be, who are born under a free conftitution, and are allowed to have the least share of common good fenfe.

In this objection there are two queftions included. First, Whether, upon the foot of our conftitution, as it flood in the reign of the late King James, a king of England may be depofed? The fecond is, Whether the people of England, convened by their own authority, after the King had withdrawn himself in the manner he did, had power to alter the fucceffion ?

As for the first, it is a point I fhall not presume to determine; and fhall therefore only fay, that, to any man who holds the negative, I would demand the liberty of putting the cafe as strongly as I please. I will fuppofe a prince limited by laws like ours, yet running into a thousand caprices of cruelty, like Nero or Cali gula; I will fuppofe him to murder his mother and his wife; to commit inceft, to ravish matrons, to blow up the fenate, and burn his metropolis; openly to renounce God and Christ, and worship the devil: these, and the like exorbitancies, are in the power of a fingle perfon to commit, without the advice of a miniftry, or affiftance of an army. And if fuch a king as I have described, cannot be depofed but by his own consent in parliament, I do not well fee how he can be refifted; or what can be meant by a limited monarchy; or what fignifies the people's confent in making and repealing laws, if the perfon who adminifters, hath no tie but confcience, and is anfwerable to none but God. I defire no stronger proof that an opinion must be false, than to find very great abfurdities annexed to it; and there cannot be greater than in the prefent cafe: for it is not a bare fpeculation, that kings may run into fuch enormities as are above mentioned; the practice may be proved by examples, not only drawn from the firft Cæfars, or later Emperors, but many modern princes of Europe; fuch as, Peter the Cruel, Philip II of Spain, John Bafilovits of Mufcový; and, in our own nation, King John, Richard III. and Henry VIII. But there cannot be equal abfurdities fuppofed in maintaining the contrary opinion; because it is certain, that princes have it in their power to keep a majority on their fide by any tolerable administration, till provoked by continual op

preffions;

preffions; no man indeed can then anfwer where the madness of the people will stop.

As to the fecond part of the objection, Whether the people of England, convened by their own authority, upon King James's precipitate departure, had power to

alter the fucceffion?

IN anfwer to this, I think it is manifeft from the practice of the wifeft nations, and who seem to have had the truest notions of freedom, that when a prince was laid afide for male-adminiftration, the nobles and people, if they thought it neceffary for the public weal, did refume the administration of the fupreme power, (the power itself having been always in them), and did not only alter the fucceffion, but often the very form of government too; because they believed there was no natural right in one man to govern another, but that all was by inftitution, force, or confent. Thus, the cities of Greece, when they drove out their tyrannical kings, either chofe others from a new family, or abolished the kingly government, and became free states. Thus the Romans, upon the expulfion of Tarquin, found it inconvenient for them to be fubject any longer to the pride, the luft, the cruelty, and arbitrary will of fingle perfons; and therefore, by general confent, entirely altered the whole frame of their government. Nor do I find the proceedings of either, in this point. to have been condemned by any hiftorian of the fucceeding ages.

BUT a great deal hath been already faid by other writers upon this invidious and beaten fubject; therefore I fhall let it fall; tho' the point is commonly mistaken, efpecially by the lawyers; who, of all others, feem least to understand the nature of government in general; like under-workmen, who are expert enough at making a fingle wheel in a clock, but are utterly ignorant how to adjust the several parts, or regulate the movements.

To return, therefore, from this digreffion: It is a church-of-England man's opinion, that the freedom of a nation confifts in an abfolute unlimited legislative power, wherein the whole body of the people are fairly reprefented, and in an executive duly limited; becaufe on this fide likewife there may be dangerous degrees, and a very ill extreme. For when two parties in a ftate are Ꮓ

pretty

pretty equal in power, pretenfions, merit, and virtue, (for thefe two laft are, with relation to parties and a court, quite different things), it hath been the opinion of the beft writers upon government, that a prince ought not in any fort to be under the guidance or influence of either; because he declines, by this means, from his office of prefiding over the whole, to be the head of a party; which, befides the indignity, renders him anfwerable for all public mifmanagements, and the confe quences of them; and in whatever state this happens, there must either be a weakness in the prince or miniftry, or else the former is too much reftrained by the nobles, or those who reprefent the people.

To conclude: A church-of-England man may, with prudence and a good confcience, approve the profeffed principles of one party more than the other, according as he thinks they beft promote the good of church and ftate; but he will never be swayed by paffion or intereft to advance an opinion, merely because it is that of the party he most approves; which one fingle principle he looks upon as the root of all our civil animofities. To enter into a party, as into an order of friars, with fo refigned an obedience to fuperiors, is very unfuitable both with the civil and religious liberties we fo zealoufly affert. Thus the understandings of a whole fenate are often inflaved by three or four leaders on each fide; who, inftead of intending the public weal, have their hearts wholly fet upon ways and means how to get or to keep employments. But, to fpeak more at large, how has this fpirit of faction mingled itself with the mafs of the people, changed their nature and manners, and the very genius of the nation? broke all the laws of charity, neighbourhood, alliance and hofpitality, deftroyed all ties of friendship, and divided families against themselves? And no wonder it should be fo, when, in order to find out the character of a perfon, instead of inquiring whether he be a man of virtue, honour, piety, wit, good fenfe, or learning; the modern question is only, Whether he be a Whig or a Tory? under which terms all good and ill qualities are included.

Now, because it is a point of difficulty to chufe an exact middle between two ill extremes, it may be worth

inquiring,

inquiring, in the prefent cafe, which of these a wife and good man would rather feem to avoid. Taking therefore their own good and ill characters, with due abatements and allowances for partiality and paffion, I should think, that, in order to preserve the conftitution entire in church and state, whoever hath a true value for both, would be fure to avoid the extremes of Whig for the fake of the former, and the extremes of Tory on account of the latter.

I have now faid all that I could think convenient upon so nice a subject, and find I have the ambition common with other reasoners, to wish at least that both parties may think me in the right; which would be of fome ufe to thofe who have any virtue left, but are blindly drawn into the extravagancies of either, upon falfe reprefentations, to ferve the ambition or malice of defigning men, without any prospect of their own. But if that is not to be hoped for, my next wifh fhould be, that both might think me in the wrong; which I would understand as an ample juftification of myself, and a fure ground to believe, that I have proceeded at least with impartiality, and perhaps with truth.

1

244

A PROPOSAL humbly offered to the PAR-
LIAMENT, for the more effectual prevent-
ing the further growth of POPERY.

With the defcription and ufe of the ECCLESIA-
STICAL THERMOMETER.

Very proper for all families.

Infani fanus nomen ferat, æquus iniqui,
Ultra quam fatis eft, virtutem fi petat ipfam.

HOR.

HAVING, with great forrow of heart, obferved

the increase of Popery among us of late years, and how ineffectual the penal laws and ftatutes of this realm have been, for near forty years last past, towards reclaiming that blind and deluded people from their errors, notwithstanding the good intentions of the legiflators, and the pious and unwearied labours of the many learned divines of the established church, who have preached to them without ceafing, altho' hitherto without fuccefs:

HAVING alfo remarked, in his Grace's fpeech to both houfes of parliament, moft kind offers of his Grace's good offices, towards obtaining fuch further laws as shall be thought neceffary towards bringing home the faid wandering heep into the fold of the church ; as alfo a good difpofition in the parliament to join in the laudable work, towards which every good Proteftant ought to contribute at least his advice: I think it a proper time to lay before the public a scheme which was writ fome years fince, and laid by to be ready on a fit occafion.

THAT whereas the feveral penal laws and ftatutes now in being against Papists, have been found ineffectual, and rather tend to confirm than reclaim men from their errors, as, calling a man coward, is a ready way to make him fight; it is humbly propofed,

I. That