them? If the foul of man be mere matter, it can only judge of things according to the impreffions which are made upon our fenfes: but we do judge otherwife, and fee reafon to do fo many times. Therefore it must be fome higher principle which judges of things, not by the material impreffions which they make upon our fenfes, but by other meafures. And therefore to avoid this inconvenience, Epicurus was glad, to fly the abfurdity, to affirm that all things really are what they appear to us, and that in truth the fun is no bigger than it feems to be. 2dly, The contemplation, of things fpiritual and divine, is an argument that the foul is of a higher origi nal than any thing that is material. To contemplate the nature of God, and the divine excellencies and perfections; the meditation of a future ftate, and of the happiness of another world; thofe breathings which good men feel in their fouls after God, and the enjoyment of him, argue the fpiritual nature of the foul. Hot habet argumentum divinitatis fuæ, faith Seneca, quod eam divina delectant, nec ut alienis intereft fed ut fuis. "The "foul of man hath this argument of its divine original, "that it is fo ftrangely delighted, fo infinitely pleafed

and fatisfied with the contemplation of divine things, and is taken up with thefe thoughts, as if they were "its proper bufinefs and concernment." Thofe ftrong inclinations and defires after immortality, and the pleafure which good men find in the fore-thoughts of the happiness which they hope to enter into, when their fouls fhall quit thefe manfions; the reftlefs afpirings of our fouls towards God, and those bleffed mansions where he dwells, and where the fpirits of good men converfe with him and one another; thefe fignify our fouls to be of a nobler extraction than the earth, that they are defcended from above, and that heaven is their country, their thoughts are fo much upon it, and they are fo defirous to return to it.

I fhall conclude this argument from the noble and excellent operations of our fouls, of which we are confcious to ourfelves, with a paffage of Tully to this purpose. Animarum nulla in terris origo inveniri poteft: nihil enim eft in animis mixtum atque concretum, ut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur. "The fouls

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"of men have not their original from the earth, it is "in vain to feek for it there: for there is nothing in "the mind of man of a material mixture and compofi

tion, which we can imagine to be born or formed out "of the earth. For, fays he, among material and "earthly things there is nothing," quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat, quod & præterita teneat, futura provideat, & complecti poffit præfentia. "There

is no earthly thing which hath the power of memory, of "understanding, of thought, which retains things paft, "forefees and provides for things future, comprehends

and confiders things prefent." Singularis eft igitur quædam natura atque vis animi, fejuncta ab his ufitatis notifque naturis; "fo that the nature and power of the foul are of a peculiar and fingular kind, different "from all thofe natures which we are acquainted with "in this world." He concludes, Itaque quicquid eft quod fentit, quod fapit, quod vult, quod viget, cælefte & divinum eft, ob eamque rem æternum fit neceffe eft. "Thère"fore whatever that is which is endowed with a power "of perception, with wifdom, with liberty, with fo much "vigour and activity as the foul of man, is of heavenly " and divine original, and for that reafon is neceffarily "immortal, and to continue for ever."

Thus I have reprefented to you as briefly and plainly as I could, those which I account the chief and strongest arguments of this great principle of religion, the foul's immortality. Some of them are plain and obvious to every capacity; the reft, though they be above common capacities, yet were not to be neglected, becaufe they may be useful to fome, though not to all; and as thofe who are more wife and knowing fhould have påtience, whilft the most common and plaineft things are fpoken for the inftruction of ordinary capacities, fo thofe of lower capacities fhould be content that many things fhould be fpoken which may be useful to others, though they be above their reach.

To fum up then what has been faid from reafon, for the proof of the foul's immortality. It is a natural ditate and notion of our minds, univerfally entertained in all ages and places of the world, excepting fome very few perfons and fects; it doth not contradict any other

principle that nature hath planted in us, but doth very well agree with those other notions which are moft natural; it is most fuitable to the natural hopes and fears of men; it evidently tends to the happiness and perfection of man, and to the good order and government of the world; laftly, it gives the faireft account of the phænomena of human nature, of thofe feveral actions and operations which we are conscious to ourselves of.

Now, fuppofing the foul were immortal, what greater rational evidence than this can we expect for it? how can we, without a revelation, have more affurance of the things of this nature than these arguments give us, not taken fingly, but as they concur together to make up an entire argument, and to give us fufficient evidence of this?

I do not say that thefe arguments do fo neceffarily conclude it, that there is an abfolute impoffibility the thing fhould be otherwise; but fo as to render it fufficiently certain to a prudent and confiderate man, and one that is willing to accept of reasonable evidence. For the generality of the Papifts do pertinaciously maintain this unreasonable principle, that there can be no certainty of any thing without infallibility: yet fome of the wifer of them have thought better of it, and are pleased to ftate the bufinefs of certainty otherwife; particularly Melchior Canus, one of the moft learned of their writers, determines thofe to be fufficiently certain, which no man can, without imprudence and obftinacy, disbelieve. Certa apud homines ea funt, quæ negari fine pervicacia & ftultitia non poffunt. Men efteem those

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things certain, which no man that is not unreasonably “obstinate and imprudent can deny." And I think the arguments I have brought for the foul's immortality, are fuch as no man that is unprejudiced and hath a prudent regard to his own intereft can refift.E

Thus I have done with the firft thing I propounded to do for the proof of the foul's immortality, which was to fhew what evidence of reafon there is for it. I fhall fpeak briefly to the

Second thing I propounded, which was to fhew how little can be faid against it, because this will indirectly give a strength and force to the arguments I have

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brought for it. For it is very confiderable in, any queftion of controverfy, what ftrength there is in the arguments on both fides: for though very plaufible arguments may be brought for a thing, yet if others as plaufible and fpecious may be urged against it, this leaves the thing in equilibrio, it fets the balance evep, and inclines the judgment neither way; nay, if the objections against a thing be confiderable, though not fo ftrong as the arguments, for it, the confiderableness of the objections does fo far weaken the contrary, arguments: but where the arguments on one hand are strong, and the objections on the contrary very flight, and fuch as may easily be anfwered, the weakness of the objections contributes to the strength of the argument for the other fide of the question.

To come then to the bufinefs, I know but three objections which have any colour. against this principle. I. That the notion of a fpirit, or an immaterial fubftance, does imply a contradiction.

Anfw. 1. This is only boldly faid, and not the least colour of proof offered for it by the author that afferts

it.

This objection had indeed been confiderable, if it had been made out as clearly, as it is confidently affirmed. In the mean time I think we may take leave to deny, that the notion of a fpirit hath any repugnancy in it, till fome body think fit to prove it.

2. I told you that this queftion about the foul's immortality fuppofeth the existence of God to be already proved; and if there be a God, and it be an effential property of the divine nature, that he is a fpirit, then there is fuch a thing as a spirit and immaterial fubftance, and confequently the notion of a fpirit hath no contradiction in it: for if it had, there could be no fuch thing.

II. It is faid, there is no exprefs text for the foul's immortality in the Old Teftament,

Anfw. This doth not properly belong to the intrinfical arguments and reafon of the thing, but is matter of revelation. And this I fhall fully speak to, whenI come to shew what evidence the Jews had for the foul's immortality. In the mean time, this may be a fuffiscient answer to this objection, that there is no abfolute

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neceffity why it should be exprefly revealed in the Old Teftament, if it be, as I have fhewn, a natural notion of our minds: for the fcripture fuppofeth us to be men, and to have an antecedent notion of those truths which are implanted in our nature, and therefore chiefly defigns to teach us the way to that eternal happiness which we have a natural notion and hope of. The

III. Objection is from the near and intimate fympathy which is between the foul and the body, which appears in the vigour and ftrength of our faculties; as understanding and memory do very much depend upon the temper and difpofition of the body, and do ufually decay and decline with it.

Anfw. The utmost that this objection fignifies, is, that there is an intimate union and conjunction between the foul and body, which is the caufe of the fympathy which we find to be between them: but it does by no means prove, that they are one and the faine effence. Now, that there is fuch an intimate union and connexion between the foul and matter in all creatures endowed with life and fenfe, is acknowledged by all who affirm the immateriality of fouls; though the manner of this union be altogether unknown to us; and fuppofing fuch an union, it is but reasonable to imagine that there fhould be fuch a fympathy, that the body should be affected with the delights and disturbances of the mind, and that the foul fhould also take part in the pleasures and pains of the body, that by this means it may be effectually excited and stirred up to provide for the fupply of our bodily wants and necef Gities; and from this fympathy, it is eafy to give account how it comes to pafs, that our faculties of understanding, and memory, and imagination, are more or lefs vigorous, according to the good or bad temper and difpofition of our bodies. For by the fame reafon that the mind may be grieved and afflicted at the pains and fufferings of the body, it may likewife be difordered and weakened in its operations by the diftempers of the body. So that this objection only proves the foul to be united to the body; but not to be the fame thing with it.

SERM