CHAPTER VII

CAMPAIGNS OF 1862—IN THE EAST

PASSING, for the present, such minor engagements and detached expeditions as would come first in chronological order, let us give attention to the movements of the great armies of the invasion and follow their campaigns through the year 1862. The western army of invasion was the first in the field, and its campaigns were, in the main, successful. The eastern army was later in motion and sustained signal defeats.

We have seen that McClellan, upon being removed from the command of the entire Federal army, was retained in command of the Army of the Potomac, which included nearly all the forces in Virginia. Here we are greeted with a series of brilliant Confederate victories, first in chronological order being the famous "Valley Campaign" of "Stonewall" Jackson.

Thomas J. Jackson, in reward for his services at the battle of Bull Run, was commissioned major-general on October 7, 1861. On November 4th he was gratified by the assignment to command the forces of the Shenandoah Valley, of which section he was a native and to which he was ardently attached. He at once requested that all the troops guarding the mountain passes be placed under his command, but his request was not complied with. Early in December he asked permission to be supplied with a sufficient force to move against Romney. But this request was also refused by the Confederate government. His total force, January 1, 1862, including 2,000 or 3,000 militia,

amounted to less than 11,000. The Federals had not resumed active operations in the valley since its abandonment by Patterson, and Jackson remained for a time in enforced quiet at his headquarters in Winchester. He employed the time in organizing and drilling his troops. But it was not in his nature to remain inactive. Learning that General Rosecrans contemplated using the possession of Romney as a means of throwing his western Virginia forces into the valley for the purpose of occupying Winchester and establishing communication with Banks, thus reducing the valley to permanent Federal control, Jackson determined to use what troops he had to checkmate the movement.

On January 4, 1862, he drove a force of the enemy from Bath, followed their retreat to Hancock, which commanded the communications along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and took Romney in the rear. The Federal forces evacuated Romney, January 10th, on Jackson's approach. Leaving Loring, who was second in command, to occupy Romney, and establishing communication with General Edward Johnson at Camp Alleghany, Jackson returned to Winchester, having defeated the plans of Rosecrans and Banks, and freed the entire district under his command from the presence of the enemy. The Confederate secretary of war, without consulting General Jackson or General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the department, sent a peremptory order on January 31st to Jackson to abandon Romney and to recall Loring to Winchester. Jackson obeyed the order, but resented this intermeddling with his command. He immediately tendered his resignation. General Johnston withheld the letter, and entreated Jackson to reconsider it. Governor Letcher, of Virginia, and other influential men strongly joined in the request. Finally, Jackson acceded to their wishes and withdrew the resignation. The Federals in a few days reoccupied Romney, repaired the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and reëstablished communications. Jackson now remained in enforced idleness until the movement of McClellan to the Peninsula changed the condition

of affairs and opened the way to the remarkable campaign. which ranked him among the most renowned commanders of the world.

During the illness of McClellan in December, 1861, and January, 1862, President Lincoln had called to his councils other advisers, who were impatient and incompetent, and hostile to McClellan. They raised another "On to Richmond!" cry, and demanded an immediate advance. As soon as McClellan reported for duty, the president demanded his plans for the campaign. McClellan was forced to disclose that he did not favor a direct advance by the way of Manassas, but designed a movement by water to Urbana on the lower Rappahannock, thus flanking Johnston's army and defences at Manassas, and landing troops at a point nearer to Richmond than that occupied by the Confederate army. The president discussed the plan with incompetent advisers and insisted on the direct advance.

While consideration of these matters was pending, General Johnston, the Confederate commander, disconcerted all the plans of the enemy by a skilful retreat, on March 9th, behind the Rappahannock to a new position previously entrenched. This movement especially defeated any surprise by way of Urbana.

McClellan now advanced toward Manassas, and established headquarters at Fairfax Court House. Here he called a council of his officers and submitted his plan of moving upon Richmond by way of the Peninsula. A majority of the council favored the plan. Thus sustained, it was urged upon the president, who finally consented to it upon the condition that a sufficient force should be left in and around Washington to guard the city from any sudden attack. The embarkation of McClellan's troops for the Peninsular campaign began on March 17th. Supposing himself to be still in command of the defences of Washington and of northern Virginia, McClellan issued orders accordingly. By his own statement, he left 73,456 men, with 109 pieces of light artillery, for the defence of Washington, and recommended

other available troops to be ordered in, among others 4,000 from New York. These troops were stationed as follows: 18,000 as a garrison for Washington, 7,780 at Warrenton, 10,859 at Manassas, 35,467 in the Shenandoah Valley, 1,350 on the lower Potomac. McClellan soon found that he was not in command of the defences of Washington. The president was not satisfied with his disposition of troops. He detached from his command McDowell's splendid corps, 40,000 strong, and detained it for strengthening the defence of Washington. Soon afterward, the Department of the Rappahannock was formed, and McDowell was placed in command of it.

A new plan was now devised. McClellan was at Fortress Monroe with an army of more than 100,000 men, ready to move upon the Peninsula to assail Richmond with the coöperation of a powerful naval force. Banks was moving up the valley with 35,000 men, 18,000 men were at Warrenton and Manassas, McDowell was at Fredericksburg with 40,000 men, Frémont was moving to the valley from his "Mountain Department" with 16,000 men, and 8,000 men were on the way from the Kanawha.

While McClellan was moving up the Peninsula and every available Confederate soldier was engaged in opposing his advance and northern Virginia was thus denuded of defenders, the several armies above enumerated were to converge toward Richmond, driving the Confederates before them; at the same time protecting Washington and sweeping the Confederates in a closing circle. This great converging force was thus to envelop Richmond and insure its capture, if McClellan should fail to take it before their arrival.

The magnitude and brilliancy of Jackson's Valley Campaign will be seen when it is recalled that by the most consummate generalship he so used the small force under his command as to strike these several armies in detail, defeat each in turn, shatter the combination, inspire terror for the safety of Washington, and finally join Lee in the defence of Richmond.

To oppose the tremendous force arrayed against Richmond, General Lee could not muster more than 83,000 men. Of these, the main army under Joseph E. Johnston consisted of 47,306 effective men. Holmes had 2,000 at Fredericksburg. Magruder on the Peninsula had about 11,000. These troops were thrown as rapidly as possible on the Peninsula to oppose McClellan's advance, and General Benjamin Huger, who commanded about 7,000 men, was subsequently ordered there after the evacuation of Norfolk.

To oppose the great combination gathering in the valley and northern Virginia were three small bodies of troops. Jackson, in the valley, had a total force, as shown by his field returns, of 5,297 men. General Edward Johnson, on the extreme west of the Confederate line, had about 3,500 men. General Ewell, guarding the direct route from Washington to Richmond, had about 6,200 men.

The first movement was made against Jackson in the valley before McClellan's troops had embarked for the Peninsula. Banks with 38,484 men crossed the Potomac February 26th, at Harper's Ferry, and occupied a line across the valley, paying but little attention to Jackson, whom he expected to brush out of his way as soon as he was ready to advance.

Banks advanced on Winchester on March 6th, when Jackson drew up his little army for battle, but Banks withdrew. Banks again advanced on March 11th, and Jackson offered battle. That night he called his first and last council of war. Like all councils, this council opposed fighting. Jackson then evacuated Winchester, much against his will. He steadily fell back before the advance of Banks, watching for an opportunity to strike, while Turner Ashby, his gallant chief of cavalry, engaged the enemy in daily skirmishes, easily defeating its cavalry, and keeping its detached parties in constant alarm.

At length the opportunity came. Thinking the possession of the valley practically assured, the Federal authorities ordered Banks to leave sufficient forces to retain the valley,