CHAPTER VIII

CAMPAIGNS OF 1862—IN THE EAST (Continued)

MCCLELLAN and Lee now faced each other, their armies inactive. The two generals, however, were preparing for offensive operations. McClellan's force on May 31st was 126,089, in five corps. Lee had a force of 57,000 men, which he speedily increased to 72,000 by reinforcements from the South, and was planning to bring Stonewall Jackson to Richmond with 16,000 men.

McClellan, despairing of active assistance by any movement of McDowell from Fredericksburg, and suspecting, as is shown by his letters, that Jackson would suddenly move to Richmond, had now no object in maintaining his long line on the north side of the Chickahominy. He was beginning to make arrangements to contract his lines by throwing all his troops south of that river. In order to do this it was necessary to "change his base." He sent engineers to inquire into the feasibility of a base on James River, to be reached by way of White Oak Swamp, but after consultation with trusted officers, took no active steps. Had he changed at that time he would have secured a safer base and would have avoided the ridicule which attached to the movement when he finally made it under compulsion. He kept one corps under Fitz-John Porter north of the Chickahominy, and held the other four on the south side, constantly pressing forward by slow approaches toward Richmond, until his advanced posts were about four and a half miles from the city.

Lee, as early as June 8th, wrote to Jackson suggesting that the latter should move rapidly to Richmond to unite in the attack on McClellan. On June 17th Jackson was on the way, having taken the steps previously related to deceive the enemy. He had reached Ashland on June 25th, and was moving, in accordance with General Lee's plan of attack, upon McClellan's rear.

It was on the 25th that McClellan made his first movement, which was to direct General Hooker to take a position one mile in advance on the Fair Oaks Farm, on the Williamsburg Road leading directly to Richmond. The move was a tentative one by which it was hoped to gain an advantage in one of two ways. It was thought that the movement might arouse a general resistance from the Confederates and so renew the battle of Fair Oaks, in which event, by the advantage of the bridges, the whole army could be concentrated. On the other hand, should the battle not be renewed, it would be one step gained in the march toward Richmond. The ground General Hooker was ordered to occupy was taken, lost, and retaken at a cost of four or five hundred men, Brigadier-generals C. Grover and D. E. Sickles ably supporting Hooker. During the ensuing night the news was received that General Jackson had returned from the Shenandoah Valley and was in force near Hanover Court House. Knowing that this signified the concentration of the Confederate forces, and believing that Jackson's object was to cut off Federal communications by seizing the York River railroad in their rear, Hooker was recalled from his position the following day. The advance upon Richmond had been checked.

Jackson was instructed to move upon the right flank of the Federal army, and if McDowell remained inactive in his position near Fredericksburg a general attack was to be made on McClellan's whole line. Jackson was to leave Ashland early in the morning of the 26th and turn Beaver Dam. A. P. Hill was to cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge as soon as Jackson's advance beyond that point

William Parish Chilton.

From photographs in the collection of Charles Edgeworth Jones, Esq., Augusta, Georgia.

THE

NEW YORK

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should be known, and move directly upon Mechanicsville. As soon as the Mechanicsville bridge should be uncovered, Longstreet and D. H. Hill were to cross, the latter to proceed to the support of Jackson, the former to that of A. P. Hill. These four commands were to sweep down the north side of the Chickahominy toward the York River railroad, Jackson on the left and in advance, Longstreet nearest the river, and in the rear. Huger and Magruder were to hold their positions against any assault of the enemy, to observe his movements and follow him closely in case of his retreat.

Jackson began his flanking operations at Ashland, his advance guard driving in the little Federal force posted there and pushing on to Hanover Court House. General Branch's brigade was thrown forward between Chickahominy and Pamunkey Rivers, to establish a junction with A. P. Hill. Hill did not commence his movement until three o'clock in the afternoon, when he crossed the river and advanced toward Mechanicsville. This advance was witnessed by the Federals, who knew approximately of Jackson's position and realized that serious work was at hand. Fitz-John Porter had strongly fortified Mechanicsville; and as the Confederates advanced, the artillery on both sides opened fire. The cannonade lasted half an hour, until night fell, and then the Federal guns were silent and the forces that lately manned them took refuge in the works on the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, a mile distant. This position was one of great strength. The banks of the creek were high, almost perpendicular, and approach was by open. field. There were no bridges, and trees had been felled along the bank to add to the difficulty of its passage. It was thought that the only possible method of attack was to cross the creek and swamp higher up, and it was believed Jackson would do this and try to turn the enemy's right.

D. H. Hill and Longstreet had crossed the Mechanicsville bridge as soon as it was uncovered and could be repaired. They reached the north bank of the Chickahominy late in the day. D. H. Hill's leading brigade, under Roswell S.