This is the name God gives Himself;-"The Lord, the Lord DISCOURSE God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering," &c. I. Exod. Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith to be com- xxxiv. 6. monly true, that he who doth permit anything to be done, which it is in his power to hinder, knowing that if he do not hinder it, it will be done, doth in some sort will it. I say, in some sort; that is, either by an antecedent will or by a consequent will, either by an operative will or by a permissive will, or he is willing to let it be done but not willing to do it. Sometimes an antecedent engagement doth cause a man to suffer that to be done, which otherwise he would not suffer. So Darius suffered Daniel to be cast into the lions' den, to [Dan. vi. make good his rash decree: so Herod suffered John Baptist Matt. xiv. 14-17.] to be beheaded, to make good his rash oath; how much more 9.] may the immutable rule of justice in God, and His fidelity in keeping His word, draw from Him the punishment of obstinate sinners, though antecedently He willeth their conversion? He loveth all His creatures well, but His own justice better. Again, sometimes a man suffereth that to be done, which he doth not will directly in itself, but indirectly for some other end, or for the producing of some greater good; as a man willeth that a putrid member be cut off from his body, to save the life of the whole; or as a judge, being desirous to save a malefactor's life, and having power to reprieve him, doth yet condemn him for example's sake, that by the death of one he may save the lives of many. Marvel not, then, if God suffer some creatures to take such courses as tend to their own ruin, so long as their sufferings do make for the greater manifestation of His glory, and for the greater benefit of His faithful servants. This is a most certain truth, that God would not suffer evil to be in the world, unless He knew how to draw good out of evil". Yet this ought not to be so understood, as if we made any priority or posteriority of time in the acts of God, but only of nature. Nor do we make the antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to another; because the one respects man pure and uncorrupted, the other respects him as he is lapsed. The objects are the same, ["Neque enim Deus omnipotens, cum summe bonus sit, ullo modo sineret mali aliquid esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus, ut benefaceret et de malo." PART but considered after a diverse manner. III. [How God is the cause of the act, yet not of the sin of the act.] Nor yet do we make these wills to be distinct in God; for they are the same with the Divine essence, which is one. But the distinction is in order to the objects or things willed. Nor, lastly, do we make this permission to be a naked or a mere permission. God causeth all good, permitteth all evil, disposeth all things, both good and evil. T. H. demands, how God should be the cause of the action and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the action. I answer, because He concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but not by a special influence. As the earth gives nourishment to all kinds of plants, as well to hemlock as to wheat, but the reason why the one yields food to our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is not from the general nourishment of the earth, but from the special quality of the 678 root even so the general power to act is from God,-" In [Acts xvii. Him we live and move and have our being;"-this is good; 28.] but the specification and determination of this general power to the doing of any evil is from ourselves, and proceeds from the free-will of man; this is bad. And to speak properly, the free-will of man is not the efficient cause of sin, as the root of the hemlock is of poison, sin having no true entity or being in it, as poison hath; but rather the deficient cause. Now no defect can flow from Him, Who is the highest perfection". Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and determinate act of killing Uriah to be from God. The general power to act is from God; but the specification of this general and good power to murder, or to any particular evil, is not from God, but from the free-will of man. So T. H. may see clearly if he will, how one may be the cause of the law, and likewise of the action in some sort, that ["Nemo quærat efficientem caussam malæ voluntatis; non enim est efficiens sed deficiens, quia nec illa effectio est sed defectio." Aug., De Civ. Dei, lib. xii. c. 7; Op. tom. vii. p. 306, C. Ex his apertissima erit ratio cur Deus non peccet neque peccati causa jure dici possit, quamvis concurrat ad illam actionem efficiendam quæ homini sit peccatum;" viz. "quia Deus non efficit actionem illam ut caussa particularis sed ut caussa universalis, præbens vim et influxum quendam indifferen tem," &c. Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. ii. c. 17; Op. tom. iii. p. 207. B.-" Non est enim injustitia qualitas aut actio aut aliqua essentia, sed tantum absentia debitæ justitiæ; nec est nisi in voluntate, ubi debet esse justitia." Anselm., De Concord. Præscient. &c. cum Lib. Arb., c. i. p. 88. B. Opusc. fol. Paris. 1544-" Peccatum nihil est, et nihil fiunt homines cum peccant." Aug., In Joh. Evang. Tract. i. § 13; Op. tom. iii. P. 2. p. 294. D.] I. is, by general influence, and yet another cause, concurring DISCOURSE by special influence and determining this general and good power, may make itself the true cause of the anomy or the irregularity. And therefore he may keep his "longer and shorter garments" for some other occasion. Certainly they will not fit this subject, unless he could make general and special influence to be all one. tice not and that the Who is per But T. H. presseth yet further, that the case is the same, [God's jusand the objection used by the Jews, vers. 19,-" Why doth measured by His He yet find fault? who hath resisted His will?"—is the very power but same with my argument; and St. Paul's answer, vers. 20,- by His will, "O man, who art thou that repliest against God? shall the will of One thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made fect.] me thus? hath not the potter power over his clay?" &c.is the very same with his answer in this place, drawn from the irresistible power and absolute dominion of God, which justifieth all His actions; and that the Apostle in his answer doth not deny, that it was God's will, nor that God's decree was before Esau's sin. To which I reply : 1. First, that the case is not at all the same, but quite different; as may appear by these particulars. First, those words-"Before they had done either good or evil”—are not, cannot be, referred to those other words-"Esau have I hated." Secondly, if they could, yet it is less than nothing; because, before Esau had actually sinned, his future sins were known to God. Thirdly, by "the potter's clay" here is not to be understood the pure mass, but the corrupted mass, of mankind. Fourthly, the "hating" here mentioned is only a comparative hatred, that is, a less degree of love. Fifthly, the "hardening" which St. Paul speaks of, is not a positive, but a negative obduration, or a not imparting of grace. Sixthly, St. Paul speaketh not of any positive reprobation to eternal punishment; much less doth he speak of the actual inflicting of punishment without sin; which is the question between us, and wherein T. H. differs from all that I remember to have read, who do all acknowledge that punishment is never actually inflicted but for sin". If the question ["Omnis pœna, si justa est, i. c. 9. § 5: Op. tom. i. pp. 631. B, 14. peccati pœna est." Aug., De Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 18. § 51; and Retract., lib. E.] PART III. Matt. xx. 15. be put, why God doth good to one more than to another, or why God imparteth more grace to one than to another, as it is there, the answer is just and fit,—because it is His pleasure, and it is sauciness in a creature in this case to reply. "May not God do what He will with His own?" No man doubteth but God imparteth grace beyond man's desert. But if the case be put, why God doth punish one more than another, or why He throws one into Hell-fire and not another, which is the present case agitated between us; to say with T. H., that it is because God is omnipotent, or because His power is irresistible, or merely because it is His pleasure, is not only not warranted, but is plainly condemned, by St. Paul in this place. So many differences there are between those two cases. It is not therefore "against God" that I "reply," but against T. H. I do not "call my Creator to the bar," but my fellow creature. I ask no account of God's counsels, but of man's presumptions. It is the mode of these times to father their own fancies upon God, and when they cannot justify them [Rom. xi. by reason, to plead His omnipotence, or to cry, "O altitudo!" 33.] that "the ways of God" are "unsearchable." If they may justify their drowsy dreams because God's power and dominion is absolute, much more may we reject such fantastical devices, which are inconsistent with the truth, and goodness, and [2 Cor. i. 3. justice of God, and make Him to be a tyrant, who is "the Father of mercies," and "the God of" all "consolation." The unsearchableness of God's ways should be a bridle to restrain presumption, and not a sanctuary for spirits of 5.] Rom. xv. error. 2. Secondly, this objection contained vers. 19, to which the 674 Apostle answers vers. 20, is not made in the person of Esau or Pharaoh, as T. H. supposeth, but of the unbelieving Jews; who thought much at that grace and favour which God was pleased to vouchsafe unto the Gentiles, to acknowledge them for His people, which honour they would have appropriated to the posterity of Abraham. And the Apostle's answer is not only drawn from the sovereign dominion of God, to impart His grace to whom He pleaseth, as hath been shewed already, but also from the obstinacy and proper fault of the Jews; as appeareth vers. 22,-"What if God, willing" (that is, by a consequent will) "to shew His wrath, and to make I. His power known, endured with much long-suffering the DISCOURSE vessels of wrath fitted to destruction." They acted, God "endured;" they were tolerated by God, but "fitted to destruction" by themselves; for their much wrong doing, here is God's "much long-suffering." And more plainly vers. 31, [32;]-" Israel hath not attained to the law of righteousness; wherefore? because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the law." This reason cr is set down yet more emphatically in the next chapter, vers. 3;—"They" (that is, the Israelites), "being ignorant of God's righteousness" (that is, by faith in Christ), "and going about to establish their own righteousness" (that is, by the works of the law), "have not submitted themselves to the righteousness of God;"—and yet most expressly chap. xi. vers. 20,―" Because of unbelief they were broken off, but thou standest by faith." Neither was there any precedent binding decree of God, to necessitate them to unbelief, and consequently to punishment. It was in their own power, by their concurrence with God's grace, to prevent these judgments, and to recover their former estate;-vers. 23, "If they" (that is, the unbelieving Jews) "abide not still in unbelief, they shall be graffed in." The crown and the sword are immoveable' (to use St. Anselm's comparison), but it is we that move and change places. Sometimes the Jews were under the crown, and the Gentiles under the sword; sometimes the Jews under the sword, and the Gentiles under the crown. 3. Thirdly, though I confess, that human "pacts” are not the measure of God's justice, but His justice is His own immutable will, whereby He is ready to give every man that which is his own, as rewards to the good, punishments to the bad; so, nevertheless, God may oblige Himself freely to His creature. He made the covenant of works with mankind in Adam; and therefore He punisheth not man contrary to His own covenant, but for the transgression of his duty. And Divine justice is not measured by omnipotence, or by "irresistible power," but by God's will. God can do many things according to His absolute power which He doth not; He "could raise [Matt. iii. 9.] up children to Abraham of stones," but He never did so. It is a rule in theology, that God cannot do anything which argues any wickedness or imperfection; as, God "cannot 2 Tim. ii. 13. |