"when nothing will remain but the original

atoms, and infinite fpace."

Epicurus abfolutely denied all wisdom in the conftruction of the univerfe, even in the moft obvious inftances. "The parts of ani"mals," he said, "were not originally framed "for the uses to which they are now applied; "but having been accidentally produced, they

were afterwards accidentally employed. "The eye, for example, was not made for

fecing, nor the ear for hearing; but the foul

being formed within the body, at the same "time with the organs, and connected with "them, could not avoid making ufe of them, "in their respective functions."

Can we attend to these things, and not be ftruck with the truth of the apostle's obfervation in my text, the world by wi'dom knew not God? It was not even able to retain that knowledge of Gud which had been originally communicated to man. And how justly is their cafe described by the fame apostle, in another paffage, where he fays, Rom. i. 21, They became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. But are not their minds equally, or more, darkened, who can prefer the abfurd conceits of thefe philofo

phers,

phers, to the rational doctrines of revelation? We fhall, however, fee more of the wanderings of the human imagination when left to itself, in what I have farther to obferve.

4. The existence of evil always created the greatest difficulty to those who fpeculated concerning the origin and conftruction of the univerfe, and the caufes of events. Indeed, fo difficult is the queftion, that nothing but revelation could have folved it. In the fcriptures we learn that evil, as well as good, is the appointment of the fame great Being, but always for the moft benevolent purpofes. Shall we receive good at the hand of God, fays Job, chap. ii, 10, and fhall we not receive evil? ch. i. 21, The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord. In Isaiah, xlv. 6, 7, I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light, and create darknefs; I make peace, and create evil; I the Lord do all these things. All these evils, in the administration of this greatest and best of Beings, are fubfervient to good, as the Pfalmift says, Pf. xcvii. 1, The Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoice, let the multitude of the ifles be glad thereof. Clouds and darkness are round about bim, righteousness and judgment are the habita

tion of his throne. But through thefe clouds and darkness, the heathens, by the help of their greatest wisdom, could not fee. Some of the ancients, as the Perfians, thought that there were two independent principles in nature, one the author of good, and the other of evil. The good principle they called Oromazes, and the evil Arimanius. The Egyptians alfo worshipped an evil principle under the name of Typhon.

The Greek philofophers in general confidered matter.as the caufe of all evil. In their ancient cofmogonies it is afcribed to chaos. Plato held that "there is in matter a necef

fary but blind and refractory force, from "which arifes a propenfity to diforder and deformity," which he faid, "was the caufe "of all the imperfection which is found in "the works of God;" fo that he appears to have thought that matter, from its nature, refifts the will of the fupreme artificer, fo that, on this account, he cannot perfectly execute his designs. Plato was alfo influenced by the argument from contraries. "It cannot be," he faid, "that evil fhould be deftroyed; for "there must always be fomething contrary "to good."

The

The Stoics faid that "evil was the neceffary confequence of eternal neceffity, to " which the great whole, comprehending both "God and matter, was fubject." When Chryfippus was asked whether diseases were to be ascribed to divine providence, he replied, that "it was not the intention of nature that "these things fhould happen, nor were they "conformable to the will of the Author of "nature, and the Parent of all good; but that "in framing the world, fome inconvenience "had adhered by neceflary confequence to his "wife and useful plan."

How different is this from the fublime doctrine of the fcriptures on this fubject, as when we read, Pfalm cxxxv. 23, I know that the Lord is great, and that our Lord is above all gods. Whatever the Lord pleased that did he in heaven and in earth, in the feas, and all deep places.

5. It is in vain that we look for the rational and fublime doctrine of an univerfal providence among the philofophers of antiquity. But according to the 1criptures, there is no event, great or small, but what comes to país according to the will of God. Dan. ii. 20, Blessed be the name of God for ever and ever; for wisdom

and

and might are his. He changeth the times and Seasons, he removeth kings and fetteth up kings. The proud king of Affyria, in the midst of his conquefts, is reprefented, If. x. 5, as the Staff in the hand of God. At the fame time we are affured by our Saviour, Mat. x. 33, that a fparrow falleth not to the ground without his will, and that the very hairs of our heads are numbered. And this is true philofophy, for fo connected are all the parts of the fyftem, that the smallest things are as neceffary as the greateft, and in many cafes we cannot but fee that the greatest things depend upon the fmalleft. Voltaire juftly obferves that had a particular ftone been thrown with a little more force, it would have given a different turn to the whole hiftory of the Eaft. It was a ftone by which Mahomet was knocked down, as he was engaged in battle, but not killed.

There is most of the appearance of the doctrine of a providence among the Stoics. But according to Zeno and Chryfippus, "there

is in nature a fate, or an eternal and immutable feries of caufes and effects, within "which all events are included, and to which "the Deity himself is fubject," though the later Stoics, who wrote after the promulga