And these are the topics we must proceed upon, to justify our exclusion of the young pretender in France; that of his suspected birth being merely popular, and therefore not made use of, as I remember, since the revolution, in any speech, vote, or proclamation, where there was an occasion to mention him.

As to the abdication of king James, which the advocates on that side look upon to have been forcible and unjust, and consequently void in itself, I think a man may observe every article of the English church, without being in much pain about it. It is not unlikely that all doors were, laid open for his departure, and perhaps not without the privity of the prince of Orange, as reasonably concluding, that the kingdom might be better settled in his absence: but to affirm he had any cause to apprehend the same treatment with his father, is an improbable scandal flung upon the nation, by a few bigotted French scribblers, or the invidious assertion of a ruined party at home, in the bitterness of their souls; not one material circumstance agreeing with those in 1648; and the greatest part of the nation having preserved the utmost horror for that ignominious murder: but whether his removal were caused by his own fears, or other men's artifices, it is manifest to me, that supposing the throne to be vacant, which was the foot the nation went upon, the body of the people was thereupon left at liberty to choose what form of government they pleased, by themselves, or their representatives.

The only difficulty of any weight against the proceedings at the revolution, is an obvious objection, to which the writers upon that subject have not yet given a direct or sufficient answer, as if they were in pain at some consequences, which

they apprehend those of the contrary opinion might draw from it. I will repeat this objection, as it was offered me some time ago, with all its advantages, by a very pious, learned, and worthy gentleman of the nonjuring party.

*

The force of his argument turned upon this; that the laws made by the supreme power, cannot otherwise than by the supreme power be annulled: that this consisting in England of a king, lords, and commons, whereof each have a negative voice, no two of them can repeal or enact a law, without consent of the third; much less may any one of them be entirely excluded from its part of the legislature, by a vote of the other two. That all these maxims were openly violated at the revolution; where an assembly of the nobles and people, not summoned by the king's writ, (which was an essential part of the constitution) and consequently no lawful meeting, did merely upon their own authority, declare the king to have abdicated, the throne vacant, and gave the crown by a vote to a nephew, when there were three children to inherit; though by the fundamental laws of the realm, the next heir is immediately to succeed. Neither does it appear, how a prince's abdication can make any other sort of vacancy in the throne, than would be caused by his death; since he cannot abdicate for his children, (who claim their right of succession by act of parliament) otherwise than by his own consent in form to a bill from the two houses.

And this is the difficulty, that seems chiefly to stick with the most reasonable of those, who, from

Mr Nelson, author of the Feasts and Fasts of the Church of England.

a mere scruple of conscience, refuse to join with us upon the revolution principle; but for the rest, are, I believe, as far from loving arbitrary government, as any others can be, who are born under a free constitution, and are allowed to have the least share of common good sense.

In this objection there are two questions in cluded: first, whether upon the foot of our constitution, as it stood in the reign of the late king James, a king of England may be deposed? The second is, whether the people of England, convened by their own authority, after the king had withdrawn himself in the manner he did, had power to alter the succession.

As for the first, it is a point I shall not presume to determine; and shall therefore only say, that to any man who holds the negative, I would demand the liberty of putting the case as strongly as I please. I will suppose a prince limited by laws like ours, yet running into a thousand caprices of cruelty like Nero or Caligula; I will suppose him to murder his mother and his wife; to commit incest, to ravish matrons, to blow up the senate, and burn his metropolis; openly to renounce God and Christ, and worship the devil: these and the like exorbitances, are in the power of a single person to commit, without the advice of a ministry, or assistance of an army. And if such a king, as I have described, cannot be deposed but by his own consent in parliament, I do not well see how he can be resisted, or what can be meant by a limited monarchy; or what signifies the people's consent in making and repealing laws, if the person who administers, has no tie but conscience, and is answerable to none but God. I desire no stronger proof that an opinion must be false, than to find very great absurdities annexed to it; and

there cannot be greater than in the present case ; for it is not a bare speculation that kings may run into such enormities as are above-mentioned: the practice may be proved by examples, not only drawn from the first Cæsars, or later emperors, but many modern princes of Europe; such as Peter the Cruel, Philip the Second of Spain, John Basilovitz of Muscovy, and in our own nation, king John, Richard the Third, and Henry the Eighth. But there cannot be equal absurdities supposed in maintaining the contrary opinion; because it is certain, that princes have it in their power, to keep a majority on their side, by any tolerable administration, till provoked by continual oppressions; no man indeed can then answer, where the madness of the people will stop.

As to the second part of the objection; whether the people of England convened by their own authority, upon king James's precipitate departure, had power to alter the succession?

In answer to this, I think it is manifest from the practice of the wisest nations, and who seem to have had the truest notions of freedom, that when a prince was laid aside for maladministration, the nobles and people, if they thought it necessary for the public weal, did resume the administration of the supreme power, (the power itself having been always in them,) and did not only alter the succession, but often the very form of government too; because they believed there was no natural right in one man to govern another, but that all was by institution, force, or consent. Thus, the cities of Greece, when they drove out their tyrannical kings, either chose others from a new family, or abolished the kingly government, and became free states. Thus the Romans, upon the expulsion of Tarquin, found it

inconvenient for them to be subject any longer to the pride, the lust, the cruelty, and arbitrary will of single persons, and therefore, by general consent, entirely altered the whole frame of their government. Nor do I find the proceedings of either, in this point, to have been condemned by any historian of the succeeding ages.

But a great deal has been already said by other writers upon this invidious and beaten subject; therefore I shall let it fall; though the point is commonly mistaken, especially by the lawyers; who, of all others, seem least to understand the nature of government in general; like underworkmen, who are expert enough at making a single wheel in a clock, but are utterly ignorant how to adjust the several parts, or regulate the

movements.

To return therefore from this digression: it is a church of England man's opinion, that the freedom of a nation consists in an absolute unlimited legislative power, wherein the whole body of the people are fairly represented; and in an executive duly limited; because on this side likewise, there may be dangerous degrees, and a very ill extreme. For, when two parties in a state are pretty equal in power, pretensions, merit, and virtue, (for these two last are, with relation to parties and a court, quite different things,) it has been the opinion of the best writers upon government, that a prince ought not in any sort to be under the guidance or influence of either; because he declines by this means from his office of presiding over the whole, to be the head of a party; which, beside the indignity, renders him answerable for all public mismanagements, and the consequences of them; and in whatever state this happens, there must