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decision, and we pledge ourselves to prove, that the falsehood of the miracles of the Gospel, would be more improbable, and consequently more incredible, than the truth of the facts recorded in them. But this discussion will be reserved for another place. To conclude this section: since then it has been shown, that there is no antecedent presumption against miracles from the nature of God, or from the laws by which he governs the universe; since a miraculous fact is not more difficult to be accomplished by omnipotence, than any other; since miracles are no further improbable than as they are unusual; since they are the most suitable and decisive evidences which can be given of a revelation; since, even by the concession of Mr. Hume himself, there may be sufficient testimony fully to establish them; and since the many false pretences to miracles, and the general disposition to credit them, are rather proofs that they have existed, than the contrary, we may safely conclude that Mr. Hume's argument on this subject is sophistical and delusive; and that it is so far from being true, as he alleges, that they are incredible, whatever may be their evidence, when brought to support religion, that this is, of all others, that department in which they are most reasonable and credible.

SECTION V.

The Miracles of the Gospel are Credible.

Having shown, in the preceding section, that miracles may be so attested as to be credible, I come now to examine the evidence by which the miraculous facts, recorded in the New Testament, may be established.

This is the main point in our inquiry; for, after all that has been said, it must be admitted, that unless the Christian religion is attended with sufficient evidence, we cannot believe in it, even if we would.

Before entering directly on this discussion, it may be useful to premise a few things respecting the nature and force of testimony, which, it is presumed, will be admitted by all who have attended to the subject.

This species of evidence admits of all con-" ceivable degrees, from the weakest probability to the fullest assurance; for while, on this ground, we yield to some reports the most hesitating assent, we are as certainly persuaded of others, as of those things which we perceive by our senses, or have demonstrated by mathematical reasoning.

The exact force of testimony cannot be calculated by rule, nor estimated by reason, but is known only from experience. Many things are believed on testimony with the

most unwavering confidence, when we are utterly unable to explain the precise ground on which our conviction rests. The sources of our information have been so numerous, and the same facts presented to us in so many forms, that it is impossible to attribute to each its influence in gaining our assent. If we were asked, on what particular testimony we believe that there is such a place as Rome, or why we believe that such a person as Buonaparte lately figured in Europe, we could only answer, in the general, that multiplied testimonies of these facts had reached us, so that all possibility of doubting was excluded. The same assurance, and resting on the same grounds, is experienced in relation to facts which occurred in ages long past. Who can bring himself to doubt, whether such persons as Julius Cæsar, Paul, Mohammed, Columbus, or Luther, ever existed?

When we have obtained evidence to a certain amount, nothing is gained by the admission of more. The mind becomes, as it were, saturated, and no change in its conviction is produced by multiplying witnesses. One sound demonstration of a theorem in mathematics, is as good as a hundred. A few upright witnesses who agree, and are uncontradicted by other evidence, are as satisfactory as any conceivable number. On a trial for murder, if there were a thousand witnesses who could attest the fact, a judicious court

would not deem it necessary to examine more than half a dozen, or, at most, a dozen, if there was a perfect agreement in their testimony. Experience only can inform us what degree of evidence will produce complete conviction; but we may judge from former experience, what will be the effect of the same evidence in future; and from the effect on our own minds, what it will be on the minds of others.

Testimony, not of the strongest kind, may be so corroborated by circumstances, and especially, by the existing consequences of the facts reported, that it may be rendered credible, and even irresistible. Should a historian of doubtful credit attest, that an eclipse of the sun occurred on a certain day, and was visible in a certain place; if we possessed no other evidence of the fact, it might be considered doubtful whether the testimony was true or false; but, if by astronomical calculation it should be found, that there must have been an eclipse of the sun at that time, and visible at that place, the veracity of the witness, in this case, would be confirmed beyond all possibility of doubt. Or, should we find it recorded by an anonymous author, that an earthquake, at a certain time, had overthrown a certain city; without further evidence, we. should yield but a feeble assent to the statement; but if, on personal observation, or by the report of respectable travellers, it was

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ascertained, that the ruins of an ancient city existed in that place, we should consider the truth of the history sufficiently established.

The evidences of the Christian religion may be sufficient, and yet not so strong as inevitably to produce conviction. Our conduct in the pursuit and reception of truth, may be intended by our Creator, to be an important part of that probation to which we are subjected; and, therefore, the evidence of revelation is not so great as to be irresisti ble; but is of such a kind, that the sincere and diligent inquirer will be in no danger of fatal mistake, while men of pride and prejudice, who prefer darkness to light, will be almost sure to err.*

It is natural for all men to speak truth; falsehood requires an effort. Wicked men lie, only when they have some sinister end in view. Combinations to deceive are never formed but with a view to accomplish some object desirable to those concerned. No set of men will be at the trouble of forging and propagating a falsehood, which promises them no profit or gratification. Much less will they engage in such an enterprise, with the view of bringing evil on themselves, or when they foresee, that it can be productive of nothing but pain and reproach.

Between truth and falsehood there is so

See Pascal's Thoughts.

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