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111.

see plainly, that either he is not provided, or that his cause
admits no choice of answers. The Jews dealt ingenuously,
when they met with a difficult knot which they could not
untie, to put it upon Elias ;-"Elias will answer it when he
comes.'

1

NUMBER XI. Argument J. D.—Fourthly, if either the decree of God, or the fore4.- [That every

knowledge of God, or the influence of the stars, or the con-
theory of catenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of
proves too objects, or the last dictate of the understanding, do take
much, in
proving away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true
necessary liberty. For he was subjected to the same decrees, the same
agent ; prescience, the same constellations, the same causes, the
which yet
Necessi. same objects, the same dictates of the understanding. But,
tarians
deny. ]

“Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odij.”
The greatest opposers of our liberty are as earnest main-
tainers of the liberty of Adam. Therefore none of these
supposed impediments take away true liberty.

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[ Answer. ] T. H.-The fourth argument is to this effect :-“If the

decree of God, or His foreknowledge, or the influence of the
stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral
efficacy of” causes, “or the last dictate of the understanding,”
or whatsoever it be,“ do take away true liberty, then Adam
before his fall had no true liberty.

"Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odil."
[ T. H.'s That which I say necessitateth and determineth every action,
of nethicory —that he may no longer doubt of my meaning,—is the sum
sity.]

of all those things, which, being now existent, conduce and
concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if
any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be
produced. This concourse of causes, whereof every one is
determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former
causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and
ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the

decree of God.
[ of the But that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of
theories of

[Horat., A. P., 188.—Quodcunque doctrine, Calvin., Instit., lib. I. c. xv. ostendis mihi sic,” &c. And for the $8; Op. tom. viii. p. 44.]

I.

held by

anything, cannot be truly said; seeing foreknowledge is Discourse knowledge, and knowledge depends on the existence of the

necessity things known, and not they on it.

others. ] The influence of the stars is but a small part of the whole cause, consisting of the concourse of all agents.

Nor doth the concourse of all causes make one simple chain or concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains joined together, not in all parts, but in the first link, God Almighty; and consequently the whole cause of an event does not always depend upon one single chain, but on many together.

Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary agents, and necessitates the will, and consequently the action; but for “moral efficacy," I understand not what he means by it.

The last dictate of the judgment concerning the good or bad 666 that may follow on any action, is not properly the whole

cause, but the last part of it; and yet may be said to produce the effect necessarily, in such manner as the last feather may be said to break a horse's back, when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that to do it.

Now for his argument,—that if the concourse of all the [Election causes necessitate that effect, that then it follows, Adam had as well as no true liberty. I deny the consequence: for I make not cessary.) only the effect, but also the election of that particular'effect, to be necessary; inasmuch as the will itself, and each propension of a man during his deliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient cause, as anything else whatsoever. As, for example, it is no more necessary that fire should burn, than that a man, or other creature, whose limbs be moved by fancy, should have election, that is, liberty to do what he has a fancy to, though it be not in his will or power to choose his fancy, or choose his election or will.

This doctrine, because he says he “hates," I doubt had better been suppressed; as it should have been, if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.

J. D.-This argument was sent forth only as an espy, to [Reply.) make a more full discovery what were the true grounds of T. H. his supposed necessity; which errand being done, and the foundation whereupon he builds being found out, which

III.

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PART is, as I called it, "a concatenation of causes,” and as he calls

it, a concourse of necessary causes,” it would now be a superfluous and impertinent work in me to undertake the refutation of all those other opinions, which he doth not undertake to defend. And therefore I shall wave them for

the present, with these short animadversions. [The de- Concerning the eternal decree of God, he confounds the crees and foreknow. decree itself with the execution of His decree. And concernledge of God.)

ing the foreknowledge of God, he confounds that speculative knowledge, which is called the “knowledge of vision",” which doth not produce the intellective objects, no more than the sensitive vision doth produce the sensible objects, with that other knowledge of God, which is called the “knowledge of approbation," or a practical knowledge, that is, knowledge joined with an act of the will ; of which divines do truly say,

that it is the cause of things, as the knowledge of the artist John i. [3. is the cause of his work. God made all things "by His -Heb. i. 2.) Word,” that is, by His wisdom. (The in- Concerning the influences of the stars, I wish he had exfluences of the stars.] pressed himself more clearly. For as I do willingly grant,

that those heavenly bodies do act upon these sublunary things, not only by their motion and light, but also by an occult virtue, which we call influence, as we see by manifold experience, in the loadstone, and shell-fish, &c.; so, if he intend, that by these influences they do naturally or physically determine the will, or have any direct dominion over human counsels, either in whole or in part, either more or

less, he is in an error. [The con- Concerning the concatenation of causes, whereas he makes catenation of causes.] not one chain, but "an innumerable number of chains” (I

hope he speaks hyperbolically, and doth not intend that they are actually infinite), the difference is not material whether one or many, so long as they are all joined together, both in the first link, and likewise in the effect. It serves to no end, but to shew what a shadow of liberty T. H. doth fancy, or rather what a dream of a shadow. As if one chain were not sufficient to load poor man, but he must be clogged with innumerable chains. This is just such another freedom as the Turkish galley slaves do enjoy.

[Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xiv. artt. 8, 9.]

I.

But I admire, that T. H., who is so versed in this ques- DISCOURSE tion, should here confess, that he understands not the diffe

[Physical rence between physical or natural, and moral efficacy. And and moral

efficacy of much more, that he should affirm, that outward objects do

objects.) "determine voluntary agents” by a "natural efficacy.” No object, no second agent, angel or devil, can determine the will of man naturally; but God alone, in respect of His supreme dominion over all things. Then the will is determined naturally, when God Almighty, besides His general influence, whereupon all second causes do depend as well for their being as for their acting, doth moreover, at some times, when it pleaseth Him, in cases extraordinary, concur by a special influence, and infuse something into the will in the nature of an act or a habit, whereby the will is moved and excited and applied to will or choose this or that. Then the will is determined morally, when some object is proposed to it with persuasive reasons and arguments to induce it to will. Where the determination is natural, the liberty to suspend its act is taken away from the will; but not so, where the

determination is moral. In the former case, the will is 667 determined extrinsecally, in the latter case, intrinsecally; the

former produceth an absolute necessity, the latter only a necessity of supposition. If the will do not suspend but assent, then the act is necessary; but because the will may suspend and not assent, therefore it is not absolutely necessary. In the former case the will is moved necessarily and determinately; in the latter, freely and indeterminately. The former excitation is immediate; the latter is mediate mediante intellectu, and requires the help of the understanding. In a word, so great a difference there is between natural and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and mine in this question. There remains only the last dictate of the understanding, (The last

dictate of which he maketh to be the last cause that concurreth to the determination of the will, and to the necessary production of standing.) the act ; "as the last feather may be said to break a horse's back, when there were so many laid on before that there wanted but that to do it.” I have shewed (Numb. vii."), that the last dictate of the understanding is not always absolute

1 [Above, pp. 42, 43.]

the under

PART in itself, nor conclusive to the will; and when it is concluIII.

sive, yet it produceth no antecedent nor extrinsecal necessity. I shall only add one thing more in present,--that by making the last judgment of right reason to be of no more weight than a single feather, he wrongs the understanding as well as he doth the will; he endeavours to deprive the will of its supreme power of application, and to deprive the understanding of its supreme power of judicature and definition. Neither corporeal agents and objects, nor yet the sensitive appetite itself, being an inferior faculty, and affixed to the organ of the body, have any direct or immediate dominion or command over the rational will. It is without the sphere of their activity. All the access which they have unto the will, is by the means of the understanding, sometimes clear and sometimes disturbed, and of reason either right or misinformed. Without the help of the understanding, all his second causes were not able of themselves to load the horse's back with so much weight as the least of all his feathers doth amount unto. But we shall meet with his horse-load of

feathers again Numb. xxiii.m [Adam was These things being thus briefly touched, he proceeds to anoressary his answer. My argument was this;-If any of these or all of other men these causes formerly recited do take away true liberty (that are.]

is still intended, from necessity), then Adam before his fall had no true liberty; but Adam before his fall had true liberty. He mis-recites the argument, and denies the consequence; which is so clearly proved that no man living can doubt of it,-because Adam was subjected to all the same causes as well as we, the same decree, the same prescience, the same influences, the same concourse of causes, the same efficacy of objects, the same dictates of reason. But it is only a mistake; for it appears plainly by his following discourse, that he intended to deny, not the consequence, but the assumption. For he makes Adam to have had no liberty from necessity before his fall; yea, he proceeds so far as to affirm, that all human wills, his and ours, and “each propension” of our wills, even during” our “ deliberation,” are “as much necessitated as any thing else whatsoever;" that we have no more power to forbear those actions which we do,

m (Below, p. 707. fol. edit.]

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