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that they were mathematicians. Nor when I read in Cres- Discourse pet, that they invoke God to their aid, when they go out of their hives, bending their thighs in form of a cross and bowing themselves, did I therefore think, that this was an act of religious piety, or that they were capable of “theological virtuese;" whom I see in all other things, in which their fancies are not determined, to be the silliest of creatures, strangers not only to right reason but to all resemblances of it.
Seventhly, concerning those actions which are done upon 7. (Habituprecedent and past deliberations; they are not only spon- voluntary.) taneous, but free acts. Habits contracted by use and experience do help the will to act with more facility, and more determinately; as the hand of the artificer is helped by his tools. And precedent deliberations, if they were sad and serious, and proved by experience to be profitable, do save the labour of subsequent consultations. “ Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora.” Yet, nevertheless, the actions which are done by virtue of these formerly acquired habits are no less free, than if the deliberation were coexistent with this particular action. He that hath gained a habit and skill to play such a lesson, needs not a new deliberation how to play, every time that he plays it over and over. Yet I am far from giving credit to him in this, that walking or eating universally considered are free actions, or proceed from true liberty; not so much because they want a particular deliberation before every individual act, as because they are animal motions, and need no deliberation of reason; as we see in brute beasts. And nevertheless the same actions, as they are considered individually, and invested with their due circumstances, may be, and often are, free actions subjected to the liberty of the agent. Lastly, whereas T. H. compareth the first motions or rash 8. [How
they diller attempts of “ choleric persons” with such acquired habits, it is a great mistake. Those rash attempts are voluntary tions done
in passion.] actions, and may be facilitated sometimes by acquired habits :
& (" Virtutes Theologicæ dicuntur, order of the Celestines at Paris, who quæ ordinant nos ad Deum ;" scz. died in 1594, was author of a Summa
Fides, Spes, Caritas :" as distin- Fidei Catholicæ, and of several mystical guished from "moral” and “intellec- religious works, from one of 'which tual” virtues. Thom. Aquin., Summ. latter class the account in the text is Prima Secund., Qu. lxii. art. 2. § 2. probably taken. See Moreri, and the -Father Peter Crespet, a monk of the Biogr. Univ.)
PART but yet, forasmuch as actions are often altered and varied
by the circumstances of time, place, and person, so as that act which at one time is morally good, at another time may be morally evil; and forasmuch as a general precedent deliberation how to do this kind of action is not sufficient to make this or that particular action good or expedient, which being in itself good, yet particular circumstances may render inconvenient or unprofitable, to some persons, at some times, in some places; therefore a precedent general deliberation how to do any act (as, for instance, how to write), is not sufficient to make a particular act (as my writing this individual reply) to be freely done, without a particular and subsequent deliberation. A man learns French advisedly, that is a free act. The same man in his choler and passion reviles his friend in French without any deliberation; this is a spontaneous act, but it is not a free act. If he had taken time to advise, he would not have reviled his friend. Yet, as it is not free, so neither is it so necessary, as the bees making honey ; whose fancy is not only inclined but determined by nature to that act. So every way he fails. And his conclusion—"that the liberty of election doth not take away the necessity of electing this or that individual thing”-is no consequent from my doctrine, but from his own.
Neither do my arguments “fight one against another,” but his private opinions fight both against me and against an undoubted truth. A free agent endowed with liberty of election, or with an elective power, may nevertheless be necessitated in some individual acts; but those acts wherein he is necessitated, do not flow from his elective power, neither are those acts which flow from his elective power necessitated.
NUMBER IX. Argument J. D.—Secondly, they who might have done, and may do, 2.- [That men may
many things which they leave undone, and they who leave
undone many things which they might do, are neither comthings and do them pelled nor necessitated to do what they do, but have true not, and therefore liberty. But we might do many things which we do not, have true liberty.)
and we do many things which we might leave undone; as is 66+ plain, 1 Kings iii. 11,—“Because thou hast asked this thing,
and hast not asked for thyself long life, neither hast asked Discourse riches for thyself, nor hast asked the life of thine enemies,” &c. God gave Solomon his choice. He might have asked riches, but then he had not asked wisdom, which he did ask. He did ask wisdom, but he might have asked riches, which yet he did not ask. And Acts v. 4,—"After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?” It was in his own power to give it, and it was in his own power to retain it; yet if he did give it, he could not retain it; and if he did retain it, he could not give it. Therefore we may do, what we do not; and we do not, what we might do: that is, we have true liberty from necessity.
T. H.—The second argument from Scripture consisteth in (Answer.) histories of men, that did one thing, when if they would they might have done another. The places are two: one is in the 1 Kings iii. 11; where the history says, God was pleased, that Solomon, who might if he would have asked riches or revenge, did nevertheless ask wisdom at God's hands: the other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, Acts v. 4,-"After it was sold, was it not in thine own power ?”
To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former places ;—that they prove there is election, but do not disprove the necessity which I maintain of what they so elect.
J. D.—We have had the very same answer twice befored. [Reply.] It seemeth, that he is well pleased with it; or else he would not draw it in again so suddenly by head and shoulders to no purpose, if he did not conceive it to be a panchreston-a salve for all sores, or "dictamnum”-sovereign “dittanye,” to make all his adversary's weapons drop out of the wounds of his cause, only by chewing it, without any application to the sore. I will not waste the time to shew any further, how the members of his distinction do cross one another and one take away another. To make every election to be of one thing imposed by necessity, and of another thing which is absolutely impossible, is to make election to be no election at all. But I forbear to press that in present. If I may be bold to use his own phrase,
1 [ Thrice; see above T. H., Numbers üi, vi, vii. pp. 27, 38, 41.]
e [See Virg., Æn., xii. 411–419;Plin., Nat. Hist., viii. 27. xxv. 8.]
PART his answer
his answer "looks” quite "another way?” from mine arguINI.
ment. My second reason was this ;—“They who may do, and might have done, many things which they leave undone, and who leave undone many things which they might do, are not necessitated,” nor precisely and antecedently determined, to do what they do; “but we might do many things which we do not, and we do many things which we might leave undone;" as appears evidently by the texts alleged; therefore we are not antecedently and precisely determined nor necessitated to do all things which we do. What is here of "election” in this argument? To what proposition, to what term, doth T. H. apply his answer ? He neither affirms, nor denieth, nor distinguisheth of anything contained in my argument. Here I must be bold to call upon him for a more pertinent answer.
NUMBER X. Argument J. D.—Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things 3.--[ That the in- come to pass by inevitable necessity, then what are all those terroga
interrogations, and objurgations, and reprehensions, and extories, expostula- postulations, which we find so frequently in Holy Scriptures, tions, and the like, in (be it spoken with all due respect) but feigned and hypocritiScripture, cal exaggerations?
“ Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I to have
commanded that thou shouldest not eat ?” Gen. ii. 11; and true li berty.] verse 13, He saith to Eve, “Why hast thou done this ?” and (“ What is to Cain, “Why art thou wrath, and why is thy countenance hast
cast down?” And, “Why will ye die, O house of Israel ?” done?”] [Gen. iv 6. Doth God command openly not to eat, and yet secretly by xviii. 31;
Himself or by the second causes necessitate him to eat ? Doth xxxiii. 11.] He reprehend him for doing that, which He hath antecedently
determined that he must do? Doth He propose things under impossible conditions? Or were not this plain mockery and derision ? Doth a loving master chide his servant, because he doth not come at his call, and yet knows that the poor servant is chained and fettered, so as he cannot move, by the master's own order, without the servant's default or consent? They who talk here of a twofold will of God, "secret” and “revealed,” and the one opposite to the other, understand not what they say. These two wills concern several persons.
[See above T. H. Numb. v. p. 37.]
The secret will of God is what He will do Himself; the re- DISCOURSE
1. vealed will of God is what He would have us to do. 665 be the secret will of God to take away the life of the father;
yet it is God's revealed will, that his son should wish his life, and pray for his life. Here is no contradiction, where the agents are distinct. But for the same person to command one thing, and yet to necessitate him that is commanded to do another thing; to chide a man for doing that, which he hath determined inevitably and irresistibly that he must do; this were (I am afraid to utter what they are not afraid to assert) the highest dissimulation. God's chiding proves man's liberty.
T. H.-To the third and fifth arguments, I shall make but [ The one answer.
J. D.-Certainly distinct arguments, as the third and fifth (Reply.) are, the one drawn from the truth of God, the other drawn from the justice of God, the one from His objurgations and reprehensions, the other from His judgments after life, did require distinct answers. But the plain truth is, that neither here, nor in his answer to the fifth argument, nor in this whole treatise, is there one word of solution or satisfaction to this argument, or to any part of it. All that looks like an answer is contained Numb. xii "That which He does, is made just by His doing ; just, I say, in Him, not always just in us by the example; for a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he punish him whom he commanded so for not doing it, is unjusth.” I dare not insist upon it. I hope his meaning is not so bad as the words intimate, and as I apprehend; that is, to impute falsehood to Him that is Truth itself, and to justify feigning and dissimulation in God, as he doth tyranny, by the infiniteness of His power and the absoluteness of His dominion. And, therefore, by his leave, I must once again tender him a new summons for a full and clear answer to this argument also. He tells us, that he was “not surprised.” Whether he were or not, is more than I know. But this I
8 (From Anselm., Lib. de Volunt. Dei, Opusc. p. 85. M. fol. Paris. 1544.]
[ Below, T. H. Numb. xii. p. 65.]