but the whole taken together, and improved to the highest pitch of perfection it will admit. What fuits any lower degrees only, it is evident cannot be the proper happiness of that creature.

And hence it will follow, that nothing can be the proper object of enjoyment, except what is every way commensurate to the capacity and duration of that being whose happiness is made to consist in it, so as at the fame time to fatisfy all the wants, cravings, and desires, the highest improvement the constitution admits of, and to continue at least as long as that shall stand. If any defires or wants are left unsatisfied, it embitters all other enjoyments; and if the object of enjoyment is loft, the mifery is infupportable.

It appears likewife, that no object, however otherwise qualified, can furnish out fuch folid fatisfaction as is required to conftitute any thing near happiness, without an entire property in it, and fuch poffeffion of it, as one can have free accefs at all times to the enjoyment of: And as there is but one object in the universe of beings that can admit multitudes partners, without diminishing either the intereft or

enjoyment

enjoyment of every individual, the happinefs of those forts of beings must be very low and precarious, who, either from the neceffity of their conftitution, or a very ill-judged choice, are led to pitch upon any thing below the favour and friendship of the all-fufficient being. Every creature we know of, unless it is the light of the heavens, is capable of being ingroffed by a few; or at least must be divided, and fo parcelled out, as that one fhall want just as much as another poffeffes: and as they are but small parcels of fublunary goods that can fall to any one's fhare, the attainment will fcarce balance the labour of the purfuit; and the uneafiness arifing from his wants, will more than outweigh what he poffeffes; and thus, by marring the enjoyment, deftroy his happiness.

ESSAY II.

Of the Human Conftitution and Capacity, arifing upon the proper improvement of it.

T

O make any thing near a just estimate of human happiness, one must be,

in

in the first place, furnished with the proper knowledge of his capacity and power, what fort of objects he can take in, and what advantage he can make by them; or, which is nearly the fame, what measures of perfection he is limited and confined to by his frame and conftitution: and therefore the first step one has to take, who propofes to do any thing to the purpose in these inquiries, muft be, to acquaint himfelf with the human conftitution, and the feveral degrees of improvement it may admit of. That is the first part, and the very foundation of that knowledge of one's felf, which has been allowed by the wifeft masters the proper bufinefs of mankind; and without which, it is impoffible to make any thing of the most useful knowledge, but error and confufion.

There are only two direct ways of attaining this neceffary piece of knowledge; an immediate intuitive perception of every thing belonging to the conftitution itfelf; or, where that cannot be had, fuch a narrow examination of those qualities and powers which fall under our obfervation, as may lead us up to the best views we can attain, of the fprings from which they flow.

flow. The first of these is so much above our prefent abilities, or at leaft goes fo short a way, and the other fo laborious, and requiring fo much accurate obfervation and attention, that few are able to make any thing of either. Whence the bulk of mankind are driven, either to quit the purfuit, or betake themselves to a third; which is commonly reckoned by philofophers an indirect way, that of authority and testimony: and perhaps even those who value themselves moft on their impartial inquiries, are more influenced by it than they are willing to cwn, or perhaps themselves believe. A wife man will make use of all the helps he can call in; and as the most extensive genius cannot pretend to take in every particular with infallible exactness, one much below him may poffibly difcover, and even rectify, some of his mistakes, without any affront to his fuperior understanding.

There is one thing, I cannot help obferving, has contributed very much to difcourage ordinary people from this useful study: It is that myfterious air of learning, and profound fcience, which fpeculative and fcholaftic writers fcatter over their perform

VOL. I.

E

performances on thefe fubjects, as if they fcorned to fay the most common and familiar things in a way that any but philofophers fhould understand. Certain it is, that there is not any one thing in the fubject itself, but what falls as directly under the obfervation of a man of the plainest understanding, as of the profoundest philofopher, abating perhaps fome refinements, which no man living can ever comprehend. We propose, therefore, as much as poffible, to avoid every thing that lies out of the common road; and endeavour to point out what every man may, by a little reflection on himself, bring to the only teft of truth, obfervation and experience; and from thefe attempt to gather up fuch an account of the human conftitution, as may fatisfy any plain man where he is to look for his happiness.

Man is evidently a compounded being, made up of a great variety of parts; and thefe of very different natures, and fuited to produce very different effects, and accordingly to anfwer very different purpofes. All these have been long reduced to two general heads; known, or rather talked of, under the names of body and

foul,