is not to prove that there must be a revelation; it is only to show that there would be nothing unreasonable in the thing; and further, that it would be a very desirable thing for man, and altogether consistent with the perfections of God and the principles on which he governs the world.

Now, suppose

that God should determine to reveal his will to man; how could this be most conveniently effected? We can conceive of two ways. The first by inspiring all who needed knowledge, with the ideas which he wished to communicate. The second by inspiring a few persons, and directing them to communicate to others the truths received. The first would seem to be the most effectual, but the last is more analogous to his other dispensations. Reason might have been given in perfection at once, and not left to the uncertainty of education and human improvement; but such is not the fact. By slow degrees, and much culture, this faculty attains its maturity, and when neglected, never acquires any high degree of strength. In regard to the best mode of making a revelation, however, we are totally incompetent to judge; but of one thing we may be certain, that if God should give a revelation to men, he would so attest it, as to enable all sincere inquirers to know, that it derives its origin from him; for otherwise it would be useless, as there would be no evidence of its truth. Now, suppose a

revelation to be given, what would be a satisfactory attestation of its divine origin? It must be some sign or evidence not capable of being counterfeited; something by which God should in some way manifest himself. And how could this be effected, but by the exertion of his power, or the manifestation of his infinite knowledge? that is, by miracles, or by prophecies, or by both. There is, then, just as much probability that miracles will exist, (for prophecy may be considered one kind of miracle,) as that a revelation will be given. The conjunction of these two things is reasonable; if we find the one, we may be sure that the other exists also.

It is admitted that a revelation from God would have internal evidence of its origin, but this does not strike the attention at once. It requires time before it can be perceived; but in the first establishment of a revelation, there is need of some evidence which is obvious to the senses, and level to the capacities of all. Just such an evidence are miracles. Moreover, internal evidence requires, in order that it may be perceived and appreciated, a certain favourable state of the moral feelings, without which it is apt to be overlooked, and produces no conviction; whereas external evidence is not only level to every capacity, but adapted to bring home conviction to every description of men, to the bad as well as the good.

Miracles, then, furnish the best proof for

E

the establishment of a revelation. They seem to be its proper seal. They are the manifest attestation of God. Nothing can be conceived which will more strikingly indicate his power and presence, than a visible suspension of the laws of nature. He is invisible, he must make himself known by his works; and a miracle is such a work as no other can perform. When, therefore, a person professes to have received a revelation from God, and when we behold the effects of Almighty power accompanying his words, all are sure that God is with him, and that he is a teacher sent from God; for otherwise he could never perform such wonderful works; or, rather, to speak more correctly, God would never exert his power to confirm the pretensions of an impostor, or to attest doctrines which are not true.

SECTION IV.

Miracles are capable of Proof from Testimony.

I Do not know that any one has denied that a miracle would be credible, if exhibited to our senses. A man might, indeed, be deceived by an illusion arising from some disorder in his senses; but if he was conscious

of being in a sound state of body and mind, and should witness not only one, but a variety of miracles; not only a few times, but for years in succession; and if he should find, that all around him had the same perceptions of these facts as himself, I need not say, that it would be reasonable to credit his senses, for the constitution of his nature would leave him no choice: he would be under the necessity of believing what he saw with his eyes, heard with his ears, and handled with his hands. But are there facts which a man would credit on the evidence of his senses, which can, by no means, be rendered credible by the testimony of any number of witnesses? Then there might be facts, the knowledge of which could never be so communicated as to be worthy of credit. According to this hypothesis, the constitution of our nature would require us to withhold our assent from what was true, and what others knew to be true. If a thousand persons of the strictest veracity should testify, that they had repeatedly witnessed a miracle, and if all circumstances should concur to corroborate their testimony, yet upon this principle it would be unreasonable to credit them, even if they should consent to die in confirmation of what they had declared to be the fact. This is the ground taken by Mr. Hume, in his boasted argument against miracles. But it appears to me, that every man, previously to examination, must

be convinced that it is false; for it is contrary to common sense, and universal experience of the effect of testimony. The true principle on this subject, is, that any fact which would be believed on the evidence of the senses, may be reasonably believed on testimony. For

there may be testimony of such a nature, as to produce conviction as strong as any other conceivable evidence; and such testimony in favour of a miracle, would establish it as firmly as if we had witnessed it ourselves. But, notwithstanding that this is the conclusion of common sense and experience, the metaphysical argument of Mr. Hume has had the effect of perplexing and unsettling the minds of many; and as he boasts, that "it will be useful to overthrow miracles as long as the world endures," it seems necessary to enter into an examination of his argument, that we may be able to expose its fallacy. This has already been done, in a convincing nanner, by several men,* eminent for their learning and discrimination; and if their works were read by all who peruse Hume, I should think it unnecessary to add a single word on the subject. But it may not be without its use, to give a refutation, in a condensed form, for the sake of those who will not take the trouble to go through a minute and extended demonstration.

Dr. Campbell, Professor Vince, Mr. Adams, Dr. Douglas.