operations in the development of the plan of salvation. Israel, therefore, if begotten of Jehovah, must have had imparted to it some living germ and divine call, in connexion with that plan.

Moreover, the idea of sonship involves both paternal and filial rights. The son owes to the father obedience, confidence, reverence, and love, and the father is bound to render to the son sustenance, protection, and education. Thus, in the name "son," there is involved the duty of faith in Jehovah on the part of Israel, and the pledge of constant and immediate training on the part of Jehovah.

But the idea of sonship is still further defined by that of primogeniture; and the first-born has peculiar rights and privileges apart from the rest. He has already enjoyed the father's discipline and care, long before the others begin to participate in it. His education is complete, when the training of the others is still in progress, and therefore, for a time at least, he has essential advantages over them. Moreover he also takes part in the father's supervision over the rest, and assists in their training. And at all times he is the first and most natural representative of the father. If, then, Israel was actually the first-born son of Jehovah, all this must have been manifest in their case. The very consciousness of being the first-born in the house of Jehovah, was therefore a prediction for Israel of the future history of that house; it was a repetition in a more concrete form of the original prediction: "In thee and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." When Israel knew that he was the first-born, he must also have known that the rest of the nations were destined to be born at a later period, and therefore that they also were called to inherit and share the possessions of the father's house. And this knowledge determined the duties of Israel with regard to these nations, in both the present and future course of their history.

Such a sonship as this, though it may be the result of spiritual generation, is quite as real as that which proceeds from physical generation. In consequence of this generation, Jehovah could no more forsake the Israelites, than a father neglect his son (cf. Jer. xxxi. 20; Is. xlix. 15, &c.), for he had made Israel an actual partaker of his own nature. Moreover, the character which was imparted to Israel through this generation, and which for the

time distinguished it from every other nation, was a thoroughly real one, which had been implanted and had taken shape in the flesh and blood, as well as in the spirit and soul of the people. The call and election of Israel were something more than a mere idea, which floated like a vapour above the people, and could be driven away by the first wind that blew. It had become the soul, the national soul of Israel, and continued to fill with true life all its healthy, normal, vital functions, so long as it did not touch its own existence with suicidal hands.

(2). On the hardening of Pharaoh's heart we have an excellent dissertation by Hengstenberg (Pentateuch, vol. ii. p. 380), which, though not entirely free from partial views, has rendered essential service towards the elucidation of this subject. The earlier Lutheran theologians went so far in their opposition to the doctrine of predestination, as to maintain that the sinner always hardened himself, the part performed by God being limited to permission alone. "The rationalistic theology appropriated the rationalism of the orthodox all the more readily, since in the estimation of the former the co-operation of God even for good does not extend beyond permission." In this, however, both the orthodox and the rationalist were at variance with the Holy Scriptures, which so frequently and distinctly represent the hardening of man as the result of an actual interposition on the part of God. But the Scriptures were regarded by orthodox theologians as the word of God, and therefore they endeavoured to show that the discrepancy was merely apparent, and explained the Bible according to their notion of what hardening is. Thus, for example, in Pfeiffer's Dubia vexata, p. 229, the decisio respecting the case before us is as follows: "Deus dicitur cor Pharaonis indurare permissive, permittendo scil. justo judicio, ut ille, qui se emolliri non patiebatur, sibi permissus durus maneret in propriam perniciem." The rationalistic theology, on the other hand, was not fettered by any doctrine of inspiration, and therefore candidly acknowledged the discrepancy, and even exaggerated it to such an extent as to affirm that the Scriptures made God the author of sin. Hengstenberg has defended the authority of the Scriptures in opposition to both of these, with especial reference to the hardening of Pharaoh.

The first thing to be decided is, what interpretation the writer

2

of the Scriptural record intended us to put upon the whole transaction? With regard to this, Hengstenberg has at the outset very properly laid stress upon the fact, that the Scriptural account represents the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, no less frequently and decidedly as Pharaoh's own act, that is as selfhardening, than as an act of God of which Pharaoh was the object. He finds on examination that there are seven passages in which Pharaoh is said to have hardened his own heart (Ex. vii. 13, 22, viii. 15, 19, 32, ix. 7, 34), and also seven in which God is said to have hardened Pharaoh's heart (chap. iv. 21, vii. 3, ix. 12, x. 1, 20, 27, xi. 10). In his opinion the number seven is significant. "It indicates," he says, "that the hardening rested upon the covenant of God with Israel, of which this number was the mark." But in this we must differ from him. From the point of view referred to, we can easily understand why the hardening should be represented seven times as an act of God, for His covenant with Israel was the cause of all that He did. But it is impossible to apply the same explanation to the fact that Pharaoh is also referred to seven times, as hardening himself by his own voluntary act. Where Pharaoh acted freely, he cannot be regarded as having in any way acted in subservience to the covenant. It is only where his actions appear as the result of what God had done, that such a reference is admissible. However, as Baumgarten has already shown, Hengstenberg has not reckoned correctly. It is not seven times but ten times that God is said to have hardened Pharaoh's heart, and ten times also that Pharaoh is said to have hardened himself. At the commencement of the narrative the hardening is attributed twice to God (chap. iv. 21, vii. 3), then seven times to Pharaoh (chap. vii. 13, 14, 22; viii. 15, 19, 32; ix. 7), then again once to God (chap. ix. 12), twice to Pharaoh (chap. ix. 34, 35), four times to God (x. 1, 20, 27; xi. 10), once more to Pharaoh (xiii. 15), and, lastly, three times to God (xiv. 4, 8, 17). This considerably alters the state of the case. Ten is the sign of completeness, being the last number of the decad, in which every possible numeral appears. If, then, the Scriptural record sets

1 If the article in the evang. Kirchenzeitung 1837 was written by Hengstenberg himself, (and we have no reason to doubt it), it appears an inexplicable thing, that he should have given the right number "ten" in that article (p. 496), and then afterwards have altered it to seven.

before us the hardening of Pharaoh's heart ten times as his own act, and also ten times as the act of God, we may conclude from the equality in the numbers, that the two aspects are to be placed side by side as of equal importance, and that neither of them is to be sacrificed to the other. On the other hand, from the fact that the number ten is used on both sides, we may infer that each of the two processes, which were the determining causes of Pharaoh's hardness, ran its own course both freely and fully, and that in his case they were both of them exhausted and completely fulfilled. For this reason we are also unable to subscribe to Hengstenberg's opinion, when he says that "the equality in the numbers denotes, that the hardening attributed to Pharaoh stood to that ascribed to God, in the relation of effect to cause." We might reverse the sentence with quite as much propriety, or rather impropriety. If the author had desired to convey the idea, which Hengstenberg imagines, he would certainly have arranged the two causalities in such a manner, that every instance in which the hardening was ascribed to God, should be followed by another, in which it was attributed to Pharaoh. Even in the fact that, "in the introduction and the summing up the hardening is attributed to God," and therefore "the part performed by Pharaoh is surrounded by that of God," we can not discover any evidence of an intention to represent "the former as determined by the latter." The announcement of the obduracy of Pharaoh was necessarily made from that point of view, in which it appeared as the work of God; for this was the only light, in which it could awaken confidence or give the intended pledge. In making such an announcement, God could not possibly refer exclusively or even prominently to the fact that Pharaoh would harden himself; for that would have implied, that the people would be left to the caprice and hard-heartedness of an enemy. On the other hand, there is certainly truth in the further remarks of Hengstenberg, that "there are also marks of design in the fact, that the hardening at the beginning of the plagues is attributed, in a preponderating degree, to Pharaoh, and towards the end to God. The higher the plagues rise, so much the more does the hardening of Pharaoh assume a supernatural character, and so much the more obvious is the reference to a supernatural cause." But after the divine causality has been placed in a most decided manner in the foreground, the

self-hardening is again brought prominently forward; and in this we discover an evident intimation, that the two causalities are to be regarded as working side by side to the very close. We will here merely observe in passing, that Hengstenberg really contradicts himself, one of his assertions completely upsetting the other. In one place he says that the hardening attributed to Pharaoh stood to that ascribed to God in the relation of effect to cause; and yet afterwards he says, that in the circumstance that the hardening is at first chiefly attributed to Pharaoh, and towards the end almost exclusively to God, we have a proof that at the outset the human causality predominated, and subsequently the divine, in other words that the former was the effect, the latter the cause (the former the cause, the latter the effect-Tr.). If the two causalities really stood to each other in the relation of cause and effect, it is evident from the fact just referred to, that the human has the stronger claim to be regarded as the cause. But we deny that this is the relation in which they are to be placed, and we found our denial upon the Scriptural narrative itself. Each contains its own cause within itself, the one in the evil will of man, the other in the holy will of God; the effect of the one is the hardening of a man to his own destruction, that of the other the hardening of man to the glory of God. Still each of these forms of hardening is determined by the other, and the one can never take place apart from the other. Had Pharaoh not received that testimony from God, of which the narrative before us speaks, he would not have hardened himself; and had not Pharaoh's sinful will resisted the divine decree, God would never have hardened him.

To prevent mistake, however, we must enter in several respects into a fuller explanation of what we have said above. Both the expressions employed and the facts themselves lead to the conclusion, that hardening can only take place, where there is a conflict between human freedom and divine grace. It is the ultimate result which is sure to ensue, when the human will continues to maintain a negative attitude towards the will of God, after the latter has positively announced itself, in accordance with the plan of salvation, as having no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live (Ezek. xxxiii. 11, cf. 2 Pet. iii. 9; 1 Tim. ii. 4). Hence such a thing can only occur within the sphere of revelation, or where the

་