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CHAPTER XI

THE SUMTER AND PICKENS TRUCE

HA

AVING briefly grouped together the more important measures of defense adopted by the Cabinet régime, we must recapitulate the events already described, namely: the firing on the Star of the West and her retreat; Anderson's threat of retaliation and his failure to keep it; Governor Pickens's demand for the surrender of Sumter and Anderson's refusal; Anderson's proposal to refer the question to Washington and the Governor's acceptance; and finally the departure of the two messengers, who arrived in Washington on the evening of January 13. The Star of the West had returned to New York; and the commander of the unfortunate expedition was on the same day writing his official report.

Colonel I. W. Hayne, the Governor's envoy, called on President Buchanan on the following day, the 14th. The President, doubtless already fully informed by Anderson's messenger, appears to have made no difficulty about receiving him in an "informal and unofficial" interview; he declined, however, to hold any conversation with him, and insisted that their transactions must be in writing. Colonel Hayne thereupon gave him notice that he "bore a

CHAP. XI.

1861.

CHAP. XI. letter from the Governor of South Carolina in regard to the occupation of Fort Sumter," and that he would deliver it the next day.

Hayne to Jan. 31, 1961.

Buchanan,

House Report, No. 91. Select Committee of

Five. 2d

Session,

gress, p. 64.

Pickens to

Buchanan,

Remembering the advantage he had hitherto derived from his tone of audacity, Governor Pickens 36th Con- persevered in the use of this favorite and usually successful weapon. "I have determined to send to you the Hon. I. W. Hayne, the Attorney-General of South Carolina, and have instructed him to demand the delivery of Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charleston to the constituted authorities of the State of South Carolina. The demand I have made of Major Anderson, and which I now make of you, is suggested because of my earnest desire to avoid the bloodshed which a persistence in your attempt to retain possession of that fort will cause and which will be unavailing to secure to you that possession." Such was the language of the Governor's letter to the President, adding at the close that South Carolina would account for the value of the fort. It had been the unremitting effort of the conspirators to reduce the controversy to a question of dollars and cents, and in this they were much encouraged by the language of the President himself, who in his reply to the rebel commissioners had placed his action on to the Com- no higher grounds than that it was his "duty to D: defend Fort Sumter as a portion of the public property of the United States."

Jan. 12, 1861.

Ibid., p. 70.

Buchanan

missioners, Dec. 31, 1860.

W. R. Vol.

L., p. 118.

Meanwhile the occurrences at Charleston and Hayne's mission had been the subject of a conference by the Senators from the Cotton States yet in Washington. Not anticipating a reënforcement of Sumter, but trusting in the peaceful consummation of their scheme of secession, they had determined,

Yulee to
Finigan,

Jan. 7, 1861.

W. R. Vol.

I, p. 443.

in a caucus on January 5, " that the States should CHAP. XI. go out at once and provide for an early organization of a confederate government not later than 15th February," while they themselves proposed to remain in Congress until the 4th of March to "keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied," and defeat hostile legislation. But events were crowding them. They had not entirely succeeded in keeping "the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied." Reënforcement had been attempted despite their vigilance and intrigue. A second effort might succeed. Thompson had been driven out of the Cabinet. And now Governor Pickens's rashness was about to precipitate hostilities and rouse the North. They sent a messenger to Colonel Hayne to remonstrate against this hot haste, which might expose their web of conspiracy to the shock of sudden war. They desired delay until they could consult more fully, and devise further means to "keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied."

Colonel Hayne, having readily joined in their scheme, did not deliver the Governor's letter to the President as he had appointed. Instead thereof, and on the same day, ten of the Senators from the States of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, and Texas prepared an open letter to Colonel Hayne. In diplomatic phrases they requested him to delay the delivery of the Governor's letter to the President. They had assurances, they said, that Sumter was held with no hostile or unfriendly purpose, but "merely as property of the United States." "We represent States," they continued, "which have already seceded from the United States, or will have done so before the 1st of February next, and

Hayne to Buchanan,

Jan. 31,1861. port, No. 91. 36th Con

House Re

2d Session,

gress, pp. 64, 65.

CHAP. XI. Which will meet your State in convention on or before the 15th of that month. Our people feel that they have a common destiny with your people, and expect to form with them, in that convention, a new confederation and provisional government. We must and will share your fortunes-suffering with you the evils of war, if it cannot be avoided, and enjoying with you the blessings of peace if it can be preserved. . . We therefore trust that an arrangement will be agreed upon between you and the President, at least till the 15th of February next, by which time your and our States may in convention devise a wise, just, and peaceable solution of existing difficulties. . . If not clothed with power to make such an arrangement, then we trust that you will submit our suggestions to the Governor of your State for his instructions. Until you have received and communicated his response to the President, of course your State will not attack Fort Sumter, and the President will not offer to reënforce it."

Wigfall and

others to

Hayne,

Jan. 15, 1861.

House Re

port, No. 91.

2d Session, 36th Congress, p. 58.

This letter was written on January 15, and to give an air of deliberation and dignity to a correspondence invented purely for the purpose of consuming time, two days were allowed to elapse for its pretended consideration. On the 17th Colonel Hayne prepared a reply. "I am not clothed with power to make the arrangement you suggest," he wrote, "but provided you can get assurances with which you are entirely satisfied, that no reënforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that public peace will not be disturbed by any act of hostility towards South Carolina, I will refer your communication to the authorities. . . If your

proposition is acceded to you may assure the President that no attack will be made on Fort Sumter until a response from the Governor of South Carolina has been received and communicated to him." A plain evidence that this whole correspondence was nothing but a scheme of delay is afforded in the fact that it took these Senators two days more (until January 19) to write a note of half a dozen lines, submitting it to the President, and asking its consideration. Mr. Buchanan fell easily into the trap of dilatory diplomacy. Though undoubtedly bound by Anderson's truce of the 12th, of which he received notice on the 13th, he could, according to its terms, have ended it by a return messenger to Charleston. The Cabinet was apparently in a mood to send a second relief expedition and reënforce Sumter at all hazards; for Secretary Black in a forcible letter of inquiry to General Scott asked on January 16:

What obstacles exist to prevent the sending of such reënforcements at any time when it may be necessary to do so? . . . Major Anderson has a position so nearly impregnable that an attack upon him at present is wholly improbable and he is supplied with provisions which will last him very well for two months.

In the meantime Fort Sumter is invested on every side by the avowedly hostile forces of South Carolina. It is in a state of siege... If the troops remain in Fort Sumter without any change in their condition, and the hostile attitude of South Carolina remains as it is now, the question of Major Anderson's surrender is one of time only. . . The authorities of South Carolina are improving every moment, and increasing their ability to prevent reënforcement every hour, while every day that rises sees us with a power diminished to send in the requisite relief. . . I am persuaded that the difficulty of relieving Major Anderson has been very much magnified

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