any particular doctrine, and another, to discern such evidence in favour of it, as fhall appear greatly to overbalance the feeming difficulties which attend it, and be fufficient to determine the judgment about it. In the controverfy before us, unable as we may be fully to account for the present circumstances of danger attending man, as a moral agent; the existence of a proper principle of agency, or a self-determining power, in man, feems, notwithstanding, to be among thofe plain and important truths, which are infeparably connected with the just idea of a divine moral government, and without which we cannot be at all accountable for any thing we do.

Punishment, on the fuppofition that the whole conduct of men through

through life is determined by their Creator, and is, on their part, unavoidable, (as the doctrine of neceffity teaches) appears as flatly repugnant to the justice, not to say, the goodness, of the fupreme governor, when connected with characters usually denominated morally evil or wicked, as if it had been denounced against men, for not ftilling the raging of the winds, or making their way over a mountain, which was abfolutely impaffable.

Nor can I help expreffing very strong apprehenfions of the dangerous tendency of the Neceffarian tenet, as a practical principle: for, though Dr. Priestley has, with great ingenuity, endeavoured to fupport the utility and importance of future retributions, on his fcheme; I cannot yet but be of opinion, that the generality of

mankind

mankind would be affected by the perfuafion of it, in a very different manner from what he supposes; and that, if they could once be brought to believe that they were not moral agents, or could do nothing that implied in it real, personal demerit, they would very foon think themfelves fully warranted in concluding, that they could not, on any account, deserve punishment, and had therefore nothing to fear.

But, referving the confideration of that argument for its proper place, I take this opportunity of paying the just tribute of respect, which I think fo highly due to the character of Dr. Priestley; who is, I doubt not, animated by the warmeft love for truth, and the most affectionate concern to promote the best interests of man

kind, in all his moral and theological writings, widely as he may differ, in fome parts of them, from other judicious and efteemed authors.

The following obfervations were nearly finished before the publication of the correfpondence between Dr. Price and Dr. Priestley; though I have fince given that performance a very careful perufal, and cannot but recommend it to the attention of thofe, who have leifure and inclination for fuch ftudies, both in the view of it as a work, which manifefts distinguished ability in the defence of each fide of the question, refpecting the two important fubjects of Materialism and Neceffity, and as exhibiting a specimen of controverfiak writing, the direct reverse to what we commonly fee, but much to be ad

mired, and moft worthy of imitation, for the liberality with which it is conducted.

If I have fucceeded in my endeavours to fet the beft arguments for the liberty of man, as a moral agent, and the proper replies to those infifted on by Dr. Priestley on the fide of philofophical neceffity, in fuch a point of view, as fhall contribute to the facility of their being understood, my main end is anfwered.

The obfervations on Sections V. and VI. are chiefly in fupport of what Dr. Price has advanced in proof of the doctrine of liberty in his review of the principal queftions, and difficulties in morals. I fhould not have touched on that part of the argument, had Dr. Price seen fit himfelf to engage in it; but at the fame