hundred years later? Such a reply to Professor Dilthey's first argument seems to me unanswerable. All of our sciences, in so far as they deal with concrete fact, consist not of absolutely proved laws, but of what may be described in the last analysis as good working hypotheses because they explain all the facts now known in that field to the human race. The possibility always remains that the accepted law of to-day may prove to be the exploded hypothesis of to-morrow. To say, then, that there neither is, nor can be, a science of education because we do not agree among ourselves as to what the end of education is, and because in so far as we do agree, we may find ourselves in disagreement with the next generation-implies such a conception of science as would lead to the conclusion that we have no science of anything, except in the department of pure mathematics.

But Professor Dilthey's second argument rests on different grounds. If there is a science of education, says Professor Dilthey (and here Professor Royce agrees with him), it would consist, in part, of such a complete and systematic knowledge of human nature as would furnish a complete set of rules for the guidance of education. in a given case. In so far as a teacher has to deal with particular cases-not by means of his general knowledge of human nature, but by means of his insight into these

particular cases, in so far he must be guided by knowledge which is not scientific in its nature. In so far as the teacher must for all time be guided by his insight into particular cases, in so far he must be for all time guided by unscientific knowledge. If it is true that the teacher's general or scientific knowledge of human nature, is and can only be useful in so far as it sharpens his insight into particular cases, then it is true that we neither have nor can have a science of education. Whoever admits that the teacher is, and forever must be, guided by his insight into particular cases, agrees with Professors Dilthey and Royce. Says Professor Royce: "Rules would here be suggested by the science at every point; yet they would never be rules that the educator could immediately apply, except with constant reference to conditions of his own nature, age and child. Universal these rules would be, yet never universal in the sense that they might be taken as precise guides in the particular case. Aids they would be, but never substitutes for personal insight. In short, our knowledge of laws would be a good staff and a bad crutch."

Instead, then, of talking about the science of education, we ought, strictly speaking, to talk about the scientific elements in education, those laws, in other words, which throw light on the business of education. But if, out of regard to

usage, we continue to use the term "science of education," we need constantly to bear in mind the limited sense in which such a science is possible. When, therefore, we ask the question, What can childstudy contribute to the science of education, our question amounts to this: What more or less general truths can child-study discover which will help us in the business of education?

Still another preliminary question must be answered: What do we mean by child-study? Professor Barnes seems to me to have answered this question in a helpful way. He describes it as the inductive and quantitative study of human beings. Child-study includes, therefore, what is meant by genetic psychology. Genetic psychology aims to discover the laws that govern the growth and development of human beings. The interests, tastes, instincts, idealsthat predominate at different periods in human development-the various capacities that exist at these different periods, and the extent of those capacities-are questions for genetic psychology to answer.

But child-study, as Professor Barnes has defined it, seems at first sight to include more than this. We might say that all study of the adult consciousness by means of the inferential method, all study of the adult consciousness the object of which is to discover peculiarities of individuals which the student could

not discover by a study of himself simply because they are peculiarities-is a part of what has been improperly called child-study. President Eliot, for example, holds that the best way to develop respect for expert knowledge is to make a man an expert along some particular line. Is he right? There is but one way of ascertaining, and that is by an actual study of experts so as to learn to what extent experts along one line have respect for the conclusions of other experts. likewise Mr. Galton got the notion that the power of people to form vivid, exact and detailed images of things, varies greatly, and he proved that he was right by a study of individuals.

So

But such study really forms at part of what is called genetic psychology. Why do people differ in the respect which they have for the conclusions of experts? Why do people differ in the power to form vivid, exact and detailed images of things? So far as such questions can be answered at all, they must be answered by a study of the laws that govern the growth and development of human beings, in connection with the history and peculiar experiences of those particular human beings whose characteristics we are investigating; we must say, for example, that this man has the power to form vivid, detailed and exact images of things either because of his experiences and his education or because of in

herited capacities, that that man's attitude towards expert conclusions is the result of one or the other of the same two causes. But to determine to which of these causes it is due we must have resort to genetic psychology. The question, then, which I am to try to answer is this: To what extent can a knowledge of the laws that govern the growth and development of human beings throw light on the business of education?

We shall find this an easy question to answer if we bear in mind that the business of education requires as precise a knowledge as possible of the answers to six ques

tions:

1. What is the end of education?

2. What instrumentalities ought society to employ for the realization of that end?

3. What subjects should students be required to study?

4. In what order should these studies be taken up?

5. By what methods should these subjects be taught?

6. What amounts of time and energy can students be required to give to work without injury to their health?

He who can answer these questions most perfectly-who has the most precise and detailed knowledge of the end of education, whose judgment is wisest as to the instrumentalities which society should make use of to realize that end,

whose knowledge of the subjects which ought to be taught, the order in which they should be taken up, the methods by which they should be taught, and the amount of time and energy which students are capable of giving to their work without injury to their health-has the largest amount of the knowledge that throws light on the business of education.

I am sure of your assent to this proposition except in so far as it relates to the agencies which society should make use of in realizing the end of education. But are not questions as to the best mode of selecting state school superintendents, the qualifications to be required of them, questions which. throw light on the business of education? Has not the business of education a vital interest in the qualifications, duties and methods. of electing boards of education? If we select state school superintendents and boards of education in any way but the best way, if we assign to them any duties except those which they ought to perform; if we require of them any qualifications-more or less-except those which they ought to possess, will not the business of education suffer? Will not the business of education suffer if society makes a mistake as to the amount of money that ought to be raised for school purposes, or if it undertakes to raise that money in the wrong way? Without doubt, then, a knowledge

of the agencies which society should employ-of the mechanism of which it should make use, is a part of the knowledge which throws. light on the business of education.

our

We may, then, consider question under the following heads: Will genetic psychology throw any light on the end of education? Will it help us to see what agencies society should employ in the business. of education? Will it tell us what subjects ought to be stulied? Will it tell us in what order they should be studied? Will it tell us by what methods they should be taught? Will it help us to see how much work students can safely be required to do?

It seems to me self-evident that genetic psychology cannot tell us what the end of education is. The end of education will be determined for each individual by his conception of man. Start from Plato's conception of man and you will reach Plato's conclusion-that the end of education is to develop the power to see those divine ideas in the contemplation of which alone. true wisdom consists, that those that do not possess the capacity to develop this power are incapable of being educated. Agree with Aristotle that the supremely important thing in man is the intellect and the supremely important thing in life is the activity of the intellect—and you will agree with him that the end of education is the development of the intellect-that those who have

religious teachers (the Jesuits, for example,), that the supremely important thing in man is his capacity to believe certain doctrines, and you will agree with them that the supremely important thing in eduIcation is the development of this capacity. Say with Dr. Dewey that a man ought to have no life of his own, that he lives in and for and by society, and you will agree with him that the education of man should be determined entirely with reference to the needs of society. Agree with the Herbartians that the will is not free, and yet insist with them that the conduct of this human automaton is a matter of the first importance, and you will agree with them that the development of interests such interests as will invariably impel the individual to certain kinds of conduct-is the supremely important thing in education. What you think of man, what you think of human life, will determine what you think of the end of education. But the science that undertakes to tell us what man is, what his inmost nature is, is philosophy, with which genetic psychology has nothing to do.

2. Will genetic genetic psychology throw any light on the agencies that society should employ for the realization of the ends of education? This question also I should answer with an unqualified negative. Such

answers as this question is capable of receiving the so-called science. of education will borrow from a study of comparative politics. What methods have actually worked well in this direction? Were there any special conditions in the cases where they worked well, to prevent them from working well elsewhere? It is the answers to such questions as these which will tell us all we shall ever know about the agencies which society should employ in the business of education.

3. Will genetic psychology help us to decide what subjects ought to be studied? The true answer to this question can be most clearly seen by considering the principies upon which a choice ought to be made between different courses of study. What you think the end of education is will determine, to a great extent, your opinion as to the subjects that ought to be studied. Suppose you say that the end of education is preparation for rational living, and suppose you say with Davidson, that such preparation consists of four elements: 1, knowledge that knowledge of the laws of nature and of life which will enable us to act wisely in the various emergencies of life; 2, discipline-that training of our minds which will enable us to draw the proper inferences from what we know; 3, that cultivation of the emotions which will cause us to estimate things at their proper worth—such a training as will make us prefer

to do what is wise; 4, that training of the will which will enable us to do what we think we ought to do. Will not your decision as to the subjects that ought to be studied. be determined primarily by your idea of these elements? You wish to give your pupils that knowledge which will prepare them for rational living. And what is that knowledge? Herbert Spencer has told us as well as any one else, and he did not base his conclusions on genetic psychology.

What kind of discipline do we need in order to be able to live wisely? Professor Hinsdale has answered this question for us. He has told us that we cannot acquire the powers, for example, to reason correctly about our children by studying politics, or learn how to vote wisely b studying Latin and Greek-that we acquire the power to reason about politics by studying politics; that we acquire the power to reason about anything by reasoning about the class of things to which it belongs. But Professor Hinsdale did not base his conclusions on genetic psychology.

What kind of training do we need in order that we may be able to estimate things at their proper worth-to hate what we ought to hate and love what we ought to love? Plato answered this question with almost ideal completeness. Bring children from their earliest years, he said in substance, in contact with the highest concrete