metaphysical. It happens, we believe, to almost every man of a vigorous intellect, at some period of his life, and generally very early, to feel considerable curiosity respecting the nature of his faculties, and the modes of exercising them; to arrest the progress of his thoughts, for the purpose of contemplating them more accurately: to consider, with some anxiety, the manner of his existence; what it is he means when he speaks of his ideas, thoughts, sentiments; what life is; what is death; what time, what eternity; what space, and matter, and motion? Good men, who discern, or who fancy they discern, the dangers attending such speculations, may warn the young and inquisitive; but it is impossible for those who have a glimpse of light to rest contentedly in darkness; and surely it is more rational fairly to ascertain, by a well-directed course of inquiry, what can be known respecting these things, and what must remain hidden, than to suffer the mind to run out into every sort of vagrant theory, or sink, after a few excursions, into that senseless scepticism which is really the refuge of indolence, not the resting place of manly thought and candid investigation.

It is not enough considered, how useful it is for us to be acquainted with the real limits of our knowledge. A celebrated French writer thought he

*Mons. Voltaire.-It has been the fashion of late, with the Edinburgh Reviewers, when this name is mentioned, to couple it with the great," "the illustrious," or some such highsounding epithet. We really think this not in very good taste. There is an appearance of a little sectarian eagerness, in such a

paid a high compliment to Mr. Locke, in saying that he was the Hercules who had fixed the boundaries of the human understanding." Surely it is something, indeed it is by no means a little matter, that we are no longer in danger of straining our faculties, and wasting our time, in researches respecting general essences, substantial forms, and the like unintelligible jargon. In common life, and conversation also, not to say in books, how many foolish sentences, which are thought wise by those who utter them, would be saved, if men were more generally persuaded, that, when they talk of abstract ideas, they use words without a meaning; that, superabundance of encomium. Voltaire was justly eminent as a poet and a wit; he was an entertaining historian; and as far as his philosophy extended, (for he was not profound in any science, though he had an insight into all,) he was sound and clear-headed. The vivacity of his parts, and variety of his attainments, entitle him to be considered as an extraordinary man; but it is very questionable whether he deserves the character of a great man. The unjust treatment he experienced in early life is some excuse for his prejudices against religion during that period; but what apology can be offered for the miserable. and devoted fury with which he persecuted Christianity during all his later years? Or what shall we say of the temper, wisdom, and enlargement of a philosopher, who could see no distinction between the blind bigotry of a popish establishment, and that pure, practical, and benign spirit which breathes through every page of the New Testament? If Voltaire had shewn half the ignorance and temerity in any branch of philosophical discussion, with which his strictures on the Holy Scriptures are justly chargeable, we suspect the votes of our northern brethren would have been more divided than they appear to be, respecting his merits.

when they speak of images impressed on the sensorium, they neither understand themselves, nor enable any body else to understand them; and that, though they should dispute about mind and matter from the cock-crow till the curfew, they have not, in reality, the least acquaintance with the one or the other. These things, and many like them, have been taught us by the men who have inquired into the origin of our knowledge, the least useful part unquestionably of metaphysical science; yet, unprofitable as it now appears to us, so curious and inviting as to have attracted the full attention of some of the most powerful understandings that have appeared in modern Europe.

But the advantages which belong to the study of the philosophy of the mind, are not merely negative. Not to mention the hints that have been obtained from the researches of metaphysicians for the judicious management of the understanding, and the more perfect lights which may be anticipated from their future labours, this science borders so closely upon others of the most unquestionable importance, that some insight into it seems necessary for the perfect understanding of subjects which nobody thinks himself at liberty to despise. Its connection with physics is so close, that the ancient writers classed them together, or rather, considered the philosophy of mind as a part of the philosophy of nature. Of philology at least one half, and that the most important half, is strictly metaphysical. In morals the case is so nearly similar, that a man

might as reasonably entitle himself a learned physician though he had never studied anatomy, as esteem himself an adept in moral science without having obtained an intimate acquaintance with the affections, passions, and sentiments of the human heart. Indeed, all moral writers must be, in a greater or less degree, metaphysical; though, to be sure, it must be owned that all metaphysical writers have not been very moral. Politics, which profess to regard only the external condition of mankind, have perhaps less connection with inquiries concerning the mind, than the sciences already mentioned; yet every body has doubtless heard of political metaphysics and though we should have no objection to admit that the questions in that department which have occasioned the most eager cóntroversies are, for the most part, frivolous; yet, so long as there are foolish men who will insist upon discussing them, it is exceedingly proper that there should be wise men sufficiently prepared to discuss them also. Lastly, in theology, the most important and interesting of all studies to an immortal and accountable being, who is there that is not sensible of the value of metaphysical knowledge in conducting us through the great questions of predestination, election, and free agency? What violence have some Calvinistic divines done to the common sense and feelings of mankind, what perilous approaches to practical Antinomianism have they sometimes made, in the stiff, unqualified, and really unphilosophical statement of their favourite doctrines! What mere

verbal frivolities, what contradictory propositions, and, sometimes, what dangerous errors and heresies have some Arminian writers fallen into, from their ignorance of the difficulties which unquestionably embarras their tenets respecting the will.

There is another view in which the value of the metaphysics deserves to be considered; we mean, in respect of the discipline they afford to the understanding. In the English universities, the certain sciences are those which alone have been employed in the institution of youth. In a neighbouring realin, young minds are exercised chiefly in morals, politics, public law, and metaphysics. Far be from us the presumption of deciding which of the two schemes is the most successful; but we have no doubt at all which is, in its principle, the most reasonable. The great objects in the instruction of young persons, so far, at least as intellectual cultivation is regarded, and we suspect even a little further, are, to form their minds to habits of thought at once bold and cautious, patient and discursive; to teach them that the memory is to be the handmaid of the understanding, not the mistress; to instil an ardent curiosity and thirst of knowledge, yet to accustom them at the same time to estimate their progress rather by the value and accuracy, than by the apparent extent of their acquirements. For these purposes, perhaps for every purpose of intellectual institution, those sciences in which the evidence is only probable, possess manifest advantages over those in which it is demonstrative; and, among