CHAP. II. into any free State, lay his hand upon whomsoever he might claim and carry him away into bondage. He was to be his own officer, and his own judge and jury.

It is painfully in evidence that at that day judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court was still under the influence of strong pro-slavery sentiment. In the long opinions of the court and individual judges, the master's right to slave property is continually treated as of higher constitutional concern than any black man's right to personal liberty. In declaring the owner's right to seize and remove his slave under the constitutional provision that persons held to service or labor "shall be delivered up," no mention is made of that other equally binding constitutional provision, that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. It is not surprising that this dictum created a profound reaction; and a significant legislative movement followed in the free States. In varying forms, such laws as had to some extent been framed to aid the claimant were repealed, and others enacted having for their sole object the protection of free citizens of color, either by agency of the writ of habeas corpus or by prohibiting officers and citizens of the State from lending any assistance in the capture of fugitive slaves, either under the act of Congress or voluntarily. But, in most instances, these laws in express terms disavowed any intention to impair or interfere with the owner's constitutional right of property; they simply threw him back upon his Federal rights and resources. As the Virginia kidnapers were the cause of the first fugitive-slave law, so

this Supreme Court decision was the cause of the first personal liberty bills.

СНАР. ІІ.

Under this condition of affairs, there came on the great slavery agitation of 1850, and, as one phase of that controversy, the South demanded a new and more effective fugitive-slave law. Since 1793 the difficulties were aggravated in all directions. Pro-slavery sentiment and antislavery sentiment were both more intense and more uncompromising. There were more slaves in the slave States to escape and more free blacks in the free States liable to unlawful seizure. The master's authority had been increased by the Supreme Court decision while his resources were diminished by State legislation. Upon the controverted question whether State authority or Federal authority ought to act, there were as sharp differences in the South as in the North. On the question of violating or executing the Constitution, the debates showed that in the past one section had transgressed about as much and obeyed about as much as the other section. The fundamental question, however, remained. Should the person claimed be fairly tried? Mr. Webster proposed an amendment, that he should have a jury trial at the place where he was arrested. Mr. Clay reported in favor June, 1850, of a jury trial at the place he fled from. As between these two propositions the issue was tersely summarized by Mr. Winthrop: "It must always be a question," said he, "whether such a person be your slave, or whether he be our freeman. Now, whether he be your slave might be a question very proper to be tried by a jury of the vicinage, and to be decided on the spot where

"Globe,"

p. 1111. Ibid., May 8, 1850,

p. 946.

Appendix, Aug.19,1850,

p. 1585.

CHAP. II. the professed owner resides; but whether he be our freeman would seem to be a question which, upon the very same principle, should be tried where he is seized, and where the immediate Globe," liberty which he enjoys is about to be taken away from him." But Mr. Mason, representing the more ultra Southern view, opposed any jury trial and insisted on summary proceedings. This view prevailed, and the act which finally passed, besides denying jury trial, contained certain other harsh features that made it peculiarly obnoxious to antislavery citizens and communities; and while it increased the claimant's facilities for recapture, also greatly intensified the public opinion of the free States against the law.

This new fugitive-slave act was mainly the work of Mr. Mason, of Virginia,—a man of intolerant pro-slavery views, and afterwards a conspicuous secession conspirator,- and appears to have been passed with but slight discussion, the attention of Congress being centered upon other, and at the moment more absorbing, features of the compromise measures of 1850. It passed the Senate, August 23, by a vote of 27 to 12, and the House, on the 12th of September, by a vote of 109 to 76; and was approved on the 18th of September by President Fillmore.

The act provided that all United States commissioners, concurrently with judges of United States courts, should have authority to issue warrants for the arrest of fugitive slaves, which warrants should be served by marshals or deputy marshals, or the commissioners might appoint suitable persons to execute the warrants or process

issued by them; to cause fugitives to be arrested and brought before them; to hear and determine the case of the claimant in a summary manner, and upon satisfactory proof, by deposition and affidavit of the identity of the fugitive and that the person arrested owed the service or labor alleged and had escaped, to make out and deliver to such claimant, his agent or attorney, a certificate of the facts. The fugitive might thereupon be taken back, or the commissioner might cause him to be taken back to the State or place whence he fled. The testimony of the alleged fugitive was not admitted in evidence. Rescuing or concealing such fugitive, or hindering his capture, or aiding his escape, directly or indirectly, was punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment not exceeding six months, with civil damages to the party injured of one thousand dollars for each fugitive so lost; and the officers were authorized "to summon and call to their aid the bystanders or posse comitatus of the proper county," who were "hereby commanded to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this law." The commissioner should receive a fee of ten dollars when he delivered the fugitive, and only five dollars "in case where the proof shall not, in the opinion of such commissioner, warrant such certificate and delivery," and the certificate should prevent all molestation of persons removing the fugitive "by any process issued by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person whomsoever"; also that the claimant might seize and arrest a fugitive and take him before the commissioner or court without process.

CHAP. II.

CHAP. II.

It was argued with much warmth that this act virtually offered the commissioner a bribe to return the fugitive. That it violated four different provisions of the Constitution of the United States, namely: The VIIth Amendment, which prescribes that in suits at common law, when the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; the Vth Amendment, that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law; the IVth Amendment, that the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated; and Section IX. of Article I., that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when in case of rebellion and invasion the public safety may require it.

Aside from the denial of trial by jury, the other feature of the fugitive-slave law of 1793 embodied only such legal principles as applied to the recovery of other property. The whole labor of the recovery was put upon the claimant or his hired or voluntary help; he was obliged himself to seize his runaway slave, just as he was obliged himself to seize his runaway horse. That law forced no one to assist him; it only required that no one should hinder him. But the new law compelled every citizen of a free State, when summoned to do so, to become a slave-catcher for the claimant, under penalty of fine and imprisonment. No wonder that the dignity and humanity of respectable citizens of the North revolted at the idea of being forced to do what a judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, though himself a zealot in enforcing the law, fitly chronicles as "a most danger