II. impertinent to our present controversy. Let him remember DISCOURSE what he himself said ;-" If they" (the instances of casting ambs-ace and raining to-morrow) "be impertinent to his opinion of the liberty of man's will, he doth impertinently to meddle with them." Not so neither, by his leave. Though I refuse to prove them formally or write volumes about them, yet I do not refuse to answer any thing which he doth or can produce. Such is his argument which followeth immediately; "Whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natural causes, was antecedently determined in the cause of such concurrence, though contingent concurrence'." He addeth, that though I "perceive" it not, "concurrence and contingent concurrence are all onem." It may be in his dialect, which differs from the received dialect of all scholars, but not in the dialect of wiser and learneder men. To his argument (pardoning his confounding of natural and voluntary causes), I answer, that if he speak of the immediate adequate cause as it is a cause in act, without doubt he saith truth. "Causa proximá in actu positá, impossibile est non sequi effectum." But he told us of a necessary connexion of all causes from eternity; and if he make not this good, he saith nothing. If he intend it in this sense, I deny his assertion,-that "whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natural causes, was antecedently determined" from eternity: as, for instance, that the generation of a monster, which nature or the agent never intended, was necessary from eternity, or necessary before the contingence was determined. dividual that 3. [The infrom acts of hum brute beasts not antecedently necessi Concerning the individual actions of brute beasts, they should be necessitated to every act they do eternity;-as the bee (for example), how often she shall in a day, and how often she shall fly abroad to gather thyme, and whither, and how many flowers precisely she must suck tated.] and no more, and such like acts;-I had reason to say, "I see no ground for it"." Yet the least of all these acts is known to God, and subject to His disposition. He telleth us, that he "hath pointed out the ground in the former discourse"." PART If he have, it is as the blind senator (of whom I told him formerly) pointed the wrong way P. All his intimations have received their answers. But whereas I made an Matt. x. 29. objection to myself,-"Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall to the ground without your Father," he doth not deal clearly, to urge mine own objection and conceal my answer :- "He doth not say, 'which your Father casteth not down,'" or, 'which your Father doth not necessitate to fall,' but "without your Father;" that is, without your Father's knowledge, without His protection, "without the influence of His power, or, which is exempted from your Father's disposition 9." 4. [The natural acts of inani tures neces The last sort of actions are the natural actions of inanimate creatures; which have not the least pretence to liberty, or so 850 mate crea- much as spontaneity; and therefore were declined by me as sary.] impertinent to this question'. Out of my words concerning these, he argueth thus ;-" If there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning, then there is no doubt but that all things happen necessarily;" but there is a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginnings. First, I deny his consequence; and by it, he (who is so busy to "take" other men's "heights in logict," wherein he never meddled yet but he was baffled) may have his own “height taken" by them that are so disposed. There is scarce a freshman in the University, but could have taught him the difference between "causa efficiens physica," and "voluntaria," the one acting by necessity of nature, the other freely according to deliberation. The former cannot defer nor moderate its act, nor act opposite actions indifferently; but the latter can. So, though a necessary connexion of all natural causes were supposed, yet it inferreth not a necessary connexion of all voluntary causes. Secondly, I deny his assumption,-that there is a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning;for proof whereof he produceth nothing, nor is able to pro II. duce any thing. All he saith he allegeth out of me,-that it DISCOURSE deserveth "further examination";" and from thence, according to his wild roving "imaginations," he draweth consequences from the staff to the corner, that have not the least grain of salt or weight in them. As these,-" Hitherto he knows not whether it be true or no, and consequently all his arguments hitherto have been of no effect, nor hath he shewed any thing to.. prove that elective actions are not necessitated"." Thus his pen runneth over without rhyme or reason. He that would learn to build castles in the air, had best be his apprentice. The truth is, I was not willing to go out of mine own profession, and therefore desired to hold myself to the question of liberty, without meddling with contingency; but yet, with the same reservation that the Romans had in their military discipline, "nec sequi nec fugere," not to seek other questions, nor yet to shun them if they were put upon me. answer stance of ambs-ace. And now we are come to his two famous instances, of His incasting ambs-ace, and raining or not raining to-morrow. said, that I had already "answered" what he produceth to prove "all sufficient causes" to be "necessary causes "." Now, saith he, "it seemeth, that distrusting his" former " he answereth again"." O memory! he did not urge them in that place, neither did I answer them at all in that place. But though he had urged them and I answered them there, yet he repeating them or enforcing them here, would he not have me to answer him? It is true, that in another section, upon the by, he hath been gravelled about his ambs-ace"; and therefore he treadeth tenderly still upon that foot. He saith, I "bring no other argument to prove the cast thrown not to be necessarily thrown, but this, that" the caster did "not deliberate"." By his leave, it is not truly said. I shewed undeniably, that the necessity upon which he buildeth is only hypothetical: I enumerated all the causes which were, or could be recited, to make the necessity; as, the dice, the PART posture of the caster's hand, the measure of the force, the posture of the table, &c.; and shewed clearly, that there was not the least grain of antecedent necessity in any of theme: which he is not able to answer, and therefore he doth well to be silent. But if I had urged nothing else, this alone had been sufficient to prove the caster a free agent from his own principles. A "free" agent (saith he) "is he that hath not done deliberating." He who never began to deliberate, "hath not done deliberating." There can be no necessity imaginable, why the caster should throw these dice rather than those other, or cast into this table rather than that, or use so much force and no more, but the caster's will, or mere chance. The caster never deliberated, nor so much as thought, of any one of these things. And therefore it is undeniably apparent, that there was no necessity of casting ambs-ace but only upon supposition; which is far enough from antecedent necessity. But he pleadeth further, that "from our ignorance of the particular causes, that concurring make the necessity," I "infer that there was no such necessity at all; which is that indeed which hath deceived" me, "and all other men, in this question." Whose fault was it then, first to make this an instance, and then to plead "ignorance?" Before, he was bold to reckon up 851 all the causes of the antecedent necessity of this cast; and now, when he is convinced that it is but a necessity upon supposition, he is fain to plead "ignorance." He who will not suffer the loadstone to enjoy its attractive virtue without finding a reason for it in a fiddle-string (as Scoggin sought for the hare under the leads, as well where she was not as where she was), is glad to plead ignorance about the necessary causes of ambs-ace. Whereas my reasons did evince, not only that the causes are unknown, but that there are no such causes antecedently necessitating that cast. Thus, if any causes did necessitate ambs-ace antecedently, it was either the caster, but he thought not of it;-or the dice,—but they are square, no more inclinable to one cast than another; -or the posture of the table,-but the caster might have II. thrown into the other table;-or the posture of the hand,- DISCOURSE but that was by chance ;-or the measure of the force,-but that might have been either more or less ;-or all of these together, but to an effect antecedently necessary all the causes must be antecedently determined; where not so much as one of them is antecedently determined, there is no pretence of antecedent necessity;—or it is some other cause that he can name, but he pleadeth "ignorance." Yet I confess the deceit lieth here; but it is on the other side, in the "ignorant" mistaking of a hypothetical necessity for absolute antecedent necessity. And here, according to the advice of the poet, "Nec Deus intersit nisi dignus vindice nodus he calleth in the foreknowledge of God to his aid; as he doth instance of to-morrow. His casting ambs-ace hath been unfortunate to him; he His other will speed no better with his shower of rain. In the entrance raining or to my answer, and as it were the stating of the cause, I not raining shewed, that rain was more contingent in our climate than in many other parts of the world, where it is almost as necessary as the seasons of the yeari;-I do not find so much weight in his discourse, as to occasion me to alter one word; -for which I could have produced authors enough, if I had [Horat., A. P., 191, 192.] h[In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. xi; [above pp. 58, 59.] [Defence, Numb. xxxiv. above p. 184; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] |