cause another. Whereas he addeth, that it "hath been proved" formerly, that "sufficient cause" is a every 66 necessary cause, and that [it] is but "jargon" to say "free causes determine themselves," it is but a puff of his vain-glorious humour. He hath made nothing to appear but his own ignorance and mistakes. His answer to some demands. In the latter end of this section, I made bold to make some serious demands to Mr. Hobbes, which did not at all reflect upon him in particular, but at those "natural notions" which are common to all mankind. The first demand was, "whether he doth not find by experience that he doth many things which he might have left undone if he would," &c. He answereth, Yes, if he would; but he maketh it impossible for him to have had any other will*. So he doth as good as tell us, that he might have done them upon an impossible condition or supposition; as he himself II. might have flown over sea if he had had a pair of wings. DISCOURSE This is a contradiction indeed, implied; first, to say he might have done otherwise, and then to add an impossible condition which makes his proposition negative. I am sure it is not fairly done to avoid the scope and meaning of the demand. The second question was, "whether he do not some things out of mere animosity and will without regard to the direction of right reason," &c. He answereth, "this question was in vain, unless" I "thought" myself his "confessor'." No, it is enough, I desire not to intrude into his secrets. My third demand (as he saith) was, whether he “writ not this defence of necessity against liberty, only to shew that" he "will have a dominion over" his "own actions m.' He answereth, "No, but to shew that" he "had no dominion over" his "will, and this at" my "request"." My request was, that what he did upon this subject, should rather be in writing than by word of mouth. It seemeth, that I had the dominion over his will. So might I come to be questioned for all his paradoxes. The truth is, this was no distinct question, but a corollary of the second question. My third demand was, "whether he be not angry with those who draw him from his study, or cross him in his desires; and why he is angry with them (if they be necessitated to do what they do), any more than he is angry with a sharp winter," &c. This is wholly omitted by him. ،، The last demand was, "whether he do not sometimes blame himself and say, O what a fool was I, to do thus or thus; or 848 wish to himself, O that I had been wise:" and why he doth this, if he were irresistibly necessitated to do all things that he doth; he might as well have wished, O that I had not breathed, or, O what a fool was I to grow olds." To this he answereth nothing but, "subtle questions, and full of Episcopal gravity;" and that he "thinks, in this question," I "will appear the greater fool";" supposing that I meant to put the fool upon him, which I profess myself to be innocent III. PART of; as he might have found by these words inserted among the questions, which "wise men find in themselves sometimes." Though I jest sometimes with his cause, or his arguments, I do not meddle with his person; further than to condemn his vain-glorious presumption, to arrogate so much to himself. Though I have not half so great an opinion of him as he hath of himself, yet I wish his humility were answerable to his wit. Thus, of four questions, he hath quite omitted one, neglected another, refused to answer a third, and answered the fourth contrary to the scope of the question. [T. H.'s boasts and CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS ;- His bragging humour will not leave him; he still forgetteth blunders.] Epictetus his sheep. He saith, "When" I "shall have read over his Animadversions, Numb. xxxi," I "will think otherwise, whatsoever" I "will confess "." "Male ominatis parcito verbis." I should sooner turn Manichee, and make two Gods, one of good, the other of evil, than to make the true God to be the cause of all evil. But there is no danger either of the one or of the other. I have "read over his Animadversions, Numb. xxxi;" I have weighed them; and I profess I find nothing in them worthy of a divine, or a philosopher, or an ingenuous person, who made a sad inquisition after truth; nor any thing that doth approach within a German mile of the cause in controversy. And so I leave him to the Castigations. That "his two instances, of casting ambs-ace and raining to-morrow, are impertinent," appeareth by these two reasons: first, the question is of free actions, these two instances are of contingent actions; secondly, the question is of antecedent necessity, these instances are of a hypothetical necessity. And though I used the beauty of the world as a medium to 8 [Defence, Numb. xxxiii. above p. 180; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] [Enchirid., c. xlvi. § 2. p. 222. ed. Schweig. See above in the Defence, Numb. ii. p. 26. note e; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb.xxxiv. p. 320.] [Horat., Carm., III. xiv. 11, 12] [Defence, Numb. xxxiv. above p. 181; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] II. prove liberty, wherein contingency is involved, yet this doth DISCOURSE not warrant him to give over the principal question, and to start and pursue new questions at his pleasure. But let him be of good comfort; be they pertinent or impertinent, they shall not be neglected. Because I would not blunder as he doth, I distinguished [Four sorts of actions.] actions into four sorts: first, the actions of free agents; secondly, the actions of free and natural agents mixed; thirdly, the actions of brute beasts; fourthly, the actions of natural inanimate causes'. Of these four sorts, the first only concerneth the question, and he according to his custom quite omitteth it; yet it was of more moment and weight than all he saith in this section put together. "A man proportioneth his time each day, and allotteth so much to his devotions, so much to his study, so much to his diet, so much to his recreations, so much to necessary or civil visit, so much to his rest; he that will seek for I know not what necessary causes of all this without himself (except that good God, Who hath given him a reasonable soul), may as well seek for a necessary cause of the Egyptian pyramids among the crocodiles of Nilus"." This distinction of a man's time is an act of dominion, done on purpose to maintain his dominion over his actions against the encroachments of sensual delights. Yet acts of free agents.]— Free to do and yet not free if he will, to will, is and logic. He saith here plainly, that he "knoweth no action that pro- 1. [The ceedeth from the liberty of man's will";" and again, “A man's will is something, but the liberty of his will is nothing." he hath often told us, that a man is free to do if he will, not to do if he will. If no action proceed from the liberty against law of the will, then how is a man free to do if he will? Before, he told us, "He is free to do a thing, that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear it if he have the will to forbear it." If the liberty of the will be nothing, then this supposition" If he have the will"—is nothing but an impossibility. And here, to all that I have said formerly against that frivolous distinction, I shall add an undoubted rule both III. PART in law and logic;-"A conditional proposition, having an impossible condition annexed to it, is equipollent to a simple negative." He who is "free to write if he will," if it be impossible for him to will, is not free to write at all, no more than he is free to will. But this castle in the air hath been beaten down often enough about his ears. 2. [Con cerning necessary effect re quires all causes. Where I say, that "contingent actions do proceed from the 819 indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes," my intention was not to exclude contingent determination, but necessary determination according to an antecedent necessity; which he hath been so far from proving unanswerably, that he hath as good as yielded the cause, in his case of ambs-ace, by making the necessity to be only upon suppositions. Concerning mixed actions, partly free and partly necessary, mixed ac- he saith, that "for proof of them," I "instance in a tile falling tions]-A from a house, which breaketh a man's head." How often must I tell him, that I am not now 'proving,' but answering necessary that which he produceth? He may find "proofs" enough to content him, or rather to discontent him, in twelve sections together, from the fifth to the eighteenth'; and upon the by, throughout the whole book. He who proveth, that election is always inter plura and cannot consist with antecedent determination to one, proveth, that that man who did elect or choose to walk in that street, at that very time when the stone fell, though he knew not of it, was not antecedently necessitated to walk there; and if any one of all those causes, which concur to the production of an effect, be not antecedently necessary, then the effect is not antecedently necessary; for no effect can exceed the virtue of its cause. He saith, I should have proved, that such contingent actions are not antecedently necessary by a concurrence of natural causes, though a little before" I "granted they are." First, he doth me wrong, I never granted it, either before or after. It is a foul fault in him to mistake himself or his adversary so often. Secondly, it is altogether improper and |