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VII.

Grant, we beseech thee, Almighty God, that the words, SERM. which we have heard this day with our outward ears, may through thy grace be fo grafted inwardly in our hearts, that they may bring forth in us the fruit of good living, to the honour and praife of thy name, through Jefus Chrift our

Lord. Amen.

Believe in God,

SERMON VIII.

THE BEING OF GOD PROVED FROM

UNIVERSAL CONSENT.

* Who read

inftead of

.קום

PLALM xix. 3, 4.

There is no Speech nor language where their voice is not heard: their line (or rather, according to the * LXX, their voice) is gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world.

SERM. THE Pfalmift doth in this place observe and affirm (very VIII. plainly) the univerfality of religion; that all nations did

confpire in acknowledging a Divinity, and afcribing thereto the framing and confervation of the heavens. He fupposes the heavens to speak an universal language, heard and understood by all people, therein glorifying God and declaring him their Maker.

Upon which fuppofition I purpose now to ground an argument, to prove (that which formerly by feveral other kinds of difcourfe I have endeavoured to evince) that *Teftimo- great fundamental truth concerning the existence of God, nium popu- that is, of one incomprehenfibly excellent Being, the que gen- Maker and Governor of all things.

lorum at

tium in una

hac re non

The argument (to be fhort) is that (as Lactantius tium. Laa. speaks) * universal and unanimous teftimony of people and

diffiden

τὸ δοκῶν τοῖς

σοφοῖς, ἐὰν

ταῖς τῶν

nations, through all courfes of time, who (otherwise differ- SERM. ing in language, custom, and conceit) only have agreed in VIII. this one matter of opinion. This testimony, in itself simply taken, hath indeed (according to the rules of reafon and judgments of wife men) no fmall force; but feems to have much greater, if we confider the fource, whatever that could be, whence it was derived. As to the thing absolutely taken, Aristotle thus ranks the degrees of probability: what seems true to some wife men is fomewhat probable; what seems to the moft or to all wife men, is very probable; what most men, both wife and unwise, affent unto, doth ftill more refemble truth; but what men generally confent in hath the highest probability, and approaches near to demonftrable truth; fo near, that it may pass for ridiculous arrogance and felf-conceitedness, or for intolerable obftinacy and perverseness, to deny it. A man, on day ris faith the philofopher, may affume what feems true to the wife, if it do not contradict the common opinion of men; no un ivavríov man's wifdom (he fuppofes) fufficient to balance the ge- neral authority of men. Indeed, when extravagant wits, s. Top. and pretenders to wisdom, (or to an extraordinary reach in knowledge,) fhall affert things evidently repugnant to sense or reason; that snow and coal have the like appearance, (as did Anaxagoras ;) that all motion is impoffible, (as Zeno;) that contradictory propofitions may be consistent, (as Heraclitus ;) we may add to thofe inftances, that all things in nature proceeded from chance, (as Epicurus and his followers;) what other means have we (fince no principles can be more evident than fuch propofitions as they reject) to confute them, or to decide the cause, than making appeal to the common fentiments of mankind? which if they decline, what have we more to do than to laugh at or pity them? however, furely, he needs to have a very strong and very clear reafon to fhew, who dares to withstand the common fuffrage of mankind, and to challenge all the world of mistake. Now fomewhat to enforce this difcourfe; but more to evidence the matter of fact upon which it is grounded, and withal to make good that confirmation thereof, which was intimated; I fhall

i. 8.

SERM, allege fome few teftimonies of ancient philosophers, (that VIII. is, of witneffes in this cause most impartial and unfuspect

ed,) felected out of innumerable others extant and obvious, ferving to the fame purpose: We are wont to attribute much, faith Seneca, to what all men prefume; it is an argument with us of truth, that any thing seems true to all; as that there be Gods we hence collect, for that all men have engrafted in them an opinion concerning Gods; neither is there any nation fo void of laws, or good manners, that it doth not believe there are fome Gods a; fo doth he affert the matter of fact, and argue from it. The like doth Cicero in many places, fometimes in the perfon of his dialogists, sometimes according to his own sense; preffing this argument as very weighty. This, faith he, in his Tufculan Questions, feems a moft firm thing, which is alleged, why we should believe Gods to be, because no nation is fo fierce, no man fo wild, whofe mind an opinion concerning Gods hath not imbued: many think amifs concerning Gods, for that uses to proceed from bad custom, but all do however conceive a Divine power and nature to exift-Now in all things the confent of all nations is to be supposed a law of nature b. We fhall have other occafion to cite divers places out of Plato and Ariftotle, confirming the fame thing; I fhall now only add these pregnant words of Maximus Tyrius: In fuch a quarrelling, and tumult, and jangling, (about other matters of opinion,) you may fee this one by common accord acknowledged law and Speech, that there is one God, the King and Father of all; and many gods, the children of God, and ruling together with

• Multum dare folemus præfumptioni omnium hominum, apud nos veritatis argumentum eft aliquid omnibus videri; tanquam Deos effe fic colligimus, quod omnibus de Diis opinio infita eft; nec ulla gens ufquam eft adeo extra leges morefque projecta, ut non aliquos Deos credat. Sen. Epist, 'cxvii. vid. de Benef. iv. 4.

b Firmiffimum hoc afferri videtur cur Deos effe credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam fit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit Deorum opinio. Multi de Diis prava fentiunt, (id enim vitioso more effici folet ;) omnes tamen effe vim, et naturam divinam arbitrantur.-Omni autem in re confenfio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda eft. Tufc. i. p. 299. Vid. de Nat. Deor. i. pag. 22. et ii. pag. 53, 57, &c.

him this the Greek fays, and this the Barbarian fays; the SERM. inhabiter of the continent, and the islander; the wife and VIII: the unwife do fay the fame c.

Thus it appears, by teftimony abundantly fufficient, (to which alfo all hiftories ancient and modern do agree,) that our conclufion hath been the catholic and current doctrine of all times and of all places; fo that who denies affent thereto, is beyond measure paradoxical, and belongs to a fect very thin and weak; is in opinion what a monfter is in nature, a thing extraordinary and uncouth; as a lion without courage, an ox without horns, a bird without wings, (as the philofopher speaks ;) a thing which feldom haps to be, and that never without fome great error or defect d.

But if, as furely he will, our haughty adversary shall refuse the verdict of this grand jury, we may affert its authority, not only as competent in itself, but as more confiderable in respect to the causes whence it proceeded, or from the manner by which this general confent can be - conceived to have been produced and propagated among men. That men fhould thus confpire in opinion must needs proceed either, 1. from hence, that fuch an opinion was by way of natural light or inftinct (as the firft moft evident principles of science are conceived to be, or as the moft effectual propenfions toward good are) implanted in man's nature; thus Cicero and other philofophers suppose it to have come in him it is thus faid, and argued: Since not by any inftitution, or custom, or law, this opinion is established, and among all, without exception, a firm confent doth abide, it is necessary there should be Gods; we having implanted, or rather inbred notions concerning

· Εν τοσέτῳ δὲ πολέμῳ καὶ τάσει καὶ διαφωνίᾳ ἕνα ἴδοις ἂν ἐν πάσῃ γῇ ὁμόφωνον મે νόμον καὶ λόγον, ὅτι θεὸς εἶς πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ πατήρ· καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ, θεῖ παῖδες, συνάρχοντες θεῷ, ταῦτα δὲ ὁ ἵλλην λέγει, καὶ ὁ βάρβαρος λέγει, καὶ ὁ ἠπειρώτης, καὶ ὁ θαλάττιος, καὶ ὁ σοφὸς, καὶ ὁ ἄσοφος. Dif. i. p. 5.

4 Εἰ δὲ ἐξεγένοντο ἐν τῷ ξύμπαντι αἰῶνι δύο τε καὶ τρεῖς ἄθεον καὶ ταπεινὸν καὶ ἀσθενὲς γένος, ὡς ἄθυμος λέων, ὡς βᾶς ἄκερος, ὡς ὄρνις ἄπτερος. Ιd. 16.

Καί τις ἐκ ἂν ἐπήνεσε τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων σοφίαν, εἴγε μηδεὶς αὐτῶν εἰς ἀθεότητα ἐξω επισι, μηδὲ ἀμφιβάλλεσι περὶ θεῶν, ἄρα γε εἰσὶν, ἢ ἐκ εἰσὶν, καὶ ἄρα γε ἡμῶν φροντ ,,&c. Elian. Var. ii. 31.

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