the numbers furnished for the field have ever, before the battle, rivalled the enemy's squadrons. Untried forces over-rate themselves in order to intimidate; and conquering forces under-rate themselves in order to enhance their glory: so that various causes concur to mislead the most impartial and cautious arithmetician. Our author thus estimates:

With respect to the strength of the opposed armies, it is obvious, that in order to be enabled to appretiate them with absolute precision and certainty, it would be necessary that the author should have been commander in chief, or at least an officer of the staff of both armies. His enquiries however on this point, have been numerous and extensive, and he has addressed himself for the purpose to those persons, whom their local position, and their military situation equally placed within reach of very good information on the subject, The communication which he has received from them, enables him to form a near estimate of the numbers of the French and Imperial armies, at the opening of this campaign. He thinks himself authorised to state that at this time, the two French armies, commanded by Generals Jourdan and Moreau, amounted to more than 160,000 men; and that the Imperial forces commanded by his Royal Highness the Archduke Charles, including the Saxons and other contingents of the empire, were nearly 150,000 men.'

After having described the disorderly retreat of General Jourdan, the following reflections occur,-which we believe to be very just:

Thus ended the retreat of General Jourdan, a retreat of more than one hundred leagues, in which he lost near one half of his army, and was driven in twenty-five days from the frontiers of Bohemia to the walls of Dusseldorf.

This retreat formed a strong contrast with that of General Wartenfleben, who disputed every foot of ground with scarcely 25,000, against 50,000 men, who never suffered any considerable part of his army, to be either cut off or endangered; and who employed near two months, in retiring from the Sieg to the Naab.

A comparison drawn between these two retreats, seems to confirm the opinion, that if the French are endowed with the qualities which lead to victory, they are not, in the same degree, possessed of those which are requisite to support a defeat *; and that the latter qualifications are eminently possessed by the Austrians. This cam paign of Jourdan's proved, that if the valour of the soldiers, and the boldness of their Generals, are sufficient to render an army victorious, the only hope of safety, in case of a defeat, must be placed in the passive obedience of the troops, in the regular subordination of the officers, in the ability of the Generals, and in the solid organization of all its parts. It was to the want of all these circumstances that Jourdan owed the rapid abandonment of his conquests, and the destruction of his army. Two great defeats would not have oc casioned a loss equal to that which he sustained by the want of disci* The famous retreat of Moreau will challenge this assertion, Rev, pline

Ddz

pline among his soldiers, by the spirit of independance among his Ge nerals, and of disobedience among his subaltern officers. The great irregularity in the distribution of provisions, and the extreme disorder which reigned in the interior government of his army, were mere fatal to him than the sword of the Austrians. They produced disobedience and discouragement among the soldiery, caused a considerable desertion, and obliged the different corps to follow their own discretion, in directing their retreat to whatever places could provide them the substance which they were then so much in want of. A total disunion in the motions and positions of the whole army, was the consequence which rendered it impossible to oppose a victorious, ac, tive, and well regulated force. The excessive contributions, extortions, and outrages exercised upon the inhabitants of the conquered countries, excited in them the most violent animosity, which shewed itself evidently, from the very beginning of the French disasters. The disorder of their retreat, the plunder and violence by which it was marked, gave the Franconian Peasants, at the same time, new causes of resentment, and a favourable opportunity of revenging themselves, The bad military and political conduct of the French, occasioned the loss, not only of their conquests, but likewise of the Partizans they had in Germany. When conquerors they were detested; when con, quered, they were despised.'

We have already alluded to an important original document, concerning the conduct of the French armies in the Palatinate, (see Rev. N S. vol. xxi. p. 515,) which but too much corroborates the account here given of the outrages of the French soldiery. The military character of General Moreau is, we apprehend, rather undervalued by our historian:

• Moreau having luckily escaped all the dangers which attended his retreat, having without any considerable loss conducted his whole army over the mountains of Suabia, having by the possession of the whole valley of the Rhine, as well as of the two bridges of Huningen and Brisach, a safe and perfect communication with France, might have thought (as it should seem) that he had done enough in saving his army, and have been inclined to retire with it beyond the Rhine. But whether this General had received contrary orders from the directory, or that he was elated by his successful retreat, instead of retiring into Alsace, he proposed to maintain himself in Brisgau, and to attack his enemy instead of giving way to them. Accustomed from the beginning of the campaign to successes which he had no right to expect, and which he owed very often to the errors of the Generals who were opposed to him, he trusted that fortune would continue faithful to him, and hoped to crown his retreat with a victory.'

In the concluding reflections on the first part, the writer approves the new military system of the French, which avoids. sieges, and proposes to acquire the fortified places by conquering the surrounding countries; whereas, formerly, these countries were secured by getting possession of the fortified places. We suspect that this can only be advisable where the multitude are predisposed silently to favour the progress of the

invading

invading army. A splendid panegyric on the young Archduke Charles occurs at p. 178: he is said to have profited much from the experienced wisdom and counsels of Lieutenant General Bellegarde, by birth a Savoyard. To Guibert's work on tactics, the French have been indebted for several new ideas. The employment of balloons at Maubeuge and Fleurus, to reconnoitre the adverse force, had at least the effect of giving confidence to the soldiery. It is surprizing that the republicans never tried Marshal Saxe's project of giving armour to the cavalry as they seem often to have studied change, for the sake of influencing the imagination of their troops.

The second part of this volume contains an account of the campaign of Italy, and it frequently corrects very prevalent misrepresentations of the bold and brilliant actions of Buonaparte. The famous battle of the bridge of Lodi is thus narrated:

Buonaparte left the banks of the Po on the 9th of May, and found himself on the 10th with his advanced guard, in presence of General Beaulieu's rear-guard, which was posted in front of Lodi and the river Adda. A brisk cannonade was commenced on both sides, in consequence of which the Austrians evacuated the town of Lodi, and retired to the other side of the river. Major Malcamp (son-in-law of General Beaulieu) who commanded this Austrian corps, caused several pieces of cannon to be placed at the end of the bridge which enfiladed it, whilst some other pieces placed on the right and left took it by a cross fire. He would not allow the bridge to be broken down, not imagining that the French would under such circumstances venture to attack it. Buonaparte had not attempted to force it, because the whole of his army was not yet arrived; but as soon as the major part of it had joined him, he assembled his General Officers, and communicated to them the resolution he had formed of storming the bridge. The plan was unanimously disapproved of by his Generals. Buonaparte obstinately persisting in this rash design, assembled a council of grenadiers, to whom he made an animating speech which determined them to undertake the attack. 4,000 grenadiers and carabiniers formed themselves into a solid column, and marched towards the bridge. As soon as they arrived at its extremity, they were received by a terrible discharge of grape shot, which it was impossible to withstand. They fell back with great loss, returned twice to the charge, and were again forced back by the fire of the Austrian cannon, which enfilading the bridge, were discharged all at once close upon them as soon as they had set foot on it. The French had already suffered enormously, and it might have been expected that they would have abandoned this desperate undertaking. But Buonaparte persevering in his resolution, ordered fresh troops to re-inforce the column engaged in the attack. Six Generals putting themselves at its head, animated them by their example, inflamed them by their words, and led them back to the charge. Taking advantage of a moment, when the thickness of the smoke produced by the incessant fire, prevented the Austrians from perceiving and making a general discharge upon the French; the lat

Dd 3

ter

ter rushed upon the bridge, crossed it with rapidity, and falling im. petuously upon the troops and cannon which defended its extremity, overthrew the one and made themselves masters of the other. The bridge being forced, all the other columns instantly passed it to sup port the former. This action equally brilliant and unexpected, disconcerted the Austrians, who abandoned their ground, finding themselves too weak to defend it, and began their retreat. It was protected by the Neapolitan cavalry, which gained infinite honour on this day. They charged the French infantry several times, always with courage, and sometimes with success. They shewed themselves, by the good countenance which they preserved, and the judiciousness of their movements, equal to the best veteran troops.

Buonaparte wrote to the directory that the allies had lost in this action 2,500 men, of which 1,000 were made prisoners, and that he had taken 400 horses and 20 pieces of cannon. He had the effrontery to pretend that this battle cost him only 400 men; and certainly never did he give a more glaring proof of the falseness of his accounts. The loss suffered by his army on that occasion was universally estimated at 4,000 men; and by some even greater. The very nature of the engagement rendered it more bloody than any of the preceding actions, and the French themselves considered it as the warmest contest during the campaign. It was absolutely impossible that they should be otherwise than great sufferers on the bridge of Lodi, where they were thundered upon without intermission by artillery and musquetry; and if they were three times compelled to fall back, it was undoubtedly in consequence of the terrible fire to which they were exposed, and of the great havock which it occasioned in their ranks.

One cannot however help acknowledging the intrepidity with which the French accomplished this perilous undertaking. It was a striking proof with how much indifference the French Generals throw away their soldiers lives. By making other dispositions, and by the delay of a few days, Buonaparte might have crossed the Adda with as little loss as he sustained at the passage of the Po. He would not indeed have had such brilliant things to relate, but he would have preserved some thousands of his soldiers. He would have acquired less glory, but he would have shewed more real patriotism. He forgot that the leading principle of the greatest Generals, was to spare the blood of their soldiers; and that they only considered those as true victories in which they had but a small loss to lament.'

This was not, according to our author's severe criticism, the only blemish in the military character of Buonaparte: the time lost in the siege of Mantua is also made a topic of accusation:

This town which boasts of having been founded by the Etrurians before the Trojan war, is situated upon a lake formed by the Mincio, twenty Italian miles in circumference, and two miles broad. It is large, well built, and contains a great number of churches, of which some are very richly decorated. At the time when it still belonged to the Dukes of Mantua who resided there, it reckoned upwards of 50,000 inhabitants; it does not now possess half that number. It

has

has always been fortified, and its situation has made it considered in all Italian wars as the most important fortress in that country. It has sustained several sieges, and whenever it has surrendered, it has been more in consequence of a blockade and want of provisions than of open force, or the regular operations of art. Its chief means of defence consist less in its fortifications, than in the difficulties opposed to the approach and attacks of an enemy. The town being entirely surrounded by water and marshes, is only to be arrived at by three bridges or principal causeways, which are covered by works raised at each of their extremities. It communicates by these causeways with the suburbs of St. George, St. Anthony, and la Favorite, which being capable of defence, must be carried by an enemy before he can approach the town. If once the besiegers make themselves masters of these suburbs, they may easily form and maintain the blockade of Mantua, but they are scarcely more advanced towards the formation of a regular siege, as they can only open the trenches upon the narrow front of the causeways which lead into the town. The waters of the lake stagnating in summer, the place then becomes very unwholesome, and those of the inhabitants who are in easy circumstances generally leave it at that time. This unwholesomeness is not the least of its means of defence: for it is impossible to besiege it without risking the total destruction of an army by sickness. In almost every siege this place has substained, pestilential fevers have made great ravages, both amongst the assailants and defenders of it.

These considerations did not deter General Buonaparte, who had been taught by past successes to be confident of future ones. After having carried, some out-posts of the town, he opened the trenches before it on the 18th of July. But the difficulties attending the siege, the fevers which broke out in his army, and the successful sorties of the garrison, rendered the progress of the French extremely slow, and enabled the Count de Canto d'Irles, who commanded in the town, to defend it until relieved.'

The pillage of Loretto is stated (p. 346.) to have produced but 4000l. sterling. The statue of the Madonna was not, like that of Anaitis, golden,-but of wood. Buonaparte, however, well knew how to come at the treasures of an enervated` nation. His treasurer Flachat is said (p. 353,) to have stolen from him 250,000l. The following character is given of this celebrated General:

Pascal Buonaparte, a godson of General Paoli, was born at Ajaccio in Corsica in the same year (1769) that that island became subject to France. His father who died young had the rank of Major in the service of that power. At the age of ten years Buonaparte was placed at the royal school at Brienne, from whence he was removed to the military school at Paris. While there, he discovered application and an inclination for the sciences. In 1785, being then no more than fifteen, he was appointed Lieutenant en second of the regiment de la Fere of artillery, which he joined at Valence. His person is middle sized, and his complexion is dark and swarthy; his countenance bespeaks nothing remarkable, except his black eyes which are

Dd4

lively,